May 8, the date that commemorates the victory over Nazism, is also a reminder of the moment when humanity first came to the brink of self-destruction. It was in the postwar period that the foundations of nuclear deterrence were laid, a concept that was supposed to ensure “peace through the balance of fear.” But has the world really learned to live with nuclear weapons? Today, eight decades after the end of the war, threats are being made again regarding its use. Historical parallels become dangerously straightforward: the war in Europe, the revival of the language of “existential struggle” and the over-reliance on military force as an argument in international politics.
Today’s return of the discourse on nuclear deterrence to the center of European strategic debates indicates not only a change in the security environment, but also a crisis of conceptual clarity. Despite the widespread use of terms such as “nuclear shield” or “security guarantees”, it remains unclear what mechanisms this rhetoric is based on and to what extent it reflects the real state of affairs. In the new geopolitical conditions, when authoritarian leaders demonstrate a readiness to use nuclear rhetoric as a tool of pressure, it is worth questioning the effectiveness of the classic deterrence model. Can it really guarantee stability, or are we dealing with a dangerous illusion of control?
When fear became a strategic doctrine
At one time, the concept of nuclear deterrence was formed not as a guarantee of peace, but as a response to the fear of total destruction. His logic is paradoxical: prevent war by threatening war. After the Second World War, against the background of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it became obvious: nuclear weapons are not just a new type of weapon, but a civilizational risk. In the 1950s, the USA and the USSR began to develop their arsenals, simultaneously giving birth to the theory “guaranteed mutual destruction” (Mutually Assured Destruction, MAD). The bottom line was simple and terrifying: neither side would dare press a button knowing they would be hit back with no chance of survival.
During the Cold War, this deterrence worked more as a strategic equation than as a moral position. Military analysts and politicians have created whole systems for calculating “acceptable losses”, “second strikes” and “windows of vulnerability”. The nuclear doctrine has turned into a reckoning with millions of human lives in the “collateral damage” column.
Despite this, it was the fear of losing control over nuclear escalation that forced the two superpowers to sit down at the negotiating table. Arms control treaties – SALT, START, Non-Proliferation Treaty – became an attempt to at least partially reduce the risks. But even these documents were not a guarantee of security, only a fragile agreement between rational actors. And what if the leaders turn out to be irrational?
Today we see how the old paradigm is cracking. A world where the number of nuclear-weapon states has grown and the level of predictability has fallen is looking less and less like the bipolar order of the Cold War. The concept of deterrence, which was built on mutual fear and control, increasingly looks like a vestige of a bygone era, which does not take into account either the new types of conflicts or the personalized, often impulsive politics of today.
Nuclear deterrence is a dangerous illusion
After the end of the Cold War, it seemed that the era of the nuclear threat was a thing of the past. But with the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, this illusion was dispelled. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin regularly succeeds to hints about the possibility of using nuclear weapons, and the return of Donald Trump to the White House and his statements about the conditionality of solidarity within NATO only increased the anxiety in Europe.
Against this background, in Germany, as in Europe in general, metaphors such as “nuclear shield” or “nuclear safety guarantee” are increasingly being used. They sound on airwaves and at round tables with such confidence, as if it is about something concrete and reliable. In fact, this only demonstrates a deep misunderstanding of how nuclear strategy works and how much it depends not on abstract systems, but on the decisions of specific political leaders.
The myth of the “nuclear shield”
The concept of “nuclear shield” is nothing more than a euphemism. It creates the false impression that Europe can hide under some kind of protective umbrella from a nuclear disaster. But in reality, nuclear deterrence has nothing to do with passive defense. It assumes that a potential aggressor will refrain from attacking only because it fears a guaranteed nuclear response.
Simply put: threats only work if they are actually backed by a willingness to use a weapon. There are precedents – remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After these tragedies, the world learned a terrible lesson: crossing the nuclear threshold leads to suffering that is difficult to even imagine.
Today, many politicians and commentators consciously or subconsciously choose to believe only in the deterrence theory. It is more convenient for them to talk about the balance of power than to think about what will happen if at least one of the players presses the red button. The human psyche cannot withstand the scale of a potential disaster. That is why in psychology there is a term “mental numbness” – a state when the mind blocks the ability to imagine tragedies of a colossal scale, such as a nuclear war.
Global society needs an honest conversation about the fact that nuclear deterrence is not insurance, but a “game” on the edge of the nuclear abyss. Hope for a “nuclear shield” does not guarantee security, it only feeds a false sense of control. And in reality, the world is balancing on an abyss, in which the decisive word is not the system, but the will of individual people, such as Putin or Trump.
Deterrence in an Age of Unpredictability: Why the Old Logic Doesn’t Work Anymore
Today, the concept of nuclear deterrence faces challenges that were not foreseen by its creators. First of all, it is the emergence of new, smaller nuclear states that do not fit into the logic of classic bipolar deterrence. North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel – each of them operates in its own regional context, often in the absence of effective mechanisms of communication or deterrence according to Western models. RAND Corporation analysts back in 2018 warned, that new nuclear players are more often driven by emotion, national prestige, or domestic politics than by cold strategic calculation (RAND, Understanding Nuclear Deterrence in an Era of Strategic Competition, 2018).
Infographic: IA “FACT”
The second challenge is personalized politics and leadership instability. In the 20th century, despite ideological opposition, the world’s nuclear arsenals were controlled by apparatuses based on bureaucratic rationality. Today, it depends more and more on the will of a specific person. Putin’s threats about the possible use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine and the West are a clear confirmation of that. As researcher Benjamin Valentino notes, “the concentration of decision-making in the hands of one leader lowers the threshold for nuclear escalation.” Such an environment is vulnerable to impulsive actions, miscalculations, or even simply erroneous assessments of the situation.
The third factor is the emergence of new types of threats, in particular cyberspace. If earlier containment was based on control over physical triggers, today experts warn that a cyberattack on an early warning system or on command and control tools could trigger a false escalation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Cyber Deterrence and Nuclear Stability, 2021). At the same time, no international treaty yet regulates cyber vulnerabilities in the field of nuclear security.
The fourth threat is the erosion of international agreements. Since the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, the system of restrictions that held back the arms race for years has effectively been destroyed. The New START agreement between the USA and Russia is the last remnant of the contractual architecture, but it too was in danger of disintegration against the background of the war in Ukraine.
Finally, the threat of “tactical” or limited use of nuclear weapons must be considered. Some analysts, including Matthew Kroenig of the Atlantic Council, warn that the temptation to use a “small” nuclear warhead in a local conflict is not so inconceivable. And this radically lowers the nuclear threshold, which was considered inviolable for decades.
So, the modern era is not the time to romanticize nuclear deterrence as a “security guarantee.” On the contrary, it demonstrates how fragile this concept is and how easily it can turn into a fatal illusion.
What Instead of Deterrence: Finding Alternatives in an Age of Global Vulnerability
As the concept of nuclear deterrence increasingly resembles playing with fire, a natural question arises: what alternatives are there? Can the world abandon a strategy based solely on mutual fear?
The first alternative is global nuclear disarmament. It sounds utopian, but it has a legal basis. In 2017, the UN General Assembly adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which for the first time directly prohibits its development, testing, storage and use. As of 2024, 70 countries have ratified the treaty. The problem, however, is that none of the nuclear powers have done so. The US, Russia, France, China and the UK refuse to even recognize the TPNW as legitimate. So now this contract is more of a moral than a practical lever.
The second alternative is to strengthen the arms control architecture. This means not only a return to agreements such as START or INF, but also the creation of new ones that take into account modern realities, including the development of hypersonic weapons, autonomous systems and cyber threats. Initiatives such as the Stockholm Initiative or the Vienna Process are trying to create a platform for such dialogue. But without the participation of key players – Russia, China, the USA – any agreement risks remaining declarative.
The third way is the transition to the “No First Use” (NFU) doctrine. This approach involves the nuclear state’s official refusal to use weapons proactively – only in response. China and India formally adhere to this policy. But most nuclear powers, in particular the USA, retain the right to a “preventive” strike. Moving to a universal NFU doctrine will not eliminate the risks, but it will reduce the likelihood of nuclear escalation due to mistake or misunderstanding.
The fourth alternative is regional nuclear-free zones. Such agreements are already in force in the world – Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Africa (Pelindaba Agreement), Southeast Asia (Bangkok Agreement). They show that nuclear-free status can be part of regional identity and security. The introduction of such a zone in Europe looks fantastic at the moment, but as a long-term goal it is an alternative that deserves attention.
And finally – the demilitarization of security as such. This means a gradual shift in emphasis from weapons to diplomacy, institutions and trust. In the world after the Second World War, these mechanisms – the UN, the OSCE, multilateral alliances – helped to avoid a major war. Returning to this logic can be the only strategy that not only restrains conflicts, but also reduces the likelihood of their occurrence.
Nuclear deterrence is a strategy from the past. Alternatives to it require political will, diplomatic patience and readiness for difficult compromises. But they have a chance for security, based not on fear, but on shared responsibility.
