Race for raw materials: Europe tries to keep up in the global competition for strategic resources

In an effort to strengthen its defense capabilities, Europe embarks on rearmament — only to find that its own resource base is already critically limited. Key minerals, from phosphates to vanadium and titanium, are needed not only to make weapons, but also for high-tech equipment, including the microchips that control it. Without reliable access to these raw materials, the continent risks becoming dependent on external players at a critical moment.

Global competition for strategic resources has already begun. The United States, China, Turkey and other major powers are actively buying deposits around the world or seeking to establish control over new sources of production. Even Donald Trump’s statement about the US interest in buying Greenland, rich in rare metals, is not a fantasy, but part of a real geopolitical strategy.

Against this background, the European Union is taking belated but decisive steps. In 2023, the EU adopted Law on critical raw materials (CRMA). It defines 34 types of resources without which it is impossible to maintain industrial production and defense infrastructure. The document requires at least 10% of such raw materials to be mined in the EU, and 40% to be processed within Europe.

The law was originally designed as a tool for the “green transition” — specifically to ensure access to lithium for electric vehicle batteries. But the context has changed: the war, the threat of energy and technological dependence, the need to strengthen defense capabilities have put forward new demands.

In this new geopolitical landscape, Europe is forced to look for reliable producers. One of them became the Norwegian company Norge Mining, which was founded by the Swiss Michael Wurmser. The company plans to start mining phosphate rock near Egersund in southwestern Norway in 2029. This rock contains not only phosphate, which is needed for fertilizers, but also vanadium and titanium, metals that are critical for the defense industry. Estimated reserves are 70 billion tons of phosphate, making this deposit the largest known in the world.

In response to the cooperation, the EU promised the company financial support in exchange for providing continental companies with access to raw materials.

Despite the hope for democratic partners such as Norway, Europe is unlikely to be able to do without imports from countries with authoritarian regimes — in particular, China and Turkey. Adding to the complexity is the fact that the mining industry in Europe has all but disappeared, and new projects often face local resistance due to environmental risks and high CO₂ emissions from processing.

“The secure supply of key raw materials will be a decisive factor for Europe’s defense and economic independence,” concludes Wurmser.

From partnership to rivalry: how the US ceased to be a reliable support for the EU in the pursuit of raw materials

Until recently, the European Union and the United States spoke the same language when it came to access to strategic raw materials. In 2022, together with a number of developed countries, they launched the Mineral Security Partnership, an ambitious agreement to jointly ensure resource stability. At the time, this pact looked like a reliable guarantee of a common future: the US State Department proudly declared that cooperation would help create a reliable and secure supply system.

But this era of unity is behind us. In the context of heightened geopolitics, the US is increasingly acting in its own interests, even when it goes against the needs of its allies. Raw materials are a new geopolitical weapon, and Washington increasingly behaves not as a strategic partner, but as a competitor.

A key moment is February 2023, when the US introduced another trade restriction against China. Beijing was quick to respond and within hours announced export controls on five key metals, including tungsten, an important component for the military industry. China, which last year provided 80% of the world’s supply of this resource, reminded the West who now controls the global market for critical materials.

And although Europe has not yet felt a direct blow, the signal is unequivocal: the era of free trade is coming to an end. Resources become a tool of pressure, and former partners become new centers of power. For the EU, which has relied on trade and diplomacy for decades, it means the end of the usual model.

The answer to these challenges should be the Law on Critical Raw Materials (CRMA). In addition to quotas for own mining and processing, it also provides for the acceleration of approvals for new mining projects. However, reality significantly lags behind ambitious plans. Even in Norway, a country where the mining industry enjoys state support and a generally favorable investment climate, the process of rolling out projects takes years. For example, the company Norge Mining conducted the first test drilling as early as 2020, but the actual extraction of metals is planned only in 2029. So we have nine years to wait even under ideal conditions.

In such conditions, the EU is forced to look for not just partners, but politically stable and democratic allies who share its vision of sustainable development and security. The US hardly falls into that category these days, especially after Donald Trump’s flamboyant attempts to play the Greenland card against Denmark.

Therefore, Norway becomes the closest ally – a country with high environmental standards, a powerful resource base and a strategic vision shared with the EU. In today’s world, where metal is becoming more valuable than oil, the reliability of a partner means more than high-profile diplomatic statements.

CRMA: strategic autonomy on paper

Against the background of the new geopolitical reality, when strategic raw materials become weapons in the big game, the European Union is trying to protect itself with the help of a new legislative instrument – the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA). Its adoption was a response to the EU’s dependence on external suppliers — primarily China, which dominates the market for more than 20 key metals.

CRMA was officially presented by the European Commission in March 2023 as an attempt to ensure resource independence and security of supply. The law defines a list of critical and strategic raw materials — from lithium and cobalt to rare earth elements — and sets clear goals:

• by 2030, at least 10% of domestic production
• at least 40% of raw material processing must take place within the EU,
• at least 15% of critical materials are from recycling,
• and no more than 65% dependence on one external supplier.

These numbers sound encouraging. But they need real solutions at the level of states — not just ambitions at the level of institutions. The biggest obstacle remains the slow permitting process. Today, it can take 10 to 15 years to open a new mine in Europe—far too long in an age where markets respond to geopolitical signals in real time.

CRMA, in particular, proposes to simplify and speed up approval procedures for new mining, processing and recycling projects, reducing their consideration to a maximum of 24 months. This should help member countries start production faster. But whether it can be done in practice, given the opposition of environmental activists, communities and national bureaucracies, is an open question.

Another important element of CRMA is the strengthening of international cooperation. The EU plans to enter into “strategic partnerships” with countries that have the necessary resources, but also share European values ​​— political stability, the rule of law, and environmental standards. The idea is to reduce supply risks not only through geographic diversification, but also through “value filtering” of partners.

That is, CRMA is not only about economics, but also about politics. About who Europe wants and can cooperate with in a world that looks less and less like a global market and more and more like an arena of strategic competition.

Between values ​​and questionable partnership

Europe is faced with a tough choice: either to remain faithful to its own democratic values, or to flexibly adapt to the realities of geopolitics, where raw material wealth is concentrated in the hands of not always reliable regimes. In an effort to reduce dependence on a single source of supply, the EU is increasingly looking to countries with dubious reputations – autocratic, corrupt or politically unstable.

In this context, calls for “pragmatic diplomacy” are increasingly being heard. Thus, the resumption of contacts with Turkey is taking place against the background of an increasing need for strategic raw materials, despite the fact that the political situation in the country shows alarming signals. The arrest of the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, a popular oppositionist and potential rival of Erdogan, has forced Brussels to recall principles again, but no longer with the certainty that they can be put before security interests.

The case is symptomatic of how difficult it is for Europe to maintain high standards in a world where resources are the new weapon and trade is the battlefield. In the future, the EU will face even more moral dilemmas: how far is it willing to compromise in order not to be left without critically important raw materials?

Canada: an undervalued ally in the fight for strategic resources

Among the partners with whom the EU seeks to build a sustainable supply chain of strategic resources, Canada occupies a special place. It is one of the few countries in the world that at the same time has significant deposits of critical minerals, stable democracy, high environmental standards and shared strategic interests with the West.

First, it has significant reserves of many critical minerals, including nickel, lithium, cobalt, and graphite—key components for the green transformation. Canada’s mining sector has long been distinguished by high standards of transparency, compliance with environmental regulations and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples. This makes Canada not just a supplier, but a partner whose development model resonates with European values.

Second, there is already a contractual framework between the EU and Canada: the CETA Free Trade Agreement, which, although applied temporarily, has significantly simplified bilateral trade, including the export of raw materials. In 2023, the EU and Canada signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the field of critical minerals, which covers not only exports, but also joint investments, sustainable mining and the development of value-added technological chains.

For the EU, this is a chance to diversify supplies, reduce dependence on autocracies and bet on a partnership that has a future. For Canada, this is an opportunity to strengthen its role in the global market, in particular in the field of green energy, batteries and the electric vehicle industry.

However, here too, one should not exaggerate the pace of change. Preparation of fields, agreement with local communities, construction of infrastructure – these are years. But unlike risky deals with autocrats, investing in Canada’s relationship is about long-term security and geo-economic stability.