Which sections of the front does the Russian Federation plan to attack in the summer: analysis by military expert Oleksandr Karpyuk

The summer of 2025 causes special anxiety both for the Ukrainian military and for society in general. The accumulation of Russian forces, massive attacks on infrastructure, intensification of drone strikes, as well as attempts to break through in several directions raises the question: is Russia planning a large-scale offensive? Military analyst Oleksandr Karpyuk gave his assessment of future events.

Sums are not a target, but a trap: a tactic to bypass and destroy the infrastructure

Oleksandr Karpyuk analyzes the logic of Russian actions not through formal messages, but the dynamics of combat operations in specific areas. According to his estimates, the Kremlin’s plans for the summer include three main tactics: bypassing cities instead of assaults, attempts to enter the operational space deep in Dnipropetrovsk region, and creating pressure on other areas of the front in order to stretch Ukrainian reserves.

Karpyuk notes that despite the widespread perception of the possibility of an assault on Sumy, in reality such an operation is not one of the priority tasks of the Russian Federation. He believes that the Russian military leadership has changed its approach to the cities after a series of expensive and unsuccessful attempts at direct capture. Now the goal is to render the city unlivable, cut off electricity, water, communications, and bypass it, leaving behind a dead zone.

The analyst cites the examples of Selydovo, Novogrodivka, and partly Pokrovsk, where this tactic was already used: the Russians destroyed the communication infrastructure, but did not enter the cities themselves, instead bypassing them. In the case of Pokrovsk, as he notes, the situation remained partially unfinished, but the city actually ceased to function. In his opinion, the same logic is observed now with regard to Sumy. The expert draws attention to the fact that although the Ukrainian forces managed to stop the advance of the enemy, it is still difficult to estimate how long this success will last.

A breakthrough into Dnipropetrovsk region is a search for a weak rear

According to Karpyuk, one of the main strategic directions of the summer is the Russian Federation’s efforts to enter the operational space in the direction of the Dnipropetrovsk region. He emphasizes that this is connected not only with geography, but also with the peculiarities of the Ukrainian defense structure: unlike Donetsk region, where a system of surveillance, intelligence and coordination in separate sectors was built over the years, Dnipropetrovsk region does not have such fortifications.

Karpiuk explains that in the event of a breakthrough of the front line, the Russians can try to develop an offensive already in the area of ​​Pavlograd or even the Dnipro, using armored vehicles and infantry, which they have been carefully preserving recently. According to him, this is the reason why there are fewer massive armor drops today – the Russian Federation is trying to accumulate strength for a decisive breakthrough.

“Access to the operational space in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Because drones are effective in a certain sector, where there is a system of coordination, intelligence, and deterrence in a separate square. If they break out into the Dnipropetrovsk region – well, there are no such positions and systems that have been built for years in the Donetsk region. Drones are drones, but armor and manpower will decide. They have both, and they have been armoring lately for a reason They are guarding. Exiting the operational space of “boxes” and motorcycles – we will catch them already near Pavlograd or the Dnipro”. – notes the expert.

Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions: the strategy of dispersion of Ukrainian reserves

Another element of the summer plan, Karpyuk considers simultaneous attempts to attack in other directions — in particular, possible activation in the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions. He notes that these actions are aimed not so much at a breakthrough as at withdrawing Ukrainian forces and reserves from more threatening areas. This approach, in his opinion, is a typical attempt by the Russian command to force the Ukrainian command to respond to several threats at the same time, reducing the effectiveness of the defense.

Oleksandr Karpyuk draws attention to the fact that currently these intentions of the enemy have not given the expected result – the Ukrainian army holds its positions, and the stretching of forces has not led to catastrophic consequences. However, he emphasizes that holding the front line under such a model is a grueling task, and the summer could prove to be key in terms of endurance and strategic balancing.

Karpyuk believes that the actions of the Russian Federation this summer are subject to a clear logic: avoiding major battles in cities, searching for weak points for a breakthrough, and constant pressure on the wide front line. He notes that the Russian army has changed its methods, adapted to counter-drone systems and is trying to operate less openly, taking into account previous failures.

Oleksandr Karpyuk expressed his own assessment of the events, which may not coincide with the point of view of the editors of IA “FAKT”