China’s Great Game: How Beijing Uses the Conflict in Ukraine for Geopolitical Maneuver and Its Own Gain
In the complex chess game between the West, Russia and China, every move is recorded, but not always publicly. Every year, Russia’s war against Ukraine draws deeper and deeper into itself not only European and American players, but also global forces, whose participation is formally denied. China is a prime example of a state that wants to remain neutral on the surface, while maximizing its own strategic dividends behind the scenes. China has been silent for too long to be considered a fluke, but now that the war is in its fourth year, Beijing is beginning to say aloud what used to remain between the lines of diplomatic notes. The latest statement by China’s top diplomat Wang Yi in Brussels, made during a meeting with the new head of European diplomacy Kaya Callas, became one of the most direct evidences of the two-faced game played by Beijing. In this game, China is not a passive observer, but a judicious player that benefits from prolonging the conflict.
What does China’s declaration of war in Ukraine really mean
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, known in diplomatic circles as an apologist for restraint and streamlined wording, this time deviated from the usual scenario. His statement during a meeting with the new head of European diplomacy, Kaya Callas, in Brussels was not a diplomatic comment, but a demonstration of strategy. According to Wang, China cannot afford Russia’s defeat in the war against Ukraine. This means that the duration of the war is perceived by Beijing not as a threat, but as a window of opportunity. While Washington is engrossed in supporting Kyiv, Beijing is using the space for geopolitical maneuvering without direct confrontation with the US.
This is not an excuse or a tactical statement, but a shift in emphasis in China’s public position. From claims of “neutrality” to admitting that the war benefits him. In the closed part of the negotiations, Wang Yi went even further. In response to the EU’s hints about Beijing’s assistance to the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, he said: “If we helped Russia, the war would already be over.” This phrase has a multi-level structure – on the one hand, it is a denial of direct participation. On the other hand, there is an open signal about the potential that was not used. The implication is clear: if Beijing is holding back, it is not because it cannot, but because it does not yet consider it necessary, it is keeping the situation under control and acting based on its own long-term interests.
It should be noted that China views the war in Ukraine not as an isolated conflict, but as an element of a larger geopolitical configuration. It functions in the system of Chinese strategy as a tool to keep the West in tension. As long as the US is focused on supporting Ukraine, and Europe teeters on the edge of energy and political exhaustion, Beijing is buying time. This resource is used by him both for technological rearmament or internal reforms, and for the expansion of economic, political and diplomatic influence in regions weakened by the conflict.
As you know, the Chinese role in ensuring the viability of the Russian economy is significant. Beijing has become the main partner of the Kremlin in trade, in the supply of equipment and technological components, despite the denial of any participation in the military dimension. It is thanks to these economic ties that Russia retains the ability to continue the war, even under the pressure of sanctions from the West. China, avoiding direct military aid, maintains an image of formal neutrality, while remaining a critical supplier in the shadow supply chain of the Russian military industry.
In this balancing act, the PRC tries to avoid both the excessive strengthening of Russia and its defeat. The scenario of Moscow’s victory creates a risk that Putin will try to reset relations with the West and start acting more autonomously without coordinating steps with Beijing. In turn, the defeat of the Kremlin would mean the return of the United States to a direct confrontation with China without a flanking conflict in Europe. That is why China is not interested in any decision that would lead the war out of the phase of controlled escalation.
Beijing’s position regarding possible negotiations between Russia and the USA follows from this logic. China does not want Moscow to seek separate agreements with Washington behind Beijing’s back. Such a separate agreement could be the beginning of a restructuring of the global balance without the participation of China – and this is exactly what Beijing is trying to prevent.
China acts as an empire that chooses only those tools that work for its long-term goal: asserting its influence without direct military intervention. His interests in Russia are large-scale, deep and systemic. Ukraine, from the Chinese perspective, is not an entity with which to build a strategic model. Therefore, there are no expectations regarding a change in the Chinese position in favor of Kyiv, and there cannot be – except in the case of dramatic changes in the geopolitical schedule.
Given the current signals from Beijing, a change in China’s position towards Russia is possible only under one condition: if the war turns into a threat to Beijing itself, for example, in the event of a sharp increase in American pressure or an attempt by the US to conclude a favorable agreement with Moscow. Until then, China will maintain a complex posture of distanced engagement, backed by a sober, calculated interest in a protracted conflict.
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, after another large-scale attack by Shahed-type kamikaze drones, a component manufactured in China and supplied to Russia recently was discovered. This was announced by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Andrii Sybiga. In his statement, he added: “What an irony – on the same night, the building of the Consulate General of China in Odesa was damaged by Russian strikes, although not significantly.”
It should be noted that the Chinese supply scheme has long been adapted to the realities of sanctions control. Parts, chips, navigation systems, batteries — all this enters Russia directly or through Iran and Central Asia. There are no transparent channels, but technologies move unhindered. Beijing has publicly denied involvement but has shown no will to stem the flow. Formally, this is not participation in the war. But the result is participation in maintaining its duration.
The words of Van I, pronounced in Brussels, only confirmed what had become obvious even earlier. China is not interested in ending the conflict. He does not need the victory of Russia, long, exhausting and multifactorial. It is the kind that forces the US to maintain complex support on several fronts at the same time — Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and also causes strategic fatigue in Europe. It helps China reform its armed forces, strengthen the BRICS, increase its influence in the Global South, test financial instruments outside the dollar system. At the same time, the defeat of Russia for Beijing would mean strengthening the US as an arbiter and returning to the model of world control that dominated in the 1990s. Therefore, feigning neutrality is a necessary part of this strategy. The official communiques of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, posted after Wang’s meeting with Callas, again contain formulas about “peaceful settlement”, “necessity of dialogue” and “de-escalation strategy”. However, behind the scenes there is a system of technical, logistical and political support for stable instability. Beijing does not play with light or darkness, it plays with time.
How wars work for China and what it means for world order
Over the past decades, China has repeatedly found itself among the main beneficiaries of global conflicts in which it did not directly participate. A characteristic feature of his approach is a gradual, non-conflictual expansion at those moments when the key players of the world arena are busy eliminating the consequences of their actions or confrontations. This applies both to the period of American military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to the global financial crisis of 2008, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the current stage of the war in Ukraine.
The peculiarity of Chinese foreign strategy is that it is not based on direct military intervention. Instead, Beijing uses the conflicts of other countries as a favorable background to strengthen its own position. War, in the view of the Chinese political leadership, is not a tool, but a condition that creates a favorable context for those who maintain neutrality and act at the same time.
At the time of the Vietnam War, China did not yet have the necessary capacity to play the economic game, but even then it watched as the excessive involvement of the United States in the long conflict undermined its domestic resources. In the decades that followed, this pattern was replicated in Iraq and Afghanistan: the United States, drawn into protracted campaigns, lost focus, while China invested in the creation of logistics corridors, increased its influence in Southeast Asia, intensified the purchase of strategic raw materials in Africa, and began to shape the contours of what later became the Belt and Road initiative. China did not confront — it circumvented, gradually binding countries with long-term debt obligations, infrastructure projects, and economic dependence.
The next stage — the global financial crisis of 2008 — allowed China to consolidate its position as a systemic investor. While the financial system of the US and the EU suffered a shock, and NATO countries were forced to cut defense spending, the PRC maintained internal stability, increased investment in infrastructure and continued the course of modernization. Chinese banks not only avoided a wave of bankruptcies, but also began to buy assets in the West. At the same time, Beijing stepped up its purchases of US debt, strengthening its role as a creditor to the US economy. This process did not have an immediate effect, but created an addiction that intensified in the following years.
The COVID-19 pandemic was yet another point where China managed to use global destabilization as an economic opportunity. Although the virus was first discovered in China, the centralized control system allowed Beijing to impose tight restrictions, quickly isolate outbreaks and restart industry. At that time, the West was spending resources on internal debates about epidemiological policy, faced political fragmentation and shortages of medical supplies. China has become a major supplier of protective equipment, vaccines, laboratory equipment and key elements for digital infrastructure. At the same time, the country launched new industrial zones, reconfigured supply chains and took advantage of the weakening of competitors in the global market.
After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, China took a cautious but winning position. He did not publicly support either Moscow or the West, which allowed him to maintain channels of cooperation with both sides. At the same time, Beijing has increased its influence in Central Asia, where the weakening of Russia has created a vacuum. China used the moment to renegotiate energy deals, consolidate logistics infrastructure, and intensify diplomacy in Africa and Latin America. Faced with large-scale sanctions, Russia found itself dependent on Chinese supplies, technologies and sales markets. Without direct participation in the conflict, the PRC gained wider access to Russian resources on more favorable terms than until 2022.
Common to these examples is the principle of strategic containment: China does not enter wars, but acts within their aftermath. He does not suffer the losses borne by the participants in the conflict, instead he gets a field for economic maneuver. His gain is not in victory, but in the absence of losses. This is not a policy of neutrality, but a calculated restraint, where economic activity is combined with diplomatic silence. China does not show power, but it accumulates it – just when others are forced to spend it.
China’s role in today’s world is increasingly emerging as a player who grows not through outright victories, but through anticipation and seizing the moment. The way in which China ties its economic strategy to international wars without directly participating in them is particularly telling. For Beijing, global conflicts are not a disaster, but rather an opportunity. And this is not just a political position, but a well-established model of behavior based on economic calculation. It is the wars that exhaust other states that create conditions for China to build up its internal potential and expand its external influence.
The modern Chinese economy in terms of nominal GDP is inferior to the American one — 18.4 trillion dollars against 29.18 trillion. At first glance, the gap is significant, but this indicator is distorted by several factors. First, the yuan is a devalued currency that does not reflect real domestic product. Secondly, the United States forms a significant part of its GDP at the expense of financial services, the insurance industry, virtual assets, while the Chinese economy gravitates towards the real sector: manufacturing, logistics, energy. And thirdly, prices in China are significantly lower, which understates the dollar equivalent of domestic consumption. In terms of purchasing power parity, China has been overtaking the US for several years in a row.
However, China has not yet become a hegemon, despite its economic power, its system of international relations remains limited. It lacks an extensive network of alliances, its soft power is limited by an authoritarian governance model, and efforts to make the yuan a reserve currency have so far been unsuccessful. In addition, China’s technological base is partly dependent on imports. The economic system shows strength at the moment, but has structural vulnerabilities: uneven regional development, fertility problems, a debt pyramid in the real estate sector, weak consumer demand in the province.
This state of affairs creates a situation of uncertainty for the world. The US is no longer able to perform the function of a global arbiter, since it has lost its monopoly on order, and China does not yet have a sufficient set of characteristics to offer an alternative model of managing world processes. It is in this period of intermediate multipolarity that wars not only do not disappear, but acquire a new role as instruments of redistribution of influence, which do not resolve conflicts, but create prerequisites for new formats of interaction.
As we can see, wars in other countries fit harmoniously into China’s economic doctrine, while it uses the absence of participation in them as an advantage. That is, China does not wage war, but uses its consequences. He does not interfere, but looks at who has weakened and takes the vacated place. He does not declare ambitions, but implements long-term economic instruments. This is a policy of economic restraint: not to rush into confrontation, but to wait for the moment when you can get more – without risk and expense. All of this allows the Chinese economy to grow during global downturns at the expense of others.
For Ukraine, the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi and the policy of China in general means the need to realize one’s own place in the new structure of global instability. China will not become our strategic ally, but it is not an open adversary either. Its silence is observation, calculation and expectation of its own benefit, and it is in this mode that China managed to build the foundation for its economic breakthrough. Beijing does not intervene in the war, because its strategy is to grow against its background. And it is this strategy of long-term turbulence with no final outcome that deters the US, weakens Russia, and distracts the EU that makes China the biggest beneficiary of the age of conflict.
