New faces in the old system: an effective reboot of the Cabinet of Ministers or another imitation of changes in the management system
The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has once again made a move in the domestic political game — this time, presenting the “Servant of the People” faction as candidates for the renewed government. The presentation of new faces in the Cabinet of Ministers took place against the background of accumulated problems: a chronic shortage of management capacity during the war, blurred responsibility in crisis sectors, conflicts within the authorities and increasing pressure from society and Western partners. However, the main questions are: is this the beginning of a systemic change in public administration or another cosmetic repair? Will the new composition of the government be able to really change the situation in the conditions of a war economy, constant threats and blurred boundaries of powers?
Presentation of the new composition of the Cabinet in factional format
As the head of the faction Davyd Arahamia reported, the announcement of candidates for key government positions took place on July 16 during a meeting of the “Servant of the People” faction in the presence of the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi, the head of the Office of the President Andriy Yermak, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Ruslan Stefanchuk and his first deputy Oleksandr Kornienko. At the same time, the presentation of the new composition of the Cabinet of Ministers was not accompanied by open public explanations and took place in an intra-factional format, typical of the decision-making model that has been forming in the Ukrainian executive power in recent years.
The coordination of candidacies took place in a closed format, without the participation of representatives of the non-factional environment and public discussion regarding the political expediency of decisions or alternative candidacies. Apparently, internal consistency and managerial compatibility with the Office of the President became the main points of reference in forming the composition of the government. In the proposed composition, there are no politically influential figures or independent players, instead, there is a predominance of functionaries with experience in internal government work, mostly familiar to the president’s team or already integrated into the decision-making vertical. At the same time, no public presentation of the new government’s action strategy or vision of changing the principles of public administration was presented. But
The central figure of the proposed new government was Yulia Svyridenko, a candidate for the post of Prime Minister. Her nomination is a continuation of the course on technocratic management, at the same time reinforced by the factor of loyalty. Svyridenko, who held the position of First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, is not associated with conflicts, does not have a clear public profile, but has experience of functioning in the decision-making system controlled by Bankova. Her appointment solves the problem of prime minister rotation without threatening the political independence of the head of government. That is, an autonomous player is not offered now, it will, like its predecessor, perform a technical function.
The transfer of Denys Shmyhal from the post of prime minister to the post of minister of defense requires special attention. Such a reassignment looks like an attempt to keep in the power structure a person who was the head of the Cabinet of Ministers for more than five years and actually managed the defense sphere. After the dismissal of Oleksiy Reznikov and the period of questionable effectiveness of Umerov, the president actually returns to the model where the head of the Ministry of Defense is not a military man or a strategist, but an administrator capable of maintaining the process without escalation. This decision indicates a desire to avoid experiments in the power sphere, in which political stability and controllability currently prevail over institutional reform.
The key node in the new Cabinet should be Mykhailo Fedorov, who is proposed for the post of First Deputy Prime Minister while retaining the position of Minister of Digital Transformation. This strengthening is not only personal, but also conceptual: digitalization as a political brand of “Zelensky’s team” is gaining additional weight in the government system. However, it is also a marker that at a time when the country’s physical infrastructure is crumbling, the state is betting on digital infrastructure as a point of growth, presence and managerial control.
The nomination of Taras Kachka to the position of Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration obviously meets the expectations of Western partners for more consistent and disciplined cooperation with Ukraine in the field of European integration. He has considerable experience of participating in negotiations, but does not belong to public figures who shape the political agenda or come up with their own initiatives. This format allows keeping this direction within the limits of executive discipline without the threat of excessive independence in decision-making.
The transfer of Herman Galushchenko from the field of energy to justice is one of the least predicted points of the personnel proposal. Galushchenko worked in the Ministry of Justice under the leadership of Olena Lukash. According to mass media, Herman Galushchenko’s name is mentioned in the context of corruption proceedings, which concern the Ministry of Justice. In the same episode, Deputy Prime Minister Olga Stefanishyna also appears, regarding whom the possibility of both dismissal from the government and potential appointment to the position of ambassador of Ukraine to the EU is being considered. His transfer to the post of Minister of Justice is evidence of internal personnel economy — political players with a formally acceptable reputation move from one sector to another without being tied to specialized expertise. This continues the traditional state inertial model: not to create new points of responsibility, but to adapt existing ones.
Oleksiy Sobolev, a candidate for the post of Minister of Economy, previously worked in structures engaged in economic policy development and consulting for the public sector. Its activities are mainly related to technical analysis and preparation of decisions in the field of economy, without an independent political role. He is perceived as a technocrat with a liberal background, but without a clear public profile.
The Ministry of Energy is to be headed by Svitlana Grynchuk, the current Minister of Ecology. This permutation fixes the structural logic: replacement from within the government without the admission of external figures, maximally manageable, minimally risky. The same logic is evident in the nomination of Denys Ulyutin to the position of head of the newly created Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine. The wording of the name of this ministry is in itself noteworthy—the state attempts to conceptualize “unity” as an administrative category that can be managed through the ministry. Ulyutin, as the former First Deputy Minister of Finance, is a financier, not a humanitarian — that is, the government chooses a functionary, not a public politician.
By the way, the executive power is preparing to merge several ministries within the framework of government reorganization. According to the spokeswoman of the “Servant of the People” faction Yulia Paliychuk, it is planned to merge five ministries into two new ones. In particular, the Ministry of National Unity should be attached to the Ministry of Social Policy, as a result of which the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine will be formed. In addition, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources will be merged into one department — the Ministry of Economic Resources of Ukraine.
At the same time, a significant number of current ministers, in particular, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and others, retain their positions: Serhii Marchenko, Ihor Klymenko, Oksen Lisovyi, Viktor Lyashko, Andriy Sybiga, Nataliya Kalmykova, Matviy Bidny. Some of them have been under criticism for a long time, in particular the Minister of the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science, Oksen Lisovyi, who is accused of systematically destroying education due to ill-conceived decisions, conflict initiatives, and frankly ineffective reforms. In addition, there remain public claims against him in connection with the suspicion of plagiarism, which was never properly removed.
The preservation of such figures in the new composition of the government does not indicate that they are completely satisfied with the current vertical of power, and it is not interested in their real effectiveness. They simply do not want to change them, even in spite of criticism and reputational risks. In the conditions of war, this decision is explained by the desire to avoid any complications in managed but problematic ministries.
So, the new personnel combination represents a government mosaic in which reshuffles do not initiate change, but only cement the old controlled structure. It was gathered not for the purpose of strengthening the efficiency of state administration, but for ideological considerations, loyalty and manageability of new and old ministers.
Legal uncertainty, lack of reporting and accountability
The formation of the new composition of the Cabinet of Ministers took place outside the boundaries of a clearly defined legal procedure. Article 10 of the Law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” directly prohibits the termination of the powers of the Cabinet during martial law, providing for the preservation of the stability of key executive bodies. Since no relevant changes have been made to this article, there is no legal basis for a complete reboot of the government. The government should continue to work as it is, until the special legal regime is abolished or an amendment to the law is adopted that would allow personnel rotation. At the same time, no public arguments regarding the legality of this process were heard either.
As a result, the new composition of the government appears illegitimately, without a legally regulated basis, in fact, due to putting the parliament in front of the fact. A possible vote in the Verkhovna Rada, in the absence of an official legal justification, will only emphasize the violation of compliance with the legislative procedure. Theoretically, such a course of action can be challenged in the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, but given its political inertia and the slowness of consideration of similar cases, it does not look like an effective mechanism for protecting the law. That is, it turns out that the legislative body will act contrary to the law that it passed.
The violation of the procedure for submitting the candidacy of the prime minister is no less revealing. In accordance with Article 114 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the president submits a candidacy for consideration by the parliament only after the proposal of the coalition of deputy factions, which is formed in accordance with Article 83 of the Basic Law. If there is no coalition, the initiative belongs to the faction that unites the majority of people’s deputies from the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada. None of these conditions were met.
In addition, the law “On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine” confirms this logic once again: before the president submits a candidate for the prime minister, there must be a corresponding proposal from the parliamentary coalition. In this case, the opposite was done – first a public statement by the president, only later – the expected vote in the Verkhovna Rada, which, most likely, will take place without discussing the legality of the procedure.
The structure of power, in which the executive vertical is actually completely concentrated in the hands of the president, does not correspond to the model of the parliamentary-presidential republic enshrined in the Constitution. Formally, the president does not head the executive power, but he has a decisive influence on it — in particular, in terms of forming the Cabinet of Ministers without the participation of the parliamentary majority as an independent entity. As a result, the legitimacy of the government as an institution of executive power is shaken, since its composition is not the result of a transparent political procedure, but only formalizes already adopted political decisions, which are not supported by either a parliamentary proposal or a legally flawless procedure.
Thus, the initiative of personnel changes in the government indicates a violation of the principles of constitutional subordination between the branches of government, as well as a devaluation of the role of the parliament in the system of formation of executive power. De facto, the president controls both personnel appointments and the distribution of powers, even within the formal parliamentary-presidential model.
At the same time, there is another extremely important issue – the government should have reported to the parliament about the results of its work before the dismissal, but this did not happen. The Cabinet of Ministers, which served from March 4, 2020 to July 16, 2025, became a record for the duration — 5 years, 4 months and 12 days. However, during this time he did not demonstrate the ability either for strategic planning or for flexible adaptation to new conditions. The COVID-19 epidemic exposed the managerial unpreparedness of the health care system and the crisis response of the authorities in matters of logistics, communication and social protection. The economic policy of the Cabinet of Ministers turned out to be fragmented, with pronounced dependence on external partners, and did not form a domestic model of sustainability.
The problem of unpreparedness became especially acute in February 2022. The authorities were not ready for a full-scale war – neither in the organizational, nor in the economic, nor in the informational sense. The Cabinet of Ministers did not initiate a serious risk analysis, as well as preparations for a large-scale mobilization of the economy. Despite this, the government did not report to the parliament on its activities, which indicates a lack of political responsibility to society.
Despite critical failures in the work of the government over the past five years, none of the ministers has borne political, criminal or administrative responsibility. In addition, the government has not even recorded cases of official recognition, analysis and conclusions of errors in its work strategy, while now only a transfer to other segments of the government will take place without future government officials providing their strategies and programs for improving the state of affairs in the state. Formal rotation actually only reinforces the status quo, demonstrating that political loyalty and manageability remain the main criteria for retaining a position, regardless of performance. Thus, personnel decisions will not become a tool for cleaning or rebooting the executive power, but most likely will become a means of adapting personnel to new schedules within the same administrative logic.
In addition, changes in the government will be a response to external factors, in particular, to the expectations of the European Union. In the conditions when the EU takes over a significant part of the functions of supporting Ukraine — financial, administrative, logistical — partners are increasingly clearly signaling the need for more professional cooperation. In this context, the transfer of Shmyhal to the defense sector looks like a gesture of loyalty: the obedient, predictable and uninitiative prime minister will turn into the main communicator with the West in matters of the defense budget. However, the readiness to work under the leadership of his former subordinate Yulia Svyridenko is also an eloquent indicator of Shmygal’s complete control.
Svyridenko’s candidacy also looks like a choice that corresponds to the logic of loyalty and political control. While working as deputy prime minister, she did not take initiatives that went beyond the approved framework, did not publicly participate in political discussions, and did not form a separate vision of economic strategy. Such a role involves technocratic discipline and a lack of political weight—exactly what is needed to keep the executive in check. Personnel reshuffles in other ministries also do not demonstrate a desire for a strategic review of state policy.
The fate of the Ministry of National Unity, which was created as a result of the reorganization of the Ministry of Reintegration under a specific person — Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, who now has the status of a suspect in corruption and at the same time remained in office, is also indicative. This structure, which was formally supposed to be responsible for the unity of the state policy regarding refugees, residents of the occupied territories and citizens abroad, demonstrated complete managerial disorientation. Its functions were duplicated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other departments and public initiatives. The creation of a new ministry without real competence, but with large budget costs, looks like an example of personalized public administration without systemic responsibility at the expense of taxpayers during a war.
The joining of the remaining functions of the Ministry of National Unity to the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity is another gesture in the same style: an organizational decision without the logic of matching functions and a clear purpose. It is more of a cover for funding the Agency for National Unity, a duplicate entity created on January 24, 2025 that acts as an electoral tool abroad rather than a real administrative tool. This approach only reinforces the perception of the Cabinet of Ministers as a tool for adapting political interests, rather than a center for strategic planning.
In the conditions of a full-scale war, the government should have become a system center for the analysis of combat operations, evaluation of weapons, planning of defense orders and construction of weapons manufacturing enterprises, the formation of civil-military cooperation and an effective economy, as well as a key political center for solving social problems of the population, restoring housing, providing assistance to military personnel, IDPs, and pensioners, but this did not happen.
As long as personnel decisions in the authorities in Ukraine do not comply with the requirements of the law, real accounting of public administration costs, open analysis of results, as well as accountability and strict responsibility of officials for their actions, the situation in the country will remain unchanged. The government, formed on the principle of internal loyalty, is unable to protect the interests of the population, to respond to the challenges of war and other problems in the state either institutionally or strategically.
