The ruler depends on his elite, because it is they who create the system that supports his power. The long stay in power of some of the leaders of the Celestial Empire, in particular, Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping, confirms the general tendency of authoritarian regimes to strengthen personalist rule.
After Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms aimed at preventing the concentration of power in one hand. A head of state limit of two five-year terms was introduced to ensure regular leadership change and avoid a cult of personality.
Power was distributed among different branches of the party, which helped to avoid excessive individual influence. In addition, Deng Xiaoping carried out economic reforms: he opened China to foreign investment, supported private business and reduced the role of state-owned enterprises. Thanks to this, the Celestial Empire became the Factory of the World and showed the world an economic miracle. The stability of the country in the following decades was based on the balance of power and the regular change of leaders.
In 2018, the National People’s Congress approved the decision to cancel the limit of two five-year terms for the president of the PRC, which allowed the current leader of the Communist Party, Xi Jinping, in 2022 stay for the third term. The decision broke with the post-Mao tradition of power transfers and raised concerns about a return to authoritarian rule.
By artificially extending his term in power, Xi not only cemented his own position, but also confirmed that power in such states rests not only on the leader, but also on his closest entourage, who have a direct interest in his continued rule.
The anti-corruption campaign became one of the main tools of Xi’s consolidation of power. Officially, it is aimed at combating bribery, but in practice it is often used to eliminate undesirable persons. Since the beginning of Xi’s rule, thousands of officials have been punished, including high-ranking officials from the military, government and party structures.
Recent high-profile resignations in the military leadership, in particular the removal of the leadership of the Missile Forces of the People’s Liberation Army of China, indicate the intensification of the struggle for control of the armed forces. It also signals a shift in the balance of power at the top: even the closest allies may be at risk if their loyalty is questioned. Such purges demonstrate that Xi is not only strengthening his own position, but also reshaping the team to suit his own vision of China’s future.
The king honors him: the generation of the 70s — who they are and what they symbolize
According to some media, this year will be pivotal for Chinese politics: Xi is preparing a major reshuffle that could hint at who will become the country’s next generation of leaders. Almost every fifth provincial leader has to give up their place, and this opens the way for a new generation of officials born in the 1970s. This generation grew up in a period of reform and economic growth as China opened up to the world. However, despite their education and international experience, young leaders will not necessarily bring political liberalization with them. Many of them are pupils of Xi and his school of politics, and therefore may continue the current course of strengthening state control and centralizing power.
This group of officials is already climbing the career ladder, and they are being watched closely. They are the ones who will reach political maturity when Xi turns 80, an age that currently seems to be gaining popularity for the peak of the political careers of superpower leaders. Then the question will be decided: will he hand over power to his successors, or will he continue to consolidate his power, keeping only his closest allies in the game?
Among the most prominent figures is Liu Jie, who became China’s youngest governor in charge of Zhejiang, the province that once helped Xi himself make his career debut. His appointment has attracted the attention of analysts, who see him as a potential successor to Xi Jinping.
Together with him, Li Yunjie, a former banker, and A Dong, the head of the Communist Youth League, entered ministerial positions. According to the career growth of the generation born after the 70s, are watching especially carefully, because when Xi turns 80, they will be well into their 60s, the period when Chinese officials typically reach the height of their influence. At this time, the country’s leader may delegate more power to his associates or even consider resigning.
It is noteworthy that the generation of the 70s in China is called the «happiest»: they did not experience the chaos of the Mao era and grew up in times of economic integration and digital freedom. But now the rules of the game have changed. Under Xi, career trajectories have become unpredictable, and the fight against corruption has turned into a tool of political control. Many promising personnel found themselves in the shadows or completely disappeared from the political arena. Paradoxically, the careers of these young leaders are developing against the backdrop of the gradual rollback of reforms that once paved the way for their success. Xi Jinping’s rule has seen increased state control and centralization of power, moving away from the course of market-based transformations initiated by Deng Xiaoping.
Will «old cadres» give way to young leaders?
The change of generations in the Chinese leadership can significantly affect the country’s foreign policy. If the new generation of politicians is oriented towards economic pragmatism, this may mean finding compromises with the West, especially against the background of sanctions and trade restrictions. At the same time, if more nationalist cadres gain power, this may lead to increased confrontation with the US and Europe.
China is already demonstrating a tougher foreign policy, particularly on Taiwan, the South China Sea, and technological competition with the United States. Young leaders climbing the career ladder may continue this course, especially if they feel internal pressure to show strength.
Under Xi, China is facing a number of economic challenges. A slowdown in GDP growth, a crisis in the real estate market, and an increase in youth unemployment all threaten social stability. A new generation of officials will face the dilemma of continuing state control over the economy or returning to the more open market established by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms.
Many expect that young leaders, especially those with economic education and business experience, can make policy adjustments. However, if they remain completely dependent on Xi and his environment, significant changes may not occur.
So, a potential generational conflict is brewing in Chinese politics: will the «old cadres» give way to young leaders, or will Xi Jinping change the age limits to keep his long-time allies in power? If the age restrictions are removed, it will be a continuation of the trend, because China for the first time in 46 years raised retirement age From 2025, the retirement age for men will gradually increase from 60 to 63 years, and for women — from 50-55 to 55-58 years, depending on the position. This move may be aimed at keeping experienced personnel in management positions longer.
The generation of the 70s symbolizes a new wave of Chinese politicians, who, on the one hand, are a product of the reform era, and on the other, face the reality of the collapse of these reforms and a return to more authoritarian management methods.
Large-scale personnel changes in China are a determining factor in the future political landscape of the country. The rotation in the highest echelons of power opens up an opportunity for the renewal of the elite and the emergence of a new generation of officials who can influence the course of development of the world’s second largest economy. At the same time, these changes become a kind of test of the loyalty of the new appointees to Xi Jinping and his political line.
These permutations are clear outline a balance between the old guard and potential young leaders. If only proven allies of Xi occupy key positions, it will confirm the trend of strengthening his power vertical. Analysts do not rule out that in order to preserve his influence, he may even change the age limits for high-ranking officials, which threatens to preserve the existing system and reduce the space for political renewal.
In this context, the issue of career paths of Chinese officials deserves special attention. Under Xi, they have become less predictable, as anti-corruption campaigns are often used as a tool of political struggle. This creates an atmosphere of fear among young politicians who try to climb the career ladder, avoiding even a hint of disloyalty to the current leadership.
The youngest governor of Zhejiang Province, Liu Jie, is one of the shining examples of the new generation of officials. His political future will depend on his ability to show independence and strategic thinking, or on his willingness to remain an executor of someone else’s will. If such young leaders turn into technocrats without ambitions of their own, it will further strengthen Xi’s control over the country and complicate any attempts at internal transformation of power.
Ultimately, these personnel changes could either provide an impetus for the modernization of Chinese politics or be another step in further strengthening authoritarian rule. The answer to this question will determine the future vector of China’s development and its role in global politics.
If these changes become a reality, power may remain in the hands of the same faces, leaving no room for significant renewal. Will the young leaders born in the 1970s be able to break through the wall of established orders, or will their career prospects remain limited? This issue will determine the dynamics of the development of China’s political system. After all, the future of the country depends on the choice of Xi Jinping himself: will he preserve the current order or open the door to a new generation?
…So, a potential generational conflict is brewing in Chinese politics: will the “old cadres” give way to young leaders, or will Xi Jinping change the age limits to keep his long-time allies in power? If the age limit is removed, it will continue the current trend — as evidenced by the government’s decision to raise the retirement age.
The generation of the 70s symbolizes a new wave of Chinese politicians who, on the one hand, are a product of the reform era, and on the other, face the reality of the rollback of these reforms and a return to more authoritarian methods of governance. How they act in the coming years will determine the future vector of China’s development and its role in global politics.
Tetyana Viktorova
