Why the decisions of Ukrainian courts in cases against the Russian Federation remain legally correct, but in fact powerless
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia, Ukrainians are increasingly turning to the courts with claims for compensation for damage caused as a result of hostilities. Among the plaintiffs are the owners of housing that was destroyed during the shelling; entrepreneurs who lost warehouses, shops or equipment; farmers whose land is mined or blocked; families that were forced to leave their property in the occupation. In each case, it is about both documenting losses and trying to achieve recognition and compensation through a court decision. The number of such cases is steadily increasing, some of them end with decisions in favor of the plaintiff, and some of them have already entered into force. However, even after receiving a court decision, people are faced with questions: what next? How to recover damages from a state that does not recognize the jurisdiction of Ukrainian courts?
Court decisions in Ukraine regarding compensation for damages caused by the Russian Federation
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia, Ukrainians have increasingly turned to the courts, demanding compensation for damages caused by the war. These are not isolated attempts – to date, at least 1,482 decisions in cases against the Russian Federation have been recorded in the court register. At the same time, lawsuits are filed both by ordinary citizens who have lost their homes, businesses or relatives, and by large companies whose facilities were destroyed or lost as a result of hostilities or occupation. Year by year, the number of such cases is growing — and at the same time, the amount of awarded sums is growing. However, the very appearance of a decision does not mean that it can be implemented.
The dynamics of lawsuits over the past two years demonstrates that the legal initiative has already gone beyond a symbolic gesture. If in 2022, Ukrainian courts passed only 52 decisions in cases of recovery of damages from Russia (28 on claims of citizens and 24 – from businesses), in 2023 this number increased to 405 (272 on claims of citizens and 133 – from businesses), then in In 2024, there were already 812 of them (559 due to citizen claims and 253 – from businesses). At the same time, in 2025, only in the first quarter alone, 213 decisions were recorded (126 based on citizen claims and 87 – from businesses). And these are only those cases that were discovered through open analysis systems, such as “Babusi” and Opentatabot. Their actual number may be higher, taking into account undisclosed or not yet published decisions.
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Separately, it is worth looking at who files lawsuits and how the courts react to them. In the category of cases submitted by citizens, in 2024 there were 239 decisions on full satisfaction of the claim (42.8%), 281 decisions on partial satisfaction (50.3%), and only in 39 cases (7%) the court refused.
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At the same time, in 2024, Ukrainian courts issued 253 decisions in business cases against the Russian Federation. Moreover, the vast majority of them – 224 cases, or 88.5%, ended with full satisfaction of the claim, which indicates the high-quality preparation of materials and a well-designed evidence base on the part of the companies. Another 26 decisions (10.3%) were satisfied partially — most likely, due to partial acceptance of settlements or correction of the claimed amounts of damages. And in only three cases (1.2%) the court refused to satisfy the claim completely, which makes this category of cases the most stable in terms of effectiveness among all claims submitted to the Russian Federation.
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Instead, in the first months of 2025, the courts have already fully satisfied 53 claims of Ukrainians, but also rejected six. It is significant that the majority of decisions are made in favor of the plaintiffs. Business also actively files lawsuits, while the effectiveness of decisions in its favor is even higher. As of April, not a single case was recorded when a business claim was rejected, 68 claims were fully satisfied.
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Such statistics can be explained by the quality of the preparation of lawsuits: the companies have qualified lawyers, complete financial documentation, independent assessments of losses and clearly drawn up acts. In addition, it shows that the courts recognize the legitimacy of claims and the presence of proven losses. The main arguments in these cases are expert opinions on destroyed or lost property, accompanying photo and video materials, documents on ownership, as well as geolocation of shelling, which was carried out by Russian forces.
As an example, we can cite the court case of the Magnat agricultural company, which was awarded 180 billion hryvnias in the first case and another 67 billion in the second. Another compensation of UAH 12 billion was awarded to the Alchevsk Coke Chemical Plant. Citizens, in turn, also win large sums. For example, the court awarded a resident of Kharkiv UAH 328 million in compensation for destroyed property; residents of Zaporozhye received UAH 170 million each. These are individual cases, but they indicate that the amounts in such cases are not limited to conditional “moral damages”, they are about real property losses, which the court recognizes as grounds for compensation.
Together, all decisions made regarding compensation to citizens and businesses as of 2025 amount to more than 913 billion hryvnias, but even this amount is not the limit. The register contains claims for much larger volumes. The most famous case is the claim of a resident of Khmelnytskyi for 999 quadrillion hryvnias. It was rejected, but the formally registered lawsuit demonstrates the emotional and psychological dimension of the problem — many Ukrainians try to record the very fact of loss without even counting on real recovery. And this is where the main questions arise: what to do next with the won court decisions? Does our state decide it?
Why court decisions against the Russian Federation are not implemented in practice
As we can see, a large number of court decisions have been passed in Ukraine today, recognizing the responsibility of the Russian Federation for damages caused as a result of armed aggression. These cases are filed both by individuals who have lost their homes, businesses, relatives, property, and the opportunity to work, as well as by companies that have suffered serious economic losses as a result of occupation, shelling, blocking of assets, or illegal confiscation of property. All these decisions are legally valid, they went through a full process of consideration, analysis of evidence, assessment of proven damage. However, none of them have been implemented yet. Currently, there is no mechanism that would ensure the implementation of such decisions. That is why court decisions remain valid, but implementation is blocked due to the lack of legal leverage.
First of all, the very structure of state responsibility for an international offense is limited by the modern system of public international law. Ukraine does not have a universal instrument that allows compensation to be collected from another state in a national court. The mechanism exists only when both parties — both the claimant state and the respondent state — have recognized the jurisdiction of the relevant body. Russia does not recognize such jurisdiction. Accordingly, even if national courts make a decision, they have no way to influence its implementation if there is no political support or corresponding legal agreement outside of Ukraine.
In addition, most of the states on whose territory Russia’s assets are potentially located are still governed by the principle of state immunity. Even in the presence of non-diplomatic or military assets, courts often refuse to attach or recognize a foreign court’s garnishment order. Immunity is interpreted as a tool for ensuring international legal order, and not as an exception for a country waging an aggressive war.
After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western countries reacted in a consolidated manner: one of the first joint actions was the freezing of Russian state assets abroad. The total amount of such assets is estimated at approximately 300 billion dollars, with the lion’s share of these funds concentrated in Europe. The largest amount — 191 billion euros — is held by the Belgian depository Euroclear. These assets remain frozen, but continue to generate interest income: in 2023 alone, the profit amounted to 4.4 billion euros, and it is these funds that are discussed as a potential source of support for Ukraine. Several billion more are frozen in Clearstream, Luxembourg’s financial infrastructure.
Great Britain holds about 30 billion euros of sovereign Russian assets. In addition, another 20 billion euros of private property of Russian individuals — accounts, real estate, and luxury goods — have been blocked in the country. London has publicly stated that it is considering transferring the assets of the Russian Central Bank to Ukraine as a loan, provided that Russia pays reparations in the future. France blocked about 19 billion euros of state funds and, separately, the assets of Russian citizens, including bank accounts, real estate, and yachts. About 7 billion euros of Russian state assets have been frozen in the US, and the same amount in Switzerland, which also has about 5 billion euros of private Russian funds. Germany holds about 5 billion euros in assets, although details of their status, whether public or private, have not been made public. Australia has also joined the sanctions regime — about 5 billion euros have been frozen in its jurisdiction. At the same time, Italy focused on private assets: about 2 billion euros in accounts, real estate, cars and yachts. About 1 billion euros of assets related to Russian oligarchs have been frozen in Poland.
While the Russian assets themselves remain blocked, the profits they generate go towards strengthening our defense capabilities, rebuilding infrastructure, and macro-financial support, but not to compensate for losses. This issue rests not on political will, but on complex legal and economic constraints. Positions among European countries on this issue remain ambiguous. Formally, the assets are frozen, but the actual seizure involves another legal category — confiscation. It is she who causes discussions and legal disputes. Some European states are cautious, because the final transfer of funds to Ukraine would require the creation of a separate legal mechanism that would allow bypassing or revising the rules on sovereign immunity and protection of foreign investments.
On the one hand, frozen Russian reserves can be confiscated within the framework of the doctrine of “countermeasures” — a concept of international law that allows the state to respond to a serious violation of norms, in particular armed aggression. According to this approach, the assets of the Russian Federation can be not simply frozen, but seized and realized through sale or pledge, with the subsequent allocation of the received funds to the needs of Ukraine or to a special international recovery fund.
On the other hand, such a confiscation would contradict current international legal norms and create a dangerous precedent. Russia will most likely challenge such actions in international courts, and other states may begin to reconsider the safety of storing their own reserves in Western jurisdictions. Jurisprudence on similar cases exists, but it is limited and varies widely in circumstances. For example, Iraqi assets were confiscated after the end of the Kuwait War in 1990, as were German assets after the defeat of the Third Reich in World War II. In the current situation, the war continues, which makes it difficult to justify such actions even from the standpoint of a precedent international approach.
In addition, in the US, experts in public international law and debt obligations are paying attention to the limitations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The act does not give the United States government the authority to directly seize frozen foreign assets—in this case, Russian assets—absent a direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia. This is another barrier to turning a political initiative into a legally sustainable solution.
Confiscation of private property of Russian citizens or companies is formally possible, but requires separate court procedures that must prove personal responsibility and connection with the regime. It is much more difficult to seize or transfer Russian state assets. This is where the so-called sovereign immunity comes into force, according to which the assets of one state on the territory of another enjoy legal protection and cannot be seized without the consent of the owner. This immunity protects, in particular, foreign currency reserves, property of diplomatic institutions, facilities of state banks.
An additional complication is the numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties on mutual protection of investments, which were concluded long before the start of the war. They limit the right to unilaterally confiscate assets, even in the event of a political or military conflict. It is impossible to change or bypass these mechanisms without systemic reform of international economic law.
Currently, the European Union, despite its declaration of support for Ukraine, has not decided to create a full-fledged mechanism for the confiscation of frozen Russian state funds. The main reason is fear of the consequences of such a precedent. In Brussels, they believe that if the EU allows itself to seize the assets of a state, even one that is waging an aggressive war, it can undermine the confidence of other states in European financial systems. In particular, countries in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East may decide that their reserves are also not protected and begin withdrawing funds from European banks. This threatens large-scale capital outflow and undermining the position of the euro as a reserve currency, which is of strategic importance for the economies of the European Union. Consequently, fear of financial risks and legal consequences deters the West from decisive action, even when the political arguments seem sufficient.
Another reason for a positive solution to the issue of compensation for damages is that Ukrainian legislation does not provide for a clear procedure for the automatic recognition of decisions against the Russian Federation in foreign jurisdictions. Each case requires a separate international legal action: filing an application, proving the existence of assets, overcoming the resistance of the defendant’s lawyers, and agreeing with local courts. This is a lengthy process that requires specialized legal support, often in several countries at the same time. Such costs are prohibitive for individuals. Business has a little more tools, but even big companies can’t get the actual execution done for years.
Separately, it is worth considering the factor of dispersion of Russian assets. Most of the state funds and property of the Russian Federation are registered not to Russian authorities, but to various funds, state-owned enterprises, affiliated companies, banks, trusts, and subsidiary structures. Establishing a connection between the legal entity that owns the property and the aggressor state is a separate process. Without this, no decision can be implemented, because formally the owner is not the state, but a third structure.
Another factor is the absence of a national body in Ukraine that would be responsible for the centralized collection, legal support and international promotion of such decisions. Each claimant acts independently. There are some examples, for example, Naftogaz, which has been conducting the case through international arbitrations and courts since 2016, but there is no coordinated state strategy for supporting decisions at the international level.
So, within the limits of the existing legal system, Ukrainian courts do what they can: recognize the damage, calculate it and make a decision. Although they still remain within the scope of the declaration, this is not a useless action, because it records the damage and the person responsible. The plaintiffs understand this, that is why they do not refuse the fixation, because they know: the one who did not declare the losses today will not be able to prove anything tomorrow. But without a systematic international agreement, a new legal regime regarding the assets of the Russian Federation, changes in the international interpretation of immunity, the creation of a compensation fund, as well as the political will of foreign countries, the decisions of Ukrainian courts will remain legally correct, but effectively powerless.
