International Day of UN Peacekeepers: Between the Ideal of Peace and the Failures of Reality
Every year on May 29, the world solemnly remembers those who wear a blue helmet. On the International Day of UN Peacekeepers, official speeches are made, flags are waved, and the dead are remembered. This day is designed to pay tribute to those who, according to the ideal, stand between the sides of the conflict, restraining violence and opening the way to peace. However, many voices, especially in countries that have experienced peacekeeping missions on their own soil, today question their effectiveness. Peacekeepers often find themselves between the hammer of political paralysis in the Security Council and the anvil of powerlessness on the ground. And the more the world plunges into hybrid wars and asymmetric conflicts, the louder the question: do these missions remain relevant, or have they become a symbol of diplomatic fatigue? Let’s consider the history of the creation of peacekeeping missions, the logic of their functioning, critical failures, as well as the skepticism that accompanies peacekeeping forces in the 21st century.
UN peacekeeping forces: history of creation, structure and primary goals
United Nations peacekeeping operations arose as a response to the need for international stability in the post-World War II era. Although the UN Charter of 1945 did not explicitly contain the concept of “peacekeeping”, in practice this activity became an important tool for the implementation of the main task of the UN — maintaining international peace and security.
The first precedent that started the peacekeeping practice of the UN was its creation in 1948 Organization of the UN for monitoring the implementation of the terms of the ceasefire (UNTSO), which monitored the truce between Israel and its Arab neighbors after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In addition, the task of the mission was to prevent the escalation of hostilities. It was the first attempt to create an international buffer on the contact line, which became the basis for all subsequent peacekeeping missions. The mission operated without the use of force, was armed only with observation powers, and was seen as an interim mechanism. In 1949, she joined it UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which had similar functions on the Line of Control in Kashmir.
A significant evolution of the concept of peacekeeping took place in 1956 after the Suez crisis. On the initiative of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Lester Pearson, the The first UN emergency peacekeeping force (UNEF I), which was located on the Sinai Peninsula between the Egyptian and Israeli forces. This mission marked the first time that an armed peacekeeping force was deployed, which operated by agreement of the parties, had no right to use force except in self-defense, and performed the functions of demarcation and stabilization.
Although the UN Charter does not contain a separate chapter on peacekeeping, the legal basis for the creation of such missions was a combination of the provisions of Chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes) and Chapter VII (actions in response to threats to the peace). In the practice of the Security Council, this led to the formation of a hybrid model, which is sometimes called “Chapter VI and a half” – a formulation that emphasizes the intermediate nature of peacekeeping operations between classical diplomacy and coercive actions, between a humanitarian mission and a military presence. In the 1960s, missions appeared in the Congo (ONUC), Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the Mediterranean, but each time with a strict limitation: only with the consent of the government, without intervention in the essence of the conflict. The statute did not change, but practice created a new model. And this model remained cautious, avoiding intervention in the depth of the political causes of the war.
The situation changed radically after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the old bipolar system led to a surge in internal conflicts — civil wars, disintegration of states, and ethnic cleansing. And in the new conditions, it became clear that traditional peacekeeping does not work. In the 1990s, so-called complex missions appeared: in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique. They are no longer just fixing a truce, but are engaged in organizing elections, disarmament, the return of refugees, and the restoration of justice. This is not only an armed presence, but an institutional reconstruction. But it was during this period that the UN experienced its deepest moral crises. In 1994 in Rwanda, the peacekeeping contingent did not intervene in the Tutsi genocide, limiting itself to observation. In 1995, in Srebrenica, the Dutch “blue helmets” could not protect thousands of Bosnians, despite the official status of the “security zone”. These failures have forced the world to ask: are peacekeeping missions capable of protecting civilians, or do they exist only to maintain the appearance of stability?
In response to these events at the turn of the 2000s, the UN changed its approach. The concept of “protection of the civilian population” as part of the mandate is emerging. First — in Sierra Leone, then in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Contingents get the right to use force not only for self-defense, but also to prevent violence against the civilian population. But the growth of powers is not accompanied by the growth of resources and political will. In practice, this often means that a few thousand peacekeepers with limited equipment must stop the chaos in areas where the institutions of statehood have been destroyed.
Organization of the UN for monitoring the implementation of the terms of the ceasefire continues to this day, remaining the longest-running UN operation. As of 2025, it includes 380 people, of which 232 are civilians and 148 are military experts. Since 1948, 71 UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed. More than two million people from different countries of the world took part in these missions. In general, more than 4,000 peacekeepers have died in the entire history of UN peacekeeping operations. In 2008, the largest number of deaths in one year was recorded – 132 peacekeepers. It should be noted that the annual budget of UN peacekeepers is usually about 6-7 billion US dollars. As of 2025, the UN is conducting 12 active peacekeeping operations on three continents, involving about 87,000 people in the form of “blue helmets” from 125 countries.
There are currently two peacekeeping missions in Europe. UNFICYP is a mission in Cyprus that has been operating since 1964. It was introduced after inter-ethnic clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The task of the mission is to provide a buffer zone between the parties to the conflict and monitor the observance of the ceasefire. During the decade of the mission’s existence, 183 peacekeepers died. A second European mission, UNMIK in Kosovo, was established in 1999 following an armed conflict between Serbian forces and the Kosovo Albanians. It performs mainly administrative functions, ensuring stability and coordination between local authorities and the international community. During the operation in Kosovo, 56 peacekeepers were killed.
Ukraine has been an active participant in UN peacekeeping missions since 1993. During this time, Ukrainian servicemen took part in 25 peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world. Until 2025, participation is maintained in three missions. The total number of dead Ukrainian peacekeepers as of 2021 is 58, this figure remains unchanged for 2025. Ukrainian peacekeepers operated in such complex regions as the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, where they repeatedly entered combat zones, performing tasks within the framework of UN mandates. Their participation is considered not only as a contribution to international security, but also as a means of strengthening the international authority of Ukraine as a state that supports the principles of peace and collective responsibility.
Does Ukraine need “blue helmets”: the reality of UN peacekeeping missions without illusions
Discussions about placing a UN peacekeeping mission in Ukraine have been going on since 2015, but this initiative has never come close to real implementation. The reason lies not only in the complex political configuration, but also in deep distrust of the effectiveness of the peacekeeping contingents themselves. The historical experience of UN missions in dozens of countries of the world has shown that where peace does not suit at least one of the parties, peacekeepers turn from guarantors of security into witnesses of disaster. Ukraine, which is waging a full-scale war with the regular army of a nuclear state, has the right not to repeat other people’s mistakes.
In many cases, the “blue helmets” not only did not prevent violence, but also found themselves on the sidelines of events that became symbols of international shame. The most high-profile example of this is the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, when Dutch peacekeepers were unable (and in fact unwilling) to stop the ethnic cleansing that killed more than eight thousand Bosnian Muslims. In front of the peacekeepers who were supposed to guard the “security zone”, the city was taken by Serbian troops.
The Dutch commander negotiated with General Mladic while his subordinates were humiliated and taken out at gunpoint. It was not an obstacle to the aggressor, but an open capitulation. And even when it became known about the shootings, the peacekeepers did not take any active actions. Meanwhile, in the nearby town of Zhepa, 79 Ukrainian servicemen from the 240th battalion held off an attack by militants for two weeks, risking their lives and not having heavy weapons. They did not allow a repeat of Srebrenica.
It should be noted that the problem lies not only in individual episodes, but in the very nature of UN peacekeeping missions. Most of them are political compromises with a limited mandate, no right to use force, insufficient equipment and little combat experience. In most cases, military contingents are sent by countries for which participation in missions is a source of income. The UN pays handsomely for each soldier, and for countries like Rwanda, Bangladesh or Pakistan, these funds are crucial to the defense budget. But benefit is not equal to combat capability. For most of these countries, the war in Ukraine is not their war. They have no motivation to take risks, no means of countering drones, missiles and hypersonic artillery. Therefore, holding the line of contact with regular Russian troops is a task that the “blue helmets” simply cannot handle.
This is evidenced by the events of 2024 in Lebanon, where more than 10,000 UNIFIL peacekeepers from various countries did virtually nothing when the Israeli army moved through their locations and pushed them out of their positions. The troops passed by the observation posts, and sometimes they simply physically pushed the peacekeepers off the roads. Israel acted openly, Hezbollah acted for years in parallel, and the UN again recorded but did not intervene. A similar situation is with peacekeepers in the Golan Heights: when the Israeli army took control of additional territory in December 2024, UNDOF peacekeepers did not offer any resistance. Their presence is just a formality that absorbs more than $65 million annually.
Let’s imagine that peacekeeping forces with such functionality will be stationed in Ukraine. Will they be able to stop the column of Russian tanks? Will they deter attacks on energy infrastructure? Will kamikaze drones be intercepted? And most importantly, do they have the political will to act at the moment when it is needed? The answer is obvious: no. Peacekeepers will not stand in the way of war crimes if they do not have the right to use force. Russian units will not be deterred if they do not have clear guarantees of cover from the great powers. And if the mission will act on the basis of consensus with Russia, this means that it will act only where and as the Kremlin allows.
That is why the main threat of the peacekeeping mission for Ukraine is not inaction, but its political consequences. Under the guise of a “de-escalation zone”, a scenario of actual legitimization of the occupation can be implemented. A special status for the ORDLO, elections under machine guns, amnesty for militants, lifting of sanctions from Russia – all this can easily be presented as a “peaceful compromise” if the world gets a convenient formula. For the West, this will be a reason to curtail military aid, for the UN it will be an opportunity to close the stabilization report, for the Kremlin it will be another victory without firing a single shot.
In addition, placing a peacekeeping mission only on the front line without restoring control over the border will deprive Ukraine of even the theoretical possibility of deoccupation. Any attempt to conduct a military operation would be a violation of the mandate. The Ukrainian army will lose the initiative, instead it will gain another subject in the conflict zone — a peacekeeping contingent that is not subordinate to Kyiv, but influences the situation on the ground. In the worst case, he will become a hostage of the situation: his presence will hinder the actions of the Armed Forces, and on the part of the Russian Federation, he will not have any deterrent effect.
From a legal point of view, the introduction of peacekeepers into a zone that Ukraine does not control, without prior deoccupation, will mean recognizing that the state’s sovereignty is partially limited. This will become a precedent that Russia will rely on in international courts. And any control transferred to the UN, without the consent of the Ukrainian parliament, will violate the Constitution. And although the diplomatic language does not speak about it directly, such a scenario will become the basis for freezing the conflict on Moscow’s terms.
Ukraine does not need symbolic missions, it needs guarantees. The only acceptable option is to deploy a contingent at the state border with Russia with a full mandate to block the illegal movement of weapons and personnel. However, this scenario will never be approved by the UN Security Council — Russia has veto power. And therefore, there is almost no chance of creating an effective mission.
Only the format where the international forces act as a guarantor of the ceasefire, rather than a buffer, can be called successful. All other scenarios are a delayed catastrophe, so Ukraine has no right to allow a new Srebrenica to appear on its map. And she must remember: no UN mandate will stop the war unless there is a strong will of political leaders. No “peacekeeper” will protect life if he only has a walkie-talkie and a notebook in his hands.
In general, the history of UN peacekeeping forces is a history of contradictions. The idea of a global presence for peace arose out of a post-war belief in collective security, but every time it collides with the reality of political indecision, limited mandate, lack of equipment, finance and unity in the Security Council. Peacekeepers are rarely able to change the very essence of the conflict, their role is often limited to a buffer zone, stabilization or at least prevention of the worst. However, they remain the only formalized international force operating in crisis regions under a legitimate UN mandate. And this legitimacy, despite all its weaknesses, is still an important symbol that the world has not given up trying to keep the war under control.
