Personnel irresponsibility and top officials without punishment: what destroys the state from within
As soon as the society learns about another corruption scandal or another “sham” of top officials, everything develops according to the usual scenario: loud headlines in the news, several indignant statements, photos with detention – and silence. The top in the state bodies seem to have long ago found their salvation formula: connections + one-way ticket + silent cover. At the same time, the heads of strategic institutions, ministers and their deputies are the main figures in the scandals. What do all these stories have in common? Unsuccessful personnel appointments and lack of consequences for illegal actions. Most of the officials, having more than one passport, do not stay in the country, do not answer according to the law and do not return “honestly earned”, but disappear in the geography of impunity. In the conditions of war, this logic acquired additional sensitivity. Public procurement, fortifications, humanitarian aid, reconstruction — everything that should have become a zone of increased control turned out to be vulnerable to the old schemes. Can the state develop successfully in such a situation, and the authorities can inspire confidence in their people and have international authority?
Political appointments instead of professional ones and their consequences
As recent events have shown, the experiment with the creation of the Ministry of National Unity and its hubs in Europe has so far not resulted in the consolidation of society, but a loud scandal with Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov. The anti-corruption prosecutor’s office announced the suspicion of abuse of official position and receiving a particularly large bribe against the deputy prime minister and the minister of national unity. The reason was the events of 2022, when Chernyshov held the post of Minister of Infrastructure. According to the investigation, he and his subordinates transferred the capital plot of land to the KSM-Group company, which belongs to the developer Serhii Kopistira, in violation of the procedure. Instead, according to NABU, the businessman, as a sign of gratitude, sold eight apartments to friends of the official for nothing and presented Chernyshov with Skovoroda’s volume for a symbolic thousand dollars. At the same time, Chernyshov himself declares his innocence, according to him, the land was transferred legally, and he did not receive bribes.
Nevertheless, the High Anti-Corruption Court recognized the suspicion as well-founded, but made a formal decision. Despite the seriousness of the accusations, the official retained his position and authority, continuing to perform functions in the government and publicly present the concept of “national unity”. On June 27, VAKS imposed a preventive measure in the form of bail in the amount of 120 million 2,668 hryvnias, but the request of NABU detectives to temporarily suspend the minister from his duties was rejected. The court also did not support basic measures of procedural control: Chernyshov was neither required to wear an electronic bracelet nor to hand in foreign passports. On July 2, this position was confirmed again — VAX again refused to grant the request to remove the official.
At the same time, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau announced suspicion against two of Oleksiy Chernyshov’s subordinates, Vasyl Volodin and Maksym Horbatyuk. One was the state secretary of the ministry, the other was an adviser. They are suspected of a joint criminal plan, which involved the illegal alienation of state land in exchange for private benefits. At the heart of the story are the same developers, surnames and the same lack of systematic control.
Another telling example is the story of the former head of the SBU, Ivan Bakanov, whose career is one of many eloquent examples of how the personal trust of state leaders easily supersedes professional compliance. After years spent in the leadership of “Kvartal 95” and the “Servant of the People” party, without any experience in the field of security and public administration, he headed a structure that, in the face of approaching full-scale war, had to be as competent, autonomous and technically capable as possible. Bakanov’s appointment was not a political mistake, but a logical product of a system that considers loyalty a sufficient basis for access to critical state functions. Over the course of three years (from 2019 to 2022), the SBU under his leadership did not demonstrate the capacity for structural reform and modernization of internal processes. At the moment when the country entered the hot phase of the war, the special service was affected from within: personnel betrayals, failures in the regions, chaos in coordination.
In July 2022, the president was forced to dismiss Bakanov from his position on the basis of Article 47 of the disciplinary statute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: “failure to perform official duties that led to human casualties or other serious consequences.” This very fact, according to the logic of the legal system, should trigger not only dismissal, but also criminal liability. However, this did not happen. Instead, after his release, Bakanov simply disappeared from public space, taking up law practice. This demonstrates the main function of the Ukrainian vertical: dismissal is used as a way to avoid responsibility, not as a prerequisite for its establishment.
Instead, the ex-head of internal security of the SBU, Andriy Naumov, fled Ukraine altogether, accompanied by several people, a day before the full-scale invasion. He was suspected of treason, illegal enrichment, forgery of documents and fraud. In 2024 In 2024, Interpol declared Naumov an international wanted man on charges of embezzling over UAH 3.2 million in 2019–2021. In October 2022, the SBI informed him of the suspicion, and the court chose a preventive measure — detention. However, he has already managed to be sentenced to one year in prison for money laundering in Serbia, which does not prevent him from remaining unreachable for Ukrainian justice. In Ukraine, cases drag on for years, but a personnel decision was made regarding him only after he actually disappeared.
Against the background of these events, the lack of public interest in the final result of the investigation is indicative. Despite the recording of offenses at the level of several states and the existence of a specific amount of damages, none of the cases in Ukrainian jurisdiction has been completed. The procedural steps are isolated, do not have a logical continuation and are not accompanied by an analysis of the management decisions that made these abuses possible. It should be noted that in Ukrainian practice, the dismissal of officials is not accompanied by either legal responsibility or financial control. Individuals who are removed from high government positions not only do not go through the process of investigation or public report, but also leave their positions with a full package of declared assets that do not arouse institutional interest.
For example, at the time of his dismissal, Ivan Bakanov submitted a declaration according to which for January-July 2022 he received more than a million hryvnias in wages, owned an apartment in Kyiv (56 square meters), a share in an apartment in Kryvyi Rih, a residential building with an area of 345 square meters. m in Khodosiivka, three plots of land in the Kyiv region and cash. In addition, his wife declared another apartment in Kyiv and a plot of land. None of these assets have been subject to inspection by authorized bodies. The dismissal did not initiate a financial audit, as well as an institutional assessment of the effectiveness of the official’s tenure at the head of the force structure.
Another example of the failed appointment with the subsequent scandal is the ex-First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Eka Zguladze, who in 2015 symbolized the “new police”. She, along with other “reform stars” from Georgia, was surrounded by the pathos of failed reforms, but left the country after a series of accusations. Former Minister of Internal Affairs Vitaly Zakharchenko reported on his Facebook that Zguladze was detained at Boryspil airport while trying to take $4 million in a suitcase. However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the time officially denied this information, stating on its website that no detention had taken place.
In addition, on July 7, 2015, the Minister of Internal Affairs solemnly announced the creation of a special Office for the return of criminally obtained assets. He emphasized that this is a “technical, but very important” structure, which was entrusted with the cases of Kurchenko, Firtash, Zlochevsky and other multibillion-dollar areas. At that time, Olena Tyschenko was appointed as the head of the department – a “bright”, according to the minister, a specialist who had “unique competences” for untangling offshore tangles. The minister’s speech ended with a rhetorical assurance that “we cannot do without such specialists today.” However, already on September 16, 2015, Tyshchenko was dismissed from the internal affairs authorities, and the next day criminal proceedings were registered against her under Article 366 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – “Official forgery”. The further fate of the Office or the status of this proceeding was never officially reported.
One of the characteristic cases was also the story of ex-Minister of Ecology Mykola Zlochevskyi, owner of the Burisma company. He held the position from July 2 to December 9, 2010. Although criminal proceedings were initiated regarding illegal enrichment and money laundering, the criminal proceedings against him were closed in 2020. By that time, Zlochevsky had long since left the territory of Ukraine. After leaving the civil service in 2014, he returned to commercial activity – the company Burisma Holdings, founded by him in 2002, which specializes in gas production, is the largest private enterprise in this field in Ukraine. Consequently, Zlochevsky became one of the symbols of the inviolability of the elite, which managed to avoid any legal consequences, despite widespread suspicions of abuse of natural resources, licensing schemes and cooperation with political curators.
Another illustrative example is the case of Oleh Gladkovskyi (Svynarchuk), former deputy secretary of the National Security Council and a key figure in the defense sector during Poroshenko’s presidency. An investigation by Bihus.info journalists in 2019 exposed large-scale purchases of low-quality or scrapped parts for the army at inflated prices, as well as the use of spacers and fictitious companies. The case was transferred to NABU, Hladkovsky was detained, but later he was released on bail, and the courts dragged on for years without a final verdict. He remained free, traveled and even filed lawsuits against the journalists who exposed him.
No less loud was the case of the former head of the Federal Tax Service Roman Nasirov, on whom great hopes were placed in the reformation of the tax sphere when he was appointed. He was accused of providing illegal installments of tax payments to companies related to Oleksandr Onishchenko, which caused billions in losses to the budget. Nasirov demonstratively came to court in a blanket, pretending to be sick, the case was commented on by the world media, but after several years of hearings, he did not suffer any punishment. In 2023, the media reported that Nasirov was abroad. Despite this, he continued to participate in public initiatives and submit declarations without legal consequences.
These examples are only part of the big picture. In almost every case involving millions, influential connections, or key state functions, the Ukrainian system has demonstrated its inability to conclude the case with a verdict. Instead, either dismissal without consequences, or foreign “exile” to the post of ambassador, or endless legal proceedings.
Personnel irresponsibility as a systemic threat to statehood
The reasons for this situation lie not only in individual personalities, but in the very model of public administration, which has been formed over decades. The Ukrainian system of appointments to higher positions remains closed, clannish and subject to political expediency. Transparent competitions and independent selections function more as a formal procedure than as a real mechanism for finding the best candidates. Decisions are made behind the scenes, taking into account not the professionalism and personal qualities of the candidate for the position, but loyalty, financial benefit or the balance of interests between political groups of influence. In such conditions, responsibility simply disappears: it is not demanded, because there is no one to demand it from.
It should be noted that the phenomenon of impunity after high-profile scandals is not unique to Ukraine. It is observed in the countries of Latin America, some countries of Southeast Asia, as well as in the Balkans. But in those countries that went through a real institutional reform, for example, Slovakia, Lithuania, Georgia at the initial stage of reforms, this process was painful, but effective. In Ukraine, however, the reverse is observed: even with active international assistance from partners, the lack of political will gives rise to a mechanism of circular bailout, which gradually covers all authorities.
As a result, the state does not have a personnel core capable of acting strategically and responsibly. Management functions have been replaced by showiness, and reforms by visibility. At the same time, the lack of trust in institutions on the part of citizens becomes chronic: every time after a new scandal, a part of society is finally disappointed in the possibility of change, while the other adapts to the atmosphere of constant mistrust. Trust in state bodies, where after accusations officials are not only not punished, but also have the opportunity to go abroad and lead a public or comfortable life, is practically not restored. On the contrary, it is destroyed by every new example of avoiding responsibility where there should be a judicial assessment.
At the international level, such a situation is recorded and taken into account. When partners see not just a high level of corruption, but a lack of real consequences for those in higher positions, it directly affects decisions about funding or military aid. During 2024–2025, Western states repeatedly emphasized that support for Ukraine is possible only if political responsibility is confirmed within the country. And this influence is already felt. Slowing down or revising individual funding programs, lengthening procedures, tougher conditions for the next support packages — all this directly affects the work of the defense sector, the stability of budget planning and the ability to respond in time to risks in the rear. When the persons responsible for strategic management are chosen not for their expertise, but for their personal proximity to the political centers, this undermines the manageability of not only the state apparatus, but also the overall defense capability.
Personnel irresponsibility as a systemic threat to statehood is not an abstract risk, but a practical factor of destabilization that operates at all levels of management. The given examples of Ukrainian officials show that appointments to high government positions take place without analysis of professional reputation, taking into account previous actions or conflicts of interest. At the same time, keeping an official in office after a public exposure is not considered a problem, but is perceived as a normal work process.
As of 2025, there is no mechanism in Ukraine that would automatically launch institutional procedures for checking management decisions in cases of suspicions, obvious failures, or recorded negative consequences. Formal authority remains separate from any binding accountability, and the appointment, rotation, and dismissal of officials are done as internal political actions, unrelated to external audit or professional evaluation.
In such conditions, personnel policy loses its control function as a public administration tool. It does not prevent mistakes and does not react to the consequences, but only records the fact of the change of officials without an attempt to analyze the reasons or consequences of their decisions. Such logic creates direct threats to the functioning of the state. If the system is unable to quickly identify inefficient or dangerous managers and replace them according to meaningful criteria, it loses the operational ability to self-correct. This is not limited to defense or critical infrastructure — such institutional inertia extends to all levels of decision-making.
As a result, the lack of personnel responsibility creates a cumulative threat to the entire system of statehood. In the medium term, this means a gradual loss of control in key sectors, a transition from formal control to informal influence, and as a result — a loss of state subjectivity in domestic and foreign policy.
