One-time payment at the birth of a child: will a point solution help overcome the demographic collapse?
Fifty thousand hryvnias for the birth of a child. It was this amount that became a noticeable part of the new draft law, which was recently presented by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine. The document, published on the website of the Federation of Trade Unions, is aimed at stimulating birth rates and supporting parents. It is presented as one of the steps in the implementation of the Demographic Development Strategy until 2040. At first glance, such initiatives seem ambitious and give hope for improvement, but in practice we have yet another attempt to patch a systemic problem with point solutions.
Ukraine’s demographic peak: when the nation melts
As of the beginning of 2025 in Ukraine lives about 32 million people. At the same time, more than 6.9 million Ukrainian citizens are abroad, according to the April estimate of the UN Refugee Agency. Of them, 6.36 million are in European countries, and approximately 560,000 more are on other continents. These are those who left the territory of Ukraine because of the war, and as of the spring of 2025, the vast majority of them show no intention of returning.
The birth rate fell to a historically low level of 0.9 children per woman. This is significantly lower than the average level in Europe (1.5) and even lower than the pre-war Ukrainian level, which was 1.16 in 2020-2021. The minimum sufficient coefficient for population reproduction remains at the level of 2.2. In 2023, approximately 16,000 children were born in Ukraine every month, in 2024 this figure decreased even more, while by 2014 these numbers exceeded 21,000 every month.
At the same time, a sharp increase in the disproportion between mortality and birth rate was recorded. In 2024, the number of registered deaths was almost 2.8 times greater than the number of births. This is not a separate statistical spike, but a steady trend that has been deepening for several years. The demographic burden is shifting towards older people, and the proportion of women of reproductive age is declining, in particular due to migration, losses at the front and prolonged social uncertainty.
An important reason for the decline in the birth rate is not only the war, but also the lack of institutional support for parents. The social infrastructure in many regions is not being restored at a pace that would allow us to talk about the basic conditions for living with a child. Dilapidated kindergartens and schools, the reduction of health workers, the unpredictability of the economy, the lack of housing and the low level of child care assistance remain factors that force potential parents to delay or completely refuse to have children.
What the state offers
In order to somehow stimulate the birth of children, in April 2025 the Ministry of Social Policy presented a draft law that provides for a one-time payment upon the birth of a child. It promises a considerable set of “improvements” for parents: 50,000 hryvnias upon the birth of a child, full salary coverage during pregnancy for officially employed women and 7,000 hryvnias for those without insurance experience. After the birth, the state promises another wave of aid, but the essence and amounts remain behind the scenes. Compensation for child care is provided, not only for mom or dad, but also for any relative who takes this responsibility upon themselves.
In addition, the government plans to partially cover the costs of private nurseries or babysitters if parents go to work after the child turns one. And the “Student’s Package” will also appear – a one-time payment for basic needs: clothes, shoes, books and stationery.
On paper, everything looks thoughtful, modern and caring. But an old problem hides behind the beautiful wording: there is no clear financial model, implementation mechanisms, transparent rules and guarantees. All this resembles another presentation without implementation, where the main instrument of support remains the text of the draft law, and not real changes in the lives of parents.
However, the problem is not in the idea of financial support itself, but in the form it takes. Ukrainian social policy still tends towards a fragmented approach. For some reason, officials blatantly ignore the fact that a one-time payment will not replace affordable medicine, quality care, a flexible system of employment for parents and housing programs, does not compensate for the costs of early child development or for crisis periods in the life of a young family.
This draft law is designed with a similar logic. Similar initiatives appeared earlier, but none of them led to a change in the trend. Probably, Ukrainian officials do not have a long-term vision and the search for real implementation tools. Political decisions are made against the background of catastrophic statistics, but remain at the level of symbolic gestures.
If you dig deeper, it turns out that none of the promises have a clear financial basis. The project does not mention the sources from which all the planned payments will be financed. Not a word about specific articles of the state budget for 2025. The medium-term planning for 2026-2028 also makes no mention of this program. In the conditions when the country provides part of the social costs at the expense of international aid, launching a new large-scale initiative without the specified funding is either political naivety or the deliberate creation of a screen behind which it will be possible to painlessly postpone the implementation to the usual “later” for officials.
The loud figure of UAH 50,000 for the birth of a child sounds impressive, but it does not add efficiency. By itself, this amount does not solve the deep problems that women face when deciding on motherhood. In the conditions of war, it is not only about money, but also about housing, medical security, access to care, stability of income and predictability of at least the near future. A few months will pass, and the family will be back in the same spot, where ever-increasing prices, lack of infrastructure, and red tape get in the way of accessing benefits. As you can see, the payment only records the fact, but does not create reasons for its repetition. Separately, I would like to note social inequality, which literally runs through a red line in the text of the draft law. The difference between care for insured and uninsured pregnant women does not appear to be merely technical, but frankly points to a real ideological error. For the former, full salary compensation is promised. While for others, a fixed amount of UAH 7,000 applies. In the list of those who automatically find themselves in a less protected category, there are female students, the unemployed, women on previous maternity leave, displaced women, those who lost their jobs due to the war or did not have time to find employment. It seems as if the state divides expectant mothers into “valuable” and “second-rate”, depending on who is able to pay taxes, and not on the actual need for support.
The clause on postpartum support in general seems to be the least specified in the entire draft law. The amount, terms, mechanism are fixed under the transparent wording “to be determined later”. It is quite clear that what is not written now is almost guaranteed not to be implemented later, or will be implemented only formally. The state, as always, demonstrates its irresponsibility to society. They created the illusion of care, laid provisions in the document that are convenient to ignore under the pretext of a lack of budget or a difficult situation in the country, and that’s the end of it.
Another promising item, according to officials, is child care compensation, which can be received not only by parents, but also by other relatives who actually perform this function. And again, the amount of aid is uncertain, without a clear description, without a mechanism for submitting applications and determining eligibility. Formally, such a norm looks like broad support. In fact, this is an empty field that can be left untouched, because no one knows where to start.
The entire construction of the draft law does not look like a response to the demographic crisis, but rather an attempt to simulate a reaction to it. In a country where the number of newborns falls year after year, and the life of a young family balances between survival and adaptation, such an initiative does not create a real perspective. It only adds one more item to the list of social promises, framed in the language of change, but not ready to be implemented. True demographic policy begins not with numbers in the law, but with trust. From the understanding that the state will not disappear after one payment, but will lend a shoulder when it is really needed. So far, everything looks like a beautiful, symbolic and completely budget-friendly presentation with no launch date.
An effective demographic policy should not be a package of one-time payments. It should be an investment in stability, creating conditions under which the appearance of a child will not be a financial risk, and state support will not be a bureaucratic obstacle. It is not only about money, but about access to medicine, housing, childcare facilities, flexible forms of employment, support during a crisis and a stable education policy. It is clear that such changes will not have an immediate effect, but only they can stop the demographic decline. Without this, even UAH 100,000 will not look like motivation, but only compensation for the risk.
How to fight demographic decline in Europe
European countries have been living in the reality of demographic decline for decades. But unlike Ukraine, where the state’s response is mostly limited to one-time monetary compensations, some European governments have taken a course to create real, not declarative, comfort for parents. The key difference is the bet on long-term social infrastructure rather than one-time bonuses.
France is the undisputed leader among EU countries in terms of birth rate. Her model demonstrates that the birth rate can be kept at a relatively high level when the state does not just pay, but provides a full social cycle of support. French families receive monthly child benefits that increase with each subsequent child. In addition, there are tax credits for large families, affordable municipal crèches, flexible forms of employment for both parents, nanny allowances and subsidized housing. But the main thing here is not the clauses in the law, but a real, working system that does not break at the first bureaucratic obstacle.
Germany made a bet on the combination of work and parenthood, instead of forcing to choose one of the two. The system works here Parental allowance (assistance to parents after the birth of a child, which depends on the level of previous income and can last up to 14 months – ed.). In addition, fathers have the legal right to reduced working hours without the risk of losing their jobs, which is especially true for mothers. In large cities, kindergartens with long working hours are actively developing, and the cost of services is often subsidized by local authorities.
Sweden went even further and made flexibility the standard. There, parents have a joint 480-day paid parental leave, which they can divide between them in a convenient way. Moreover, part of this vacation is reserved for the father, and if he does not take it, then the days just burn away. In this way, the state directly encourages men to participate in raising children from the first days. The country also has a system of vouchers that cover up to 90% of the cost of kindergartens, and schools provide free meals.
Hungary offers financial support in the form of KISS (preferential mortgage for families with children, as well as write-off of part of the debt with each subsequent birth – ed.). In combination with the support of young mothers in the labor market, this allowed to partially stabilize birth rates over the past five years.
Of course, the European experience does not provide a universal recipe, but it has common features, which are systematic rather than specific. Assistance is not limited to the birth of a child, it lasts for years. The infrastructure in European countries really works. Kindergartens, nurseries, schools, flexible employment, and affordable housing are available to parents. States provide ongoing support to both parents, not just mothers, which avoids discrimination in the labor market. And, probably, what the Ukrainian system lacks so much is accessibility to help, and not a theoretical right to it, which can be realized only after a lot of documents, queues and long explanations.
Ukrainian officials do not need to reinvent the wheel. After all, most of the solutions have already been tested in countries that faced the same problems. It is important to understand that without changing the approach of submitting declarations to the system infrastructure, no one-time aid will convince young people to have children in a country where they do not feel protected.
So, the new initiative of the Ministry of Social Policy once again demonstrates the illusion of care. Under the guise of a progressive demographic policy, Ukrainians are being pushed an old scheme with a one-time monetary “thank you” for having the courage to give birth to a child in conditions of chronic instability. This draft law embodies a simulation of activity against the background of a demographic collapse. It records the fact of the birth of a child, but does not create prerequisites for the desire to give birth to it. This approach is more like another accounting act, rather than a political course.
When the system works pointwise, when people are given a certificate instead of a housing program, and instead of social equality, the labels “insured” and “not insured” are attached, creating a feeling of inferiority, everything immediately turns into decorative sociality. At the same time, it is decorativeness, not reality, that is the most dangerous in demographic policy. Because it creates even more disappointment. And it is this disappointment that most demotivates young people to stay, build a family and give birth to children in their country. Ukraine is once again trying to treat a chronic problem with symptomatic means. But the birth rate is not stimulated by the figures in the draft laws. It grows out of trust in the state, the predictability of life, the availability of infrastructure, and a sense of not only physical, but also economic security. While the drafts of new “big” programs are in the hands of officials, the country is slowly but surely losing its future. And no amount, even doubling it, will change the trend if parents continue to feel alone with their fears, costs and anxieties.
European countries have long understood that demography is regulated not by symbolic gestures and point solutions, but by well-thought-out state policy and the creation of real favorable conditions for citizens. And while Ukrainian government officials are enthusiastically inventing a bicycle without pedals, the country is losing not only people, but also faith that the situation can still be changed. And without this belief, no “2040 strategy” is worth even the paper it is printed on.
