Weakness of public administration and society’s demand for bribes: why corruption is becoming more and more entrenched in our country

It is difficult to find a topic that would cause more indignation than the eternal paradox of the fight against corruption in Ukraine. Numerous anti-corruption structures, created at every step and generously financed from the state budget and international aid, seem to only add fuel to the fire. As a result, instead of transparency and justice, we see corruption and indifference, which turns the process into an endless spectacle. There are plenty of reasons: from officials who have turned the fight against corruption into a profitable business, to the state machine itself, which often slows down where it would be possible to act decisively. And, worst of all, it is a demand for corruption among the citizens themselves, who are used to “solving” issues through bribes. This is a closed circle from which it seems that no one is in a hurry to get out.

Public administration makes corruption “immortal”

Corruption in Ukraine is not just officials making money, but a deep systemic problem permeated by inefficient public administration. Let’s omit the discussion of corruption among law enforcement officers and officials, about which everyone writes. Why the head of the Khmelnytskyi MSEK, who had accumulated her wealth for years, remained in office for a long time is a question that is clear to everyone. The problem is different: the state management system is so inefficient that corruption is deeply rooted not only at the level of the central government, but also at the local level. At the same time, the change of names, transfer of functions, dismissal of corrupt officials or resignation of prosecutors do not change anything.

Corruption in Ukraine is deeply rooted not only because of individual officials, but also because of the very structure of state administration, which not only allows, but actually encourages corruption schemes at every level. The current system, built on bureaucratic procedures and complex regulations, creates unlimited opportunities for abuse, and local authorities and state administrations, instead of controlling, often become the centers of this “business”.

Let’s take at least the field of entrepreneurship. Starting or expanding a business is a real bureaucratic quest, where an entrepreneur has to interact with officials at every step, and their “help” usually has a price. Permits, licenses, certificates — getting all this without “additional costs” is almost impossible. The more complex and confusing the regulation, the more opportunities for “solving issues”, because the system is built so that at each stage the entrepreneur turns to the official for “paid acceleration”. As a result, instead of stimulating development, the administrative machine turns into a source of unofficial fees and “thanks”.

The situation in the medical field is no better. The heads of regional MSEKs are appointed by the regional councils, and when a deputy takes up this position, the principle “there must be their own people in the “sweet” places” comes into effect. This is how scandalous stories with “disabled” prosecutors who provide a “roof” for local authorities appear. That is, the state actually entrusted the adoption of political decisions to a body that cannot be called apolitical. MSEKs, which must perform purely state functions, are approved and subordinated to self-government bodies. At the same time, the influence of the Ministry of Health ends at the level of regions, although MSECs are also created at the city, inter-district and district levels, but in accordance with regulations approved at the regional level. Thus, the center has no levers of control on the ground.

Partial decentralization of power undermined the omnipotence of “local princes”, but its imperfection, as well as the lack of state administrative supervision over the legality of the actions of local self-government bodies, only strengthened the position of local “barons” in the form of city mayors. This applies not only to MSEK, but to the entire medical field. For example, the tender procurement of drugs and equipment has long been the subject of numerous corruption schemes, when the contract is not awarded to the supplier who offers quality, but to the one who knows how to negotiate. The Ministry of Health, which is supposed to ensure transparency, often only exacerbates the chaos: tender conditions are written for specific “partners”, and kickback schemes become commonplace. As a result, budget funds, instead of helping patients, turn into a way of enrichment for “their own”.

In general, an absurdity occurs in regional state administrations: they are often just “mailboxes” for the transfer of orders from the government to the district level, and district administrations do not have any functionality defined by law. In addition, reservations at enterprises have been transferred to regional state (military) administrations, which have double, or even triple, subordination — to the regional council, the government and, in fact, the President’s Office. An integral part of this is the policy of booking “your people” in positions. Regional state administrations have control over exemption from mobilization, and it turns into a tool “for themselves” – as a result, prosecutors, officials and even their relatives receive fictitious “yellow tickets” or reservations from the service. The reservation system, which should work for the security of the country, becomes a way to avoid service for the privileged. At the same time, ordinary citizens without such “connections” must go to the front. At the same time, the state personnel policy only deepens this problem, because appointments are made on a political basis, and not on professional qualities.

Local administrations are another center of corruption schemes. The legalization of illegal buildings is a vivid example of how the local authorities turn a blind eye to construction violations, and developers, knowing that the issue can be “fixed” later, build residential complexes even without documents. Then, for the “correct” contributions, the project is legalized through “arbitrary” commissions, and inspectors and officials receive their profits. The more violations, the more local leaders earn from such buildings. In fact, the local authorities are no longer in control, but simply profit from the chaos.

The management system of state-owned enterprises is arranged in the same way. It has been transformed into a source of personal enrichment, where the heads of state-owned enterprises, negotiating with the “right” companies, create artificially inflated costs, cooperate with “their” suppliers. State entrepreneurship ceased to be a sphere for providing for the needs of citizens and turned into a tool for enriching the influence groups behind those who make decisions.

These are just some examples of how the modern state machine not only allows corruption, but also actively fuels it. Every level of government — from local administrations to ministries — is full of shady deals, because the more legislative obstacles, the more chances for officials to get their share. The system is built in such a way that the state structure itself turns into a market for corrupt services, where everyone from a small official to the head of a department receives his benefit. In the end, any anti-corruption reform becomes a sham as long as every level of the state continues to function as a tool for the personal enrichment of those who are supposed to serve the citizens.

It cannot be said that there are no attempts to destroy such “feudalism” at all. The modernization of the budget system from the “pyramid” model to direct inter-budgetary relations was a significant step forward. If earlier regional budgets were formed according to the political decision of the Ministry of Finance, and district and city budgets of regional significance – according to the decision of the regional government, now inter-budgetary relations with public authorities take place directly. But in other sectors of public administration, the “center-region-district” vertical is still preserved, without clearly defined functions for each level.

As we can see, corruption in Ukraine is rooted not only at the top, but also in places where the demand for workarounds creates a whole shadow market of “services”. And instead of effective state management and control by the central government, we have chaos, which conveniently feeds local “feudalism”. So it turns out that the State Administration makes corruption “immortal”.

Public demand for help from corruption

Corruption is the enemy that everyone hates. Ukrainians condemn officials for fraud, are outraged by the wealth of oligarchs and talk about the need for change. But when it comes to personal interests, there is immediately a willingness to “solve the issue” with the help of an envelope. This duality, where society loudly condemns corruption and at the same time is ready to fuel it at the slightest opportunity, turns the anti-corruption fight into an empty declaration.

How many times do people who shout loudly about the purity of the government become “participants in the scheme” themselves! Conscripts, who condemn bureaucratic chaos, quietly look for a doctor to buy a “yellow ticket”; parents, who are outraged by the corruption of universities, do not mind “thanking” so that their child gets a place outside the competition; businessmen who condemn tax officials are happy to use their “services”. Speaking of honesty, people are often the first to stretch the envelope to get a benefit, and at that point corruption becomes for them not a crime, but a tool of comfort. This double standard keeps the whole corruption system afloat. We condemn others, but at the same time actively support the very machine we hate, turning corruption into a circle where demand and condemnation go hand in hand. It has become so common that sometimes it is not even perceived as something abnormal – for many citizens, bribery has become a common way to solve everyday problems quickly and without extra effort. Public demand for corruption is the driving force that fuels it from within and makes the fight against it ineffective.

Recent years, when the mobilization touched many, showed how Ukrainian society is ready to support corruption schemes to avoid responsibilities. Hundreds and even thousands of conscripts are actively looking for an opportunity to get a “yellow ticket” — a fictitious medical certificate of unfitness. They are ready to pay large sums for this opportunity, and after the scandal with Tatyana Krupa, who issued such certificates “on the fly”, the market received quite a shock. Prices are expected to rise as the risks for doctors increase. But will the demand decrease? Hardly. Society continues to encourage corruption, ready to pay more for workarounds that protect against mobilization.

Land in Ukraine is always a great value, and the demand for it is constantly growing. People are ready to invest money in apartments even in those houses built without permits and in violation of building regulations. Developers offer housing at a reduced price, and residents know that problems will be “solved” later. As? Through additional bribes to inspectors and officials to “legalize” the facility. Such schemes have become popular because people are willing to pay for permission after the fact, supporting the market for the legalization of illegal buildings. Everyone knows very well that if you pay, any issue will be “solved”, even if the construction violates all safety rules.

Obtaining a plot of land for development is also an issue that is often “solved” through corruption. The demand for land creates new schemes. Local communities become a kind of market, where plots are sold as a commodity. For example, in prestigious areas, it is almost impossible to get land without the “necessary connections”. Many people do not want to stand in line for years and look for workarounds – through acquaintances or bribes, they negotiate with local officials. Thus, the “land market” is turning into a corruption network that provides local officials with profits, and people with desired plots without unnecessary bureaucratic difficulties.

The university entrance campaign is another fact when Ukrainians willingly invest in corruption. Many parents want to ensure their children a place at a prestigious university, even if it means “bypassing” a fair competition. They pay bribes to get their children admitted to the school. This creates a demand for corruption schemes in the field of education, where the entrance exam is just a formality. Moreover, such “services” are considered something common, and people are convinced that this is just part of the game. Universities and teachers, receiving additional “thanks”, create a whole layer of fictitious students who have privileges not because of knowledge, but because of money.

Business also fuels corruption when it comes to taxes. Many entrepreneurs are looking for “shadow” schemes to avoid tax obligations. They are ready to pay “black” accountants to keep a “double cash register”. This approach is becoming the norm, because the accounting system is too complex and often unfair. Businessmen perceive tax fraud as a necessity for survival, and even inspections do not frighten them – you can always “deal” with tax officials. Such a scheme creates a constant demand for corrupt services in the tax sphere, where the interests of “simplification” are mutual, and the system, instead of improving service, is simply drowning in bribes.

Therefore, society perceives corruption as a tool for speeding up processes. Expect a legal solution? This is for the patient. In search of quick ways, Ukrainians create a market of demand for corruption. Even in small situations – from getting a place in kindergarten to medical benefits – society is willing to take a detour, knowing that it works faster. As long as this demand exists, officials and employees will find ways to capitalize on it. Every case where people pay for a “workaround” entrenches this system even deeper. As long as citizens seek to “solve” problems dishonestly, officials will create proposals. And until public demand changes, the fight against corruption will remain an empty promise.

Thus, the fight against corruption in Ukraine resembles a theater of the absurd, where numerous state bodies and anti-corruption agencies, generously funded and beautifully decorated, actually only play the role of spectators in their own play. The corruption of the anti-corruption structures themselves, which have been conducting an endless hunt for “elusive corruptors” for years, turns reforms into a farce. Add to this the ineffectiveness of the management system, where each instance blurs the responsibilities between bureaucratic levels, and you get a state mechanism that only creates the appearance of struggle. But the real reason is deeper: public demand for workarounds, for “solving issues.” As long as the society is ready to fuel corruption, the authorities simply play the role of a director, adapting the scenario to the needs of the “customers”. The result is obvious: without changing the system itself and public attitudes, any anti-corruption campaign is only a temporary show for those who want to believe in the fairy tale of an honest and transparent state without corruption.