Collision of nuclear giants: after the bloody terrorist attack in Kashmir, India and Pakistan once again teeter on the brink of war.

India and Pakistan – two nuclear powers – again found themselves on the verge of an open armed conflict. After the terrorist attack in Indian Kashmir, which took place on April 23, 2025 and killed 26 civilians, including tourists, diplomatic ties between New Delhi and Islamabad were effectively severed, the border trembled with gunfire and the world community was alarmed. And although similar escalations have occurred before, the current conflict is more dangerous than previous ones: the sides have crossed red lines that have kept them from direct confrontation for the past decade.

Roots of conflict: Kashmir and old hatreds

After the partition of British India in 1947, the dispute over Kashmir became a constant source of enmity between the two states. Three of the four wars they fought were related to this region. Although the situation stabilized somewhat in the 2020s, the problem remained a frozen conflict until April 23, 2025.

It was on this day that the bloodiest terrorist attack in recent years took place in the resort area of ​​Pahalgam in Indian Kashmir: armed militants attacked a group of tourists, killing 26 people and injuring more than 20. The Resistance Front (TRF), which has ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani group recognized as a terrorist group by India, the United States and the United Nations, claimed responsibility.

India’s strong response

The Indian authorities immediately placed the blame on Pakistan, accusing it of not only not fighting the extremists, but actually supporting them. The response was harsh: India recalled diplomats from Islamabad and expelled Pakistani representatives from New Delhi, and canceled the Indus Waters Treaty, one of the last remaining bilateral documents between the countries. In addition, Indian authorities imposed an entry ban on Pakistani nationals and arrested more than 2,000 people in Kashmir and began demolishing the homes of suspected militants.

“We will respond with all determination. The guilty will not hide – neither in our country nor abroad“, – stated Prime Minister Narendra Modi, citing the potential for “point operations” outside India. Yesterday he provided his armed forces full freedom of action and allowed the military to independently determine the form and scale of the response.

Pakistan warns of a strike and prepares itself

In response, Pakistan severed diplomatic relations, closed airspace to Indian aircraft, revoked the 1972 Simla Agreement that established rules for settling conflicts between the states, and cut off trade ties.

The rhetoric of Pakistani high-ranking officials also became louder. Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said that the country has information that India is preparing a military strike in the next 24-36 hours. He warned that any invasion would be met with a response, and did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty.

New dynamics of danger

Although the two states have already had similar escalations, notably after the Pulwama terror attack in 2019, the current standoff has a certain difference: the institutional trust between the parties has been completely destroyed. The closure of diplomatic channels, the rupture of key agreements and the shooting at the border indicate that the situation is out of control.

Also alarming is the silent support of radical rhetoric by the Indian authorities: part of the Indian mass media and officials are called for the “complete elimination of terrorist bases on the territory of Pakistan”, hinting at the possibility of airstrikes.

Why has the conflict between India and Pakistan continued since 1947?

Since the breakup of British India in 1947, India and Pakistan have remained in a state of protracted conflict, primarily over the disputed region of Kashmir. Over 75 years, both countries have gone through several full-scale wars, periods of acute diplomatic crisis, escalating terrorism and a nuclear arms race. The reasons for the confrontation are deep and complex, they include territorial claims, religious differences and different understandings of the identity of the two states.

In August 1947, after the withdrawal of the British, independent India and a new Muslim state – Pakistan – were created. Each of the more than 500 princely lands had to decide who to join. Jammu and Kashmir – Muslim in population but ruled by a Hindu maharaja – initially declared neutrality. But already in October 1947, tribal units supported by Pakistan invaded there. In response, the Maharaja turned to India for help and signed an act of accession, which became the basis for the introduction of Indian troops. The first Indo-Pakistani war began, which ended in 1949 with the mediation of the UN. The ceasefire line divided Kashmir into Indian and Pakistani parts. At the same time, Resolution No. 47 adopted by the UN Security Council called for the implementation the referendum regarding the future of the region, but it never happened.

Ideological confrontation also played a big role. Since the creation of the states, the two countries have followed different paths: India has become a secular democracy, while Pakistan has become an Islamic republic. In this paradigm, Kashmir perceived Islamabad as a natural part of Pakistan due to the Muslim majority of the population. India considers the act of accession as legitimate and final, and any interference by Pakistan as a violation of sovereignty.

Wars and escalations

After the first armed conflict, several more conflicts took place:

1965 year – the second Indo-Pakistani war, provoked by Pakistan’s attempt to raise a rebellion in Indian Kashmir (operation gibraltar). It ended with an armistice brokered by the USSR and the USA (Tashkent Agreement).

1971 year – the third war, this time related not to Kashmir, but to the civil war in East Pakistan. India supported the Bangladeshi independence movement which led to the defeat of Pakistan.

1999 year – Kargil conflict: Pakistani military and militants crossed the Line of Control, but were pushed back by India. International pressure, primarily from the US, helped to avoid a full-scale war.

The nuclear factor and the shadow of terrorism

Since 1998, both countries have officially become nuclear powers, which significantly complicated the prospects of a major war, but did not reduce the level of violence. Since the late 1990s, India has regularly accused Pakistan of supporting Islamist groups operating in Kashmir or carrying out terrorist attacks on Indian soil, including the 2001 attack on Parliament and the 2008 mass terrorist attack in Mumbai.

American researcher Christine Fehr books “Fight to the End: The Path of War of the Pakistan Army” (2014) argue that the Pakistani military views the conflict with India as an “existential struggle” rather than a pragmatic dispute, making a sustainable reconciliation impossible.

In 2016, after the attack on the Indian military base in Uri, India carried out the so-called “surgical strikes” on militants on Pakistani territory. In 2019, there was a terrorist attack in Pulwama, where 40 Indian security forces were killed. In response, India launched an airstrike on a militant camp in Balakot, sparking the first air clash between the two countries since 1971.

In August 2019, India canceled the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, which provoked a sharp reaction from Pakistan, which announced the suspension of diplomatic relations and appealed to the United Nations.

Pakistan: First-strike nuclear doctrine keeping the region tense

In the confrontation between two nuclear powers – India and Pakistan – it is Islamabad that consistently adheres to one of the most radical concepts of deterrence: the possibility of a nuclear first strike. Unlike India, which has formally pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, Pakistan reserves the right to preemptively use its nuclear arsenal in the event of a threat to its national survival.

Infographic: IA “FACT”

This strategy grew out of a deep awareness of military inequality: Pakistan is unable to withstand a full-scale war with India, which has a much more powerful economic and military potential. Nuclear weapons in this context play the role of a compensator – a critical deterrent tool that Pakistan is ready to use not only in response to a nuclear strike, but also in the event of a serious escalation of the conflict, for example, in response to the deep advance of Indian ground forces.

A special role in this doctrine is played by tactical nuclear weapons – short-range missiles, in particular Nasr (Hatf-9), which are designed to hit combat units directly on the battlefield. Such systems have short lead times and are often stored close to the front. Their goal is to quickly stop a large-scale invasion or destabilize the enemy in the early stages of the conflict. This approach significantly lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, blurring the line between the tactical and strategic level of their use.

Pakistan does not have an officially promulgated nuclear doctrine. Instead, Islamabad deliberately maintains strategic uncertainty by sending mixed signals. Once the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan directly stated: “If the survival of our state is threatened, we will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons.” Thus, this position is designed to deter not only a possible nuclear, but also a conventional military attack, leaving flexibility in response to the country’s leadership.

However, this approach raises serious concerns among the international community. Experts express doubts about the reliability of the decision-making system in crisis conditions, as well as the safety of the arsenals themselves – especially given the internal political instability in the country or the possibility of radicalization of certain structures. The creation of the National Command Authority of Pakistan in the 2000s gave a certain response to these risks, the body responsible for centralized control over nuclear weapons.

Islamabad’s nuclear strategy, despite its obvious India-centricity, does not exist in a vacuum. It also has an external geopolitical context. China remains Pakistan’s key military partner, supplying advanced technology and acting as a geopolitical counterbalance to Indian influence. The US, while criticizing Pakistan’s first-strike doctrine, at the same time supports this country’s army as an important factor in regional stability — a paradox that only emphasizes the complexity of the South Asian security hub.

Precisely because of this complex and at the same time potentially unstable nuclear doctrine of Pakistan, any escalation between Islamabad and New Delhi – even a local one – is immediately perceived by the world as a potential trigger for a global crisis. In a region where escalation can happen in a matter of hours, the first-strike doctrine remains not only a deterrent but also a source of constant anxiety.

India: No First Strike Policy Under Review

India maintains a policy of no nuclear first strike (NFU), but this position no longer appears to be completely unbreakable. Over time, it undergoes an increasingly active revision, both at the level of political statements and in the practical preparation of the arsenal for combat use.

In 2003, the Indian government issued an updated nuclear doctrine that established several key provisions. First, New Delhi declares that it will not use nuclear weapons first, but reserves the right to strike back in the event of a nuclear attack on its territory or armed forces. Secondly, the reaction to such a blow will be “massive” and will cause “unacceptable damage” to the aggressor. Thirdly, the doctrine allows for the possibility of responding with nuclear weapons even to a chemical or biological attack, that is, a non-nuclear act of aggression.

The principle of minimal but effective deterrence is another cornerstone of the Indian doctrine. It is about maintaining an arsenal sufficient to deter an attacker, but without drawing the country into an arms race. Accordingly, India has long followed the practice of keeping nuclear warheads and carriers separately, making an immediate launch impossible. At the same time, the latest analytical reports, in particular by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), show signs of a gradual transition to operational readiness.

Despite the official commitment to the NFU, in recent years there have been signals in the rhetoric of India’s political and military leadership about a potential revision of this policy. In 2016, former defense minister Manohar Parrikar said the no-first principle could change “depending on the circumstances”. In 2019, his successor Rajnath Singh reiterated that the NFU remained in force, but “what happens next will depend on the circumstances”. Such wording is worrisome, especially in Pakistan, where there is already anxiety about strategic imbalances.

India’s nuclear strategy is evolving in a two-front dilemma. On the one hand, Pakistan with tactical nuclear weapons and the threat of an escalation of a conventional conflict. On the other hand, there is China, which has a much larger nuclear arsenal and wider infrastructural capabilities. In response, India is actively developing a naval component of deterrence – nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs), which should provide a guaranteed response even in the event of the destruction of the land part of the arsenal.

Washington, London and Brussels called for de-escalation. The US State Department has already announced its intention to negotiate with both sides and stressed that no attack should serve as a pretext for war. But will diplomacy have time if shots are already being fired from Kashmir, and both states have put their troops on high alert?