Political

The Economist: How it was planned and what the Kursk gambit of the ZSU might lead to

The culmination of the Kursk operation is behind us, and now it is possible to lift the veil of secrecy about how it was planned in front of the general public. World media, among others The Economist, take the courage from the position of an outside observer to analyze the prerequisites that made a successful counteroffensive of the Armed Forces possible, as well as its possible consequences.

For the first time since World War II, Russia was invaded. The Economist sees in this event a vivid symbolism, they say, if last time the Ukrainian Red Army helped repel the Nazi attack in the Kursk region, now the Ukrainians themselves are advancing on the same territory. Ukraine’s surprise attack, launched on August 6, is bold and audacious and could change the narrative of the war.

Secrecy, informational silence and maneuver attacks are the key to a successful counteroffensive

The planning of the Kursk operation was shrouded in strict secrecy. Even Ukraine’s Western allies did not know about it. Only a limited group of generals and security forces were included in the circle of trust of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Syrian Army. He communicated with President Zelenskyi without the participation of the headquarters.

The main goal of the operation was to withdraw Russian troops from Donbas and create an advantage for future negotiations. Ukrainian troops planned to attack Bryansk and Kursk regions at once, but as a result it was decided to focus on Kursk.

On the eve of the operation, several scenarios of attacking the weakest points in the Russian defense line were considered. Among them – an attack on the Bryansk region in the north, an offensive in the Kursk region, and a possible combination of two or more attacks.

Informational silence during the planning of the operation contributed to the rapid advance deep into Russian territory. The guys of the Armed Forces used “maneuver attacks”, when small units explored vulnerable places and used heavy weapons. The rotation of troops took place a week and a half before the start of the operation. It seems that the orcs began to suspect something in early August when they were suddenly issued with equipment.

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The validity of the boomerang principle in war

The prevailing opinion in the global information space is that Ukraine has the full right morally and legally to transfer the war to the territory of the aggressor country. After all, every state has the right to defend itself, and this right can be exercised not only within the internal borders of the country that was attacked. Russia is waging an unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine. Thousands of attacks on the Sumy region were carried out from abroad, precisely from the territory of the Kursk region. According to the logic of war, the military and material resources that support these attacks are legitimate military objectives.

The success of the Ukrainian offensive operation on the Kursk arc currently seems obvious: the guys of the Armed Forces broke through the defenses, occupied dozens of settlements and captured hundreds of enemy soldiers.

This helped to raise the fighting spirit of Ukrainians after the failure of last year’s offensive in Donbas. In addition, it strengthened the international prestige of Ukraine, gave a chance to international partners to convince themselves that Ukraine can seize the initiative in the war. It is encouraging that the USA and Germany do not object to their weapons being used on Russian territory.

And the king is naked

Finally, the Kursk operation became a kind of litmus test for identifying the vulnerable places of the aggressor country. Of course, Putin will use the Ukrainian invasion to rationalize his big lie that Russia is allegedly waging a defensive war against the West. But in the imagination of the thinking audience, this will once again prove that the carefully constructed image of Putin’s power and control is emptiness itself. Just as the power and professionalism of the “second army of the world” are exaggerated.

The orc fuhrer hoped for a blitzkrieg, but two years later his dream remains unfulfilled. When his former chef led a riot march that marched most of the way to Moscow last year, the Russian military did not intervene. When Ukraine invaded Kursk, the local civilians did not resist either. Isn’t this proof of the phantom regime?

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The risks of the Ukrainian gambit

Despite all this, The Economist believes, the Ukrainian gambit also carries serious risks. Ukraine certainly hopes that its Kursk offensive operation will draw Russian troops away from Donbas, easing the pressure on Ukrainian forces besieged there. But there is no sign that Russia has withdrawn many troops from the front line. And this has a double meaning: Ukraine has also transferred many of its best forces from Donbas to Kursk. Indeed, Russia has continued to advance in eastern Ukraine since August 6; now it is less than 13 km from Pokrovsk, an important crossroads.

Ukraine should try to reap the political rewards of its success in Kursk, bearing in mind that its supply lines will become thin. In the case of large losses in manpower and equipment in the coming weeks, this may accelerate the failure of the Armed Forces in Donbas, as well as erase the energy of the momentum that has appeared in the last two weeks. That is, a large-scale occupation would be unjustified, unlike keeping a certain protected territory in Kursk as a bargaining chip in future negotiations.

The best defense is offense

Ukraine’s Western partners can learn a valuable lesson from the Kursk operation: for the sake of successful defense, sometimes one should resort to the attack. The USA, the World Bank and France continue to “blow on the cold”, prohibiting Ukraine from using its long-range missiles on Russian territory. Some restrictions are, of course, valid: for example, not to use missiles against Russian nuclear facilities.

But it is hardly worth exaggerating the risk of escalation. The fact that Ukraine is not allowed to strike Russian air bases, from which planes deliver glider bombs that destroy Ukrainian cities and kill military and civilians, is an unjustified precaution. Orcs, who defiantly and criminally violate the borders of Ukraine, should not count on shelter outside their own borders.

Tatyana Morarash

 

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