How the Luhansk region turned from a “golden action” into a “wolf ticket”: a conversation with the author of the book “Post-Luhansk Region” Andriy Zaitsev (continued)

We continue to communicate with the author of the book “Post-Luhansk Region” Andrii Zaitsev. We are talking about the uniqueness of the region, the events of the turning point in 2014, the historical canon of perception of the eastern regions of Ukraine, post-history and stereotypes that need to be destroyed.

Read the first part of our material link.

Oblast-commune

Mr. Andriy, what do you see as the uniqueness of Luhansk region?

For me, it has always been and remains a unique region, which I call the “region-commune”. This is not a label or an assessment, but simply an attempt to understand how her character was historically formed. If the Donetsk region is a “corporation region” with its rigid integration, and the Dnipro region is a “clan region” with its inherent system of family ties, then Luhansk developed differently. Its logic was based on more decentralized foundations, on communal principles of coexistence.

It is important for me to show that Luhansk is not only about tragic events or stereotypes. This is a region with its own ideology and logic of development, which does not contradict the general Ukrainian idea. Yes, we have our own specifics, our challenges. But that doesn’t make us worse.

I am writing about this because I am convinced that understanding such nuances helps to create a more complete picture. Modern books that describe history are the basis for the future. They record events, give them an assessment and form the political background on which the future can be built. And in this process, Luhansk Region should sound confident and dignified.

You mention Borys Grinchenko as a prominent figure in the context of Ukrainian state-building. And are there any mentions in your research of other outstanding persons connected with Luhansk Region who played a significant role in the formation of modern Ukraine?

Yes, in the book I mention people who made an important contribution to the development of Ukrainian statehood, and among them there are those who come from Luhansk region or whose activities were closely related to this region. In particular, this is Mykola Rudenko, a prominent Ukrainian dissident, head of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, as well as Ivan and Nadiya Svitlychnyi, who were repressed for their pro-Ukrainian views in the 1960s. These people were ideological leaders, martyrs, and their contribution is difficult to overestimate. However, my main focus was on the 90s.

Regarding politicians such as Yefremov, Tikhonov and other deputies who were elected from Luhansk Oblast, their contribution to the development of the modern Ukrainian state can certainly be assessed in different ways. And this is a difficult question, which each reader must solve independently after reading the book. I, for example, believe that Tikhonov really actively developed the ideas of local self-government and conveyed them to high-ranking officials, in particular to Kuchma. One such aspect was the idea of ​​a bicameral parliament

And federalization?

Yes, and when we talk today about federalization or about possible secessions, we need to understand that this did not appear in a vacuum. Such an idea had prerequisites, and I try to explain these prerequisites in my book. The people who later came to be known as separatists did not just spring up for no reason. And that is why it is important that this is not perceived as an attempt to justify their activities, but one cannot simplistically say that this is just “treason”. Instead, we have to look at all of these issues from a historical and socio-political perspective to understand why this was possible.

When someone says: “Give Luhansk and Donetsk regions, why do we need these separatists”, this question is much more complicated than it seems at first glance. Such statements are often based on dogmas and cemented stereotypes that form a closed circle of thinking from which it is difficult to break out.

Like the question of the so-called “separatists”, for which there are no simple answers, this is part of a deeper problem. A logical question arises: what are we fighting for then? And although you can try to find an explanation for why this happened, these explanations will always be complex and multifaceted. They will require taking into account historical, political and social factors, without which the situation cannot be fully understood.

The stage of the post-history of Luhansk Oblast

And what does the prefix “post” mean in the title of your book?

The prefix “post” reflects the situation in which Luhansk Region found itself after the occupation. When we talk about “post-history”, we mean that today the reality of Luhansk Region is not clearly defined. This is the territory where the processes that are usually considered vital – social, economic, political – have actually stopped. Occupiers and collaborators only simulate activity, but nothing actually happens. Luhansk region is now in such a state that it can be compared to a corpse dressed in a festive costume, but it is not alive.

This is the period of “post-history” for the region. And although there is no active development in such a situation, the territory continues to exist — and this is also part of the reality that we cannot ignore. In the future, it will be possible to talk about “meta-Luhansk region” or “trans-Luhansk region”, expanding these boundaries to better describe the changes taking place in the region. But at this moment, from a political and social point of view, Luhansk Region has entered a state of post-history, where there is neither forward movement nor going back.

What ensures the factuality of your book?

To ensure factuality, I used data from various official sources. To describe the election processes in Luhansk Oblast, I relied on data from the Central Election Commission and used statistics from the Oblast. The information was also obtained from the website of the regional state administration. All this data is taken from open sources, and it serves as the basis for the conclusions I draw in the book.

The greatest value is precisely the conclusions from these numbers, and not the numbers themselves. In addition, I used elements of oral histories in the book, which makes it possible to better convey people’s experiences, their stories and experiences.

Oral history is a currently popular method in European historiography…

Yes, I tried to use the most modern historical research tools to collect and analyze the material.

Photo: IA “FACT”

How long have you been collecting this data?

I have been collecting materials all my life. This is a constant process that has always been in sight. Each period of the history of Luhansk region brought new events, which later became part of the big picture. Then Danilov fought someone in Luhansk in the 90s, then Efremov appeared, then Yanukovych became an important figure. Gathering information is a process that never ends. It is constantly ongoing, and even today you can see new pieces of the puzzle being integrated into the overall context.

There are no illustrations in the book. Why did you decide not to use graphics?

As they say, any visualized formula can cut your readership in half. Therefore, I decided not to use graphic elements or any deviation from the main text. Illustrations and graphics can have an unpredictable effect on the reading process, distracting from the main content. My goal is for the reader to fully immerse himself in the text and come to his own conclusions without relying on external visual supports.

An alternative view of the history of the region

Can “Post-Luhansk region” be considered a history textbook?

The book has two main aspects — political and sociological, and not purely historical. I’m not a historian, I’m more of a political scientist, so it’s more important for me not only to describe events, but also to analyze the political processes that took place in Luhansk region and their impact on society. My goal is to understand how these processes shape the reality we live in and how they interact with the political situation in Ukraine as a whole.

The book can be of interest to young people and can be used as a study guide for students of political science majors. Usually, classic manuals are difficult to understand, and my book presents the history of Luhansk region in a funk style. I hope that this story will be interesting to representatives of the entire Ukrainian land, because Luhansk region is also a Ukrainian land. It is important not only for Luhansk Oblast, but also for all of Ukraine, and the perception of Luhansk Oblast in Ukrainian society provides the key to understanding Ukraine itself in the world.

The book demonstrates its own view of events, regarding which a certain historical canon has already formed in society. In particular, it was formed by historians Larisa Yakubova, Stanislav Kulchytskyi, Serhii Plokhii…

At the same time, even the most famous experts can make mistakes, especially in details that relate to regional specifics. For example, Serhiy Plokhiy, a prominent historian of Ukraine with a world name, writes in his writings that the city of Rubizhne is located east of Luhansk. However, in fact, Luhansk is the easternmost Ukrainian city. Only Rostov-on-Don is further east of Luhansk, everything else is further west…

Such inaccuracies do not indicate unprofessionalism, but rather the difficulty of a deep understanding of local history and geography, especially for those who have lived abroad for a long time. However, such “blunders” on the part of leading historians demonstrate how important the participation of local researchers is in the formation of the national historical narrative. They should help avoid mistakes and complement the historical picture with important details that may be invisible to outside researchers.

They say that a good book can be told in one sentence…

“Post-Luhansk region” in one sentence

And what kind of expression is this for “Post-Luhansk Region”?

The essence of my book can be reduced to one question: how did Luhansk region, having the potential to become a “golden stock” in the political and economic processes of Ukraine, turn into a “wolf ticket”?

This question reveals a key idea: Luhansk region could become an intermediary between different regional elites – Donetsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, as well as between the influences of Kyiv and Moscow. It had a chance to play the role of a region that provides balance and gives preference to one side or another, while remaining on pro-Ukrainian positions.

However, this did not happen. Why? Perhaps the Luhansk elites were not skilled enough or simply did not like it. Instead of turning into a “golden share” that could benefit the entire country, Luhansk became a “bear den” — a territory that was often considered problematic and blamed for everything that was happening on the local elites. These elites, in turn, proved to be the weakest of all, finding themselves in conditions where they did not have sufficient resources to influence the situation.

Do you cover the events related to the change of power in 2014 in your book?

So, the third part of the book is devoted to the events that took place from 2014 to 2024. This is the time of the beginning of the Euromaidan in Luhansk, which, by the way, was small in scale. Yaroslav Minkin (Luhansk poet, public figure), Kostiantyn Skorkin (Luhansk political scientist), Kostiantyn Reutsky (Luhansk civil servant) – the nucleus was about 10-20 people.

Then comes the aggravation of the situation in the spring of 2014. In particular, I describe the moment when the building of the regional council was captured for the first time, and the famous Moscow roofer Prokopov climbed onto its roof.

A significant event was the pro-Russian gathering on March 5 near the monument to Taras Shevchenko. It was rather ambiguous. People’s deputy of Ukraine Serhii Struk spoke at this rally. He declared his support for a “united and indivisible Ukraine”, although he, a representative of the “Party of Regions”, was met with whistles and disapproval. The people in the crowd were quite peculiar: many of them had characteristic prison tattoos.

It seems to me that Struck and those who organized these events were quite skilled psychologists. They quickly realized that the situation had radically changed, and within two months these same people radically changed their position, adapting to the new conditions.

However, the important question is another: did those who then went to rallies and voted in the so-called referendum represent the entire Luhansk Region? We will never know. It was probably a small number of people that could not be representative of the entire region.

The key point in this story is that the local elites already saw the influence of Moscow. They understood that the Kremlin works in the long term. This became evident at the beginning of 2015, when most of the field commanders were eliminated. Local politicians, in order to preserve themselves, tried to maneuver between Kyiv and Moscow, but lost this battle as early as March 5, 2014.

From that moment on, the Luhansk elite no longer controlled anything. At the same time, about 80% of the region’s population remained aloof from these events. The question arises: why did these people not come out to defend their interests and the Ukrainian state? Why did they not become active participants in the processes? This is a problem of alienation, a low level of inclusion of the population in political processes. It can be said that on March 5, 2014, the “postluhan era” began. This is the moment when Luhansk Region ceased to be the subject of events and became the object of external influences.

How will the book be distributed? Do you plan to transfer it to libraries?

We have several options for distributing the book. Yes, we will hand it over to libraries so that everyone who wants to have access to “Post-Luhansk region”. We will also distribute copies to opinion leaders, as it is important that this topic is heard and discussed at all levels. On a commercial basis, perhaps a portion of the book will be available for sale to provide funding for further projects. I believe that even if the word “Luhansk region” or “Post-Luhansk region” becomes more prominent in the information space, everyone will benefit from this. This will give a chance to better understand the reality we are facing and to reconnect with this part of Ukraine.