76 years ago, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, the document that started the history of NATO. The alliance, created as a defensive response to the Soviet threat, has survived the Cold War, expansion, internal crises, and the Afghan campaign. Now he is experiencing a new era — the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. And if earlier NATO’s role was often questioned, today it has turned into a key center of geopolitical weight. But is NATO really an influential military-political union of states that can guarantee security in the new world — the world of hybrid wars, total cyber attacks, political polarization and shifts within democracies themselves?
76 years of the Alliance: history and modernity
When on April 4, 1949, in Washington, representatives of twelve countries signed the foundational treaty on the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, the world was only moving away from the ruins of the Second World War. The USA was the founder of NATO, which, together with Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Portugal, created a bloc that was supposed to protect the West from a potential new threat — the USSR. General Hastings Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, defined its mission with British directness: «to keep the Americans in Europe, the Russians out of Europe, and the Germans under control.»
76 years have passed. The world has changed, but NATO has not disappeared. On the contrary, it has grown to 32 countries, surviving phases of stagnation, crisis, rapid expansion and new challenges. Since 1999, when the states of the former social camp (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) joined the Alliance for the first time, the expansion has only gained momentum. By 2025, all the Baltic countries, the Balkans, and part of the Black Sea region became NATO members, while Albania and Croatia became NATO members on April 1, 2009, during the Strasbourg-Kelhi summit. And already on April 4, 2023, Finland joined NATO, bringing with it 1,300 kilometers of a common border with Russia. The last country to join the Alliance is Sweden — on March 7, 2024, it became a member of NATO. In addition, this alliance officially recognizes three candidates for accession: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine, but so far only Bosnia and Herzegovina has an Action Plan for NATO membership. During the existence of the Alliance, only two countries left it — France in 1966 and Greece in 1974, but later both returned: Greece in 1980, France in 2009.
NATO has something to be proud of — it is one of the most stable interstate structures. Its institutions are working: the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, military exercises, a rapid response structure, a strategic communications system. The alliance even developed its own phonetic alphabet, known as ICAO, which is used today in civil aviation, in the armies of many countries, and in diplomacy.
Despite everything, the Alliance has one of the lowest «field reputations». In 76 years, NATO has invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on Collective Defense only once. And it was a reaction not to the invasion of the army, but to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States. Other conflicts, including Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the brutal suppression of protests in Belarus, and the war in Georgia, took place against the backdrop of the Alliance’s silent restraint. Formally, because these countries were not members. In fact, because NATO does not always want to go where it risks entering into a direct confrontation with a nuclear state.
It is worth mentioning a few more little-known, but revealing facts. Israel was the first country outside of Europe and North America to be offered potential membership. But they never reached an agreement — Israel did not want restrictions, the Alliance — new wars. France withdrew from NATO’s military structure in 1966, wanting to preserve the autonomy of its army, and returned only in 2009.
Today, in theory, NATO is one of the world’s most powerful collective security organizations. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ratings of support for the Alliance increased even in countries where skepticism has traditionally prevailed, such as Sweden and Finland. However, voices of isolationism are increasingly being heard within the member states themselves. In the US, Donald Trump once again hinted that America should not automatically guarantee Europe’s defense if it «doesn’t pay enough». At the same time, sentiment is growing in Europe about the need for an autonomous defense policy without Washington. And some countries—Hungary, Turkey—are increasingly playing on two sides.
The Alliance is facing another period of transformation. The world is no longer divided into black and white. Wars are now fought not only with guns, but also with fakes, hacker attacks, energy blackmail, and NATO understands this. That is why, since the 2020s, the Alliance has started investing in cyber defense centers, operational analytics, and information forces. But the key question remains: is NATO ready not just to deter, but to act? And will it be able to adapt not only organizationally, but also politically?
Little known facts about NATO
NATO remains a unique alliance not only because of its military and political weight, but also because of a number of facts that testify to its specific structure, ability to adapt, and even cultural specificity.
It is worth starting with the fact that the North Atlantic Alliance became the first military association in history, which did not arise as a result of war, but in peacetime. In 1949, when the Second World War had already left behind fires and millions of victims, 12 states decided to join forces not to attack, but to deter. This preventive character, established at the start, remains the basis of NATO to this day.
Despite its military orientation, the Alliance has its own communication system, which includes two official languages — English and French. But if you look at the official NATO website, you will see Ukrainian and even Russian. This is a conscious choice — focusing on maximum transparency and openness, in particular for the societies of partner countries or those who are the object of strategic interest.
Another little-known but eloquent fact: NATO member countries generate more than half of the world’s GDP. This means not only an economic power, but also that the Alliance is both a military and an economic giant. Its strength is not only in tanks and airplanes, but in finance, production, science, and innovation.
And so that all these countries could effectively communicate with each other even in the most critical moments — during combat operations, exercises, evacuations — NATO approved its own phonetic alphabet, known as the ICAO telephone alphabet, back in the 1950s. It consists of 26 code words for each letter of the English alphabet — from Alpha, Bravo, Charlie to Zulu. It is used not only by the military, but also by civil aviation pilots, rescue services, and special police units. This system prevents confusion when transferring names, coordinates, callsigns — especially in situations where fates are decided in seconds.
So, NATO is not just tanks and training, but a deeply structured system where every code, every word and every principle has a practical and symbolic meaning. The alliance is not only armed, but also linguistic and economic — one of those forming the architecture of global security in the 21st century.
NATO budget
Today, NATO is not only the armies of countries, but a bureaucratic machine with multibillion-dollar budgets. Each member country contributes annually to the common defense budget according to a formula that takes into account its GNP. The combined military expenditures of the member countries make up more than 70% of all defense expenditures in the world. However, only five of them are among the ten most powerful armies in the world — the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Turkey. Luxembourg, meanwhile, maintains the Alliance’s smallest army — just 450 troops — but has an annual defense budget of more than $370 million. Each soldier there accounts for about 800,000 dollars every year. Iceland does not have an army at all, but it fully participates in the Alliance.
In 2014, when Russia first openly violated European borders by annexing Crimea and igniting war in eastern Ukraine, only two NATO member states adhered to the Alliance’s defense standard of allocating at least 2% of GDP to the needs of the army. It was Great Britain and Greece. The USA, as the main donor, spent significantly more, but even against this background there was an obvious disparity: Europe was counting on the American umbrella, while at the same time saving money on security.
After 2014, the situation changed, but not immediately. The impetus for restarting the defense policy was indeed given by the war. The war is not in theory, not on distant continents, but a war in Europe. In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine on a full scale, even the most cool countries in relation to NATO understood: the issue of collective defense is a bureaucratic duty and an element of survival.
In 2024, 24 out of 32 NATO countries have already reached the two percent level of defense spending, which is an unprecedented figure. And although Croatia remains the only country that has not increased the percentage of its military budget in ten years, all others show growth. The most noticeable are those that have a border with Russia. Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway, Finland — these countries invest in security at the level or even higher than 2.5-3% of GDP. For them, this is not only a question of loyalty to the Alliance, but also of direct self-defense.
At the same time, the geography of defense activity is quite clear. The further the country is from the border with the Russian Federation, the more slowly and carefully it increases its spending. Italy, Spain, Portugal have still not reached two percent. This creates internal tension in the Alliance, which is manifested in particular in the statements of Donald Trump. Even before returning to the White House, he repeatedly emphasized: if Europe wants security, it must pay for it itself. And 2% is not a goal, but a minimum.
In this context, the absolute numbers are particularly revealing. In 2024, the US spent $754.7 billion on defense. All other NATO countries — 430.1 billion. That is, the American defense budget is almost twice as much as the budgets of all allies combined. Although Europe and Canada increased their share from 27.5% in 2014 to 36.3% in 2024, the balance is still tilted.
Interestingly, in the US, the share of defense spending in GDP has even decreased slightly over ten years. But in absolute numbers, the opposite is true: American military spending has increased by $95 billion over ten years. For comparison: Germany, Poland, Turkey, Great Britain and France together increased their budgets by 96.3 billion dollars. This illustrates the extent of American dominance.
Even more eloquent is the comparison of the USA with Germany. American GDP is six times larger than that of Germany, and the population is four times larger. But Germany’s defense budget is only a tenth of the American one. This causes irritation in the American political community and prompts a tougher review of intra-alliance agreements.
In the future, 2% of GDP may cease to be a symbol of sufficient loyalty. Some countries, such as Poland and Estonia, are already talking about 4% as the new norm. And this is no longer a tribute to America, but an awareness that conflicts can flare up faster than any diplomacy can react.
Thus, NATO is entering a new era: when power is measured not only by the number of armies, but also by the willingness of each country to invest in its own security — not out of compulsion, but out of the understanding that there is no other choice.
Ukraine and NATO: between allies’ caution and war
Ukraine’s membership in NATO has become a political promise that has been repeated to our country since 1991. Also, 17 years have passed since the Bucharest Summit of 2008, where it was recorded that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of the Alliance. But despite the open door, no one gives Kyiv the key to it. And it was this policy of giving hope without specifics that became one of the factors that fueled the Kremlin’s aggressive plans.
Moscow has always reacted painfully to the idea of expanding NATO to the east, but the weakness of the West’s reaction to Russian aggression in 2008 in Georgia, then in 2014 in Crimea and Donbas, became a signal: the collective defense of the Alliance is exclusively for its own. Ukraine, on the other hand, remained in the «gray zone», from which it never came out.
NATO’s policy towards Ukraine has the form of a chronicle of caution. There are no concrete solutions to official statements of support. After 2014, there was neither a MAP nor a clear schedule for admission. Even a full-scale invasion of Russia in 2022 did not change the Alliance’s position on our country’s membership. The 2023 Vilnius summit once again brought to Kyiv only statements about «future» membership, without specific terms or conditions. And when Volodymyr Zelensky openly called on partners to extend an invitation to Ukraine, the response was dry and diplomatically cautious.
And precisely this «caution» is the key word in NATO’s relations with Ukraine. At least seven countries of the Alliance did not support the idea of inviting Ukraine: USA, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Belgium, Slovenia and Spain. These are not small players. The USA is the most influential member of the Alliance, and Germany is the economic engine of Europe. Therefore, no decisions will be made without their consent. At the same time, the President’s Office denies information about opposition, trying to maintain diplomatic silence. But the fact remains: there is no unity on the issue of Ukraine.
The paradox of the situation is that the question of joining NATO became one of the reasons for the full-scale war in Ukraine. For years, the Kremlin has used the «threat of Alliance expansion» as a propaganda tool and justification for its attack. In January 2025, the Deputy Head of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Hrushko, stated that without canceling the decision of the Bucharest Summit on Ukraine’s future membership in NATO, «settlement» is impossible. That is, the Russian logic is as follows: a formal refusal to join NATO is enough, and the war will end. This is diplomatic blackmail for blood, but Western capitals still do not give a clear answer whether they are ready to defend Ukraine as they defend themselves.
This situation creates a feeling of double standards. The war in Ukraine is the biggest challenge to Europe’s security since World War II, but the Alliance continues to hesitate. Finland was accepted in 2023, then Sweden in 2024. As for Ukraine, there are only unconvincing assurances. At the same time, France and Greece have already left NATO in history, but returned. That is, the door is really open. But, it seems, not for those who prove in blood that they are ready to fight for the values of the West.
Why the Alliance did not stop the war in Ukraine
NATO is the largest military-political association in the world, its members have modern weapons, experience of operations in different parts of the world, powerful armies, fleets and technical resources that far exceed the capabilities of any other country or alliance. However, the full-scale war in Ukraine — the center of Europe, which has been going on for more than three years, proves that even such a structure does not guarantee the deterrence of aggression outside its area of responsibility.
The reasons for this can be seen in the political mechanism of NATO, its legal restrictions and internal contradictions. First of all, the Alliance has no legal obligation to intervene in the war in Ukraine. It is not a member, and therefore the key security guarantee contained in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty does not apply to it. This means that NATO has no direct obligation to defend its territory. And although many member states provide military aid to Kyiv, each of them does so at its own discretion — within the limits of national capabilities, political decisions, and public support. NATO does not have a common position regarding direct participation or actions that could become a deterrent.
The second reason is the presence of deep differences between the member countries. The USA, which has historically played the role of the driving force of the Alliance, shows inconsistency in its positions: support for Ukraine is significant, but there is no strategic clarity regarding the prospects of its integration. Hungary, Slovakia, Spain and Belgium avoided specific obligations regarding Ukraine’s membership. Even Germany, which is one of the main suppliers of weapons, refrains from clearly supporting the invitation to NATO. This creates a situation in which political will is paralyzed by the need to reach consensus among 32 actors with different interests.
NATO is also limited by its format. This is a defensive alliance built on the principle of mutual protection in the event of an attack. Therefore, proactive intervention — including with the aim of stopping aggression against a partner country — is not foreseen. And although the Strategic Concept of the Alliance recognizes Russia as the main threat, the actual response is limited to deterrence, not active intervention. Most actions are limited to rotating forces in the Baltics, increasing defense spending, and increasing surveillance. However, this was not enough to stop the conflict on the territory of Ukraine.
In addition, the situation is complicated by another factor — political caution. NATO seeks to avoid direct escalation with Russia, a nuclear power. This applies both to the supply of long-range weapons, and to the invitation to Ukraine to join, and even to public rhetoric. Among the member states, there is a prevailing belief that too decisive steps can cause a new wave of tension, which will turn into a clash between nuclear powers. And this is what forces the Alliance to act slowly, cautiously, and often belatedly.
So, the reason NATO has not stopped the war in Ukraine is not weakness or lack of resources, but political constraints, disparity between ambitions and commitments, and deep divisions among individual states over what the Alliance’s role should be in a war that has already changed Europe’s security architecture.
Prospects for the existence of NATO
The current war in Ukraine has brought NATO out of a long phase of complacency, but at the same time called into question its ability to adapt. The alliance, which for decades has dealt with «local crises» and counter-terrorist campaigns, today faces the reality of a large-scale war on its eastern flank. His answer is considered, but incomplete. Formally — support, in practice — fatigue, fear of escalation and the nuclear Russian Federation, as well as differences of opinion between the members of the Alliance. And while the rhetoric of unity sounds loud, strategic confusion continues within the bloc.
Now, politicians of various countries are increasingly speculating that NATO may be approaching its historic end. Some of them admit that instability in the US position, especially in the context of Donald Trump’s rhetoric, endangers the very principle of transatlantic unity. Republicans openly talk about the need to review commitments, and in Europe it is perceived as a political earthquake. Against the background of these discussions, the idea of a new format appears — the creation of the «European Treaty Organization» as an alternative to NATO, but without the American helm.
This scenario is not just a geopolitical fantasy. In the case of a gap between European and American approaches, the EU will have to build its own security system from scratch. And while EU member states’ defense budgets are growing, autonomy from Washington is still more of an illusion than a reality. European states have historically built their armed forces in the form of a supplement to American power, not a replacement. If the US leaves the game, the vacuum will be immediate — and Russia will take advantage of it, followed by China.
The paradox is that NATO remains the only institutional counterbalance to global authoritarian ambitions. And despite all the weak points, the alliance is still capable of mobilization. The example of Ukraine confirmed this: multibillion-dollar aid packages, the strengthening of the eastern flank, the presence in the Baltics and Romania — all these are reactions, although not preemption. Moreover, precisely because of pressure from the US, Europe began to really invest in defense for the first time in many years. Donald Trump, who today formally opposes NATO, actually made him wake up.
For all its outward weariness and irritation, the Alliance still has strategic strength. However, the problem is not the obsolescence of this structure, but the indecision of part of its elites. The Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine will remain a test of NATO’s effectiveness and political will. If it ends with the victory of the democracies, the Alliance will survive. If the West cannot protect Ukraine, which has paid tens of thousands of lives to be part of the free world, no one will be able to stop doubts about the meaning of NATO’s existence.
Thus, either NATO will become a truly defensive alliance for all who share its values, including Ukraine, or it will turn into another failed historical construct that will be remembered with nostalgia. In the 21st century, great alliances do not disappear in wars, they die in indecision. In the 76th year of life, the Alliance continues to be a symbol of collective security, but each time it resembles an old captain who has seen a lot, but increasingly asks himself: «And where are we sailing?».
