Foreigners in commissions and supervisory boards: how state decisions are formed and what this means for Ukraine

In the Ukrainian practice of public administration, a specific tradition has been established for a long time – to involve foreigners in the competitive commissions that elect the heads of state institutions, as well as in the Supervisory Boards of strategic enterprises. In many cases, it is they who determine who will manage public assets, make financial decisions, and shape policies in key sectors. Formally, this is presented as technical assistance or an anti-corruption safeguard, but in essence, this practice takes a significant part of the decision-making processes beyond national control. The legislation of Ukraine recognizes it as an independent, sovereign state. At the same time, a number of management procedures are carried out with the participation of persons who are not citizens of Ukraine, do not have political responsibility before society and are not fully subject to Ukrainian laws. Is it justified to involve foreigners in making key decisions in the public sector of Ukraine and are there similar examples in the world?

Participation of foreign experts in the selection of Ukrainian officials: mechanisms, influence and limitations

In the Ukrainian system of public administration, a practice has developed where foreign experts receive formal powers to influence the appointment of heads of strategically important bodies and supervise the activities of strategic enterprises. Such a model, which goes beyond the usual consultative participation, was formed under the influence of post-revolutionary reforms, international pressure and the need for external guarantees of transparency. Its feature is the granting of full-fledged status to foreigners as part of competition commissions with the right to a decisive vote, which provides a real influence on the selection results and protects the process from political interference. In Ukraine, state bodies believe that foreign experts are an important component of anti-corruption and judicial reforms, because their participation is designed to ensure impartiality, overcoming political pressure and objectivity in the processes of selecting the leadership of key state institutions.

The most revealing example is the recent final stage of the competition for the post of director of the Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine, in which Oleksandr Tsyvinskyi became the winner. His candidacy received the unanimous support of the international members of the competition commission, which turned out to be decisive. This commission included James Wasserstrom, founder and executive director of the Canadian Integrity Foundation, a consultant in Greece; Donatas Malaskevičius — representative of the Lithuanian Police at Europol and anti-corruption expert of the EU project in Ukraine; Laura Stefan is the director of the Romanian think tank EFOR and a consultant to the European Commission, the World Bank, the UNDP and the OECD. They represent those organizations that supposedly provide Ukraine with technical assistance in the fields of integrity, anti-corruption, and public administration. Therefore, it was the position of the internationalists that became final, while the opinion of the Ukrainian members of the competition commission did not determine the result independently.

A similar configuration applies in the case of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. When forming a competitive commission for the selection of the NABU director, the law provides for three candidacies from the government and three from international partners. This balance creates a situation where a decision is impossible without at least two positive votes of internationals.

The deepest integration of foreign experts took place in the judicial sphere. In 2018, the Public Council of International Experts (CCIEC) was established — an advisory body with six representatives from international partners, who had the authority to block candidacies for the positions of judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court. All of them had a full voice in the assessment of integrity, and their negative assessment could stop the candidate from participating in the competition.

At the same time, in the process of reforming the Supreme Council of Justice, the Ethics Council was introduced, which selects and re-certifies the members of this body. It consists of three international experts and three Ukrainian judges or former judges. Here, as in the previous examples, to make a decision, it is necessary to have the support of at least one member of the international troika, which ensures the influence of external participants on the balance.

At the same time, a competitive commission for the selection of members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine was created. Until the end of the term of office of its first members on June 1, 2025, it was internationalists who had the decisive vote. However, international experts will no longer participate in the new composition of this commission, as this is provided for by Law No. 1629-IX, adopted in 2021. This marks an important change: from the de facto predominance of internationalists to the gradual repatriation of powers to national bodies.

Large strategically important enterprises are also under the influence of international instruments. Independent members from Europe and North America are present in the supervisory boards of state-owned companies, such as Naftogaz of Ukraine, NEC Ukrenergo, Ukrainian Defense Industry, and earlier Ukrzaliznytsia. Thus, the board of Naftogaz includes Anthony Marino, Tor Martin Anfinnsen, Richard Hookway, Ludo Van der Heyden. Their goal is to ensure strategic leadership and prevent manual management of the company by the state.

At Ukrenergo, the participation of foreigners is even more professional: Patrick Greichen is a former state secretary in the German Ministry of Economy; Luigi de Francischi is a former representative of ENTSO-E and TERNA; Jeppe Kofod is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark; Ian Montell is the ex-CEO of Fingrid, the Finnish grid operator. All of them have extensive experience in strategic management and represent countries that are key donors to Ukrainian energy sustainability.

In addition, the most important strategic enterprise, whose activities are related to state secrets, also includes foreigners. In 2023, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine appointed the supervisory board of the Joint-Stock Company “Ukrainian Defense Industry” — a key structure in the defense industry sector that coordinates the production of weapons and military equipment. This is one of the central stages of corporate governance reform in the state sector of the defense industry. The collegial body consists of five people, two of them are foreigners – David Lomjaria (from the Ministry of Defense) and Lindy Smith (from the Ministry of Strategic Industries). So, for the first time, foreign citizens gained access to the management of an enterprise that works with regime documentation, special production and critical information of defense importance.

Despite the fact that there are formally no international competition commissions in the police, foreigners also played a key role in its reform at the start. Some of the reformers had foreign origins or dual citizenship. Thus, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Eka Zguladze was a citizen of Georgia and France. Her activities ended in a scandal – she was detained at the airport while trying to take out a suitcase with a significant amount of cash, which cast a shadow over attempts to legitimize the foreign presence in the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

It should be noted that the real participation of foreigners in tender procedures was the result of external pressure from donors, in particular the International Monetary Fund. Financial support packages have always been accompanied by demands for fiscal discipline, fighting corruption, cleaning up the judicial system, reforming state-owned enterprises and the energy sector. Moreover, the conditions of the IMF provided for not only reform on paper, but also guarantees of influence on the processes, and the presence in the commissions or supervisory boards seems to guarantee the transparency of the implementation of obligations for the partners. As a result, the participation of foreign experts turned from a consultative mechanism into a political tool for legitimizing internal changes.

Foreigners in competition commissions: global practice

The participation of foreign experts in competitive commissions for the selection of officials is atypical for most developed countries, but has precedents in specific political contexts when the state is experiencing a conflict, a transformational crisis or is at the initial stage of institutional formation. One of the most famous cases is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where after the end of the war in the 1990s and the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the institution of the High Representative was established with almost unlimited powers.

As part of the justice reform, the Supreme Judicial and Prosecutorial Council was formed, which included international experts with full voting rights. They participated in the selection of judges and prosecutors, and had the right to block decisions if the candidate did not meet the criteria of integrity or independence. Such participation was normatively established and perceived as a tool for restoring trust in the justice system, which was deeply ethnicized and politicized before.

A similar logic was used in Kosovo, where after the declaration of independence in 2008, the main power functions in the sphere of security and justice were carried out by the EULEX mission of the European Union. Its representatives were members of competitive commissions for the selection of judges, prosecutors and police chiefs. In the early phase, they did not just give recommendations, but made decisions jointly with national representatives or even autonomously. Many key appointments were made only after approval by the mission, which followed its own candidate vetting procedures. The participation of internationals was explained by the need to maintain neutrality and not allow any ethnic group to prevail in the new authorities.

In post-war Iraq, after 2003, the Coalition Provisional Administration under the leadership of the United States exercised control over the formation of a new state system. In conditions of complete collapse of institutions, personnel decisions at all levels were adopted or coordinated with international structures. Foreign experts participated in competitive commissions for the selection of judges, heads of ministries, representatives of the prosecutor’s office and internal security agencies. The administration’s procedural documents stipulated that all appointments should be approved on the basis of checks on loyalty to democratic values, distancing from the previous regime and compliance with basic competence criteria. Some of these inspections were carried out without the participation of local structures, and the experts themselves often made the final decisions.

In Georgia, after the Rose Revolution of 2003, a rapid reform of the law enforcement system was launched, which involved a complete renewal of personnel. Foreign experts, primarily from the countries of the European Union, the USA and international donor structures, were involved in the process of selecting new police officers, prosecutors and judges. The participation of internationals consisted in the assessment of integrity, cooperation in the development of selection criteria, monitoring the transparency of procedures, and in some cases in providing mandatory expert opinions. Formally, they did not always have the right to a decisive vote, but in key competitions, for example, in the reform of the patrol service, it was external consultants who determined the content of tests, assessment models and prepared analytical reports, without which the final decision was not made.

In Liberia, after the end of the civil war in 2003, at the invitation of the government, the UN peacekeeping mission UNMIL operated, which, in addition to security functions, was engaged in assistance in public administration reform. In particular, in the creation of new administrative structures and the judicial system, international experts participated in recruitment commissions, checked their biography, political neutrality and compliance with basic standards. The participation of foreigners was regulated by the program documents of the UN and supported by the IMF and the World Bank as a precondition for the allocation of financial assistance.

In Afghanistan, after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, a Provisional Administration was established, within which representatives of the UN, the USA, the EU and a number of other donors actively influenced personnel policy. The appointment of judges, ministry officials and regional administrators was carried out with the participation of international advisers, who had the authority to assess the professional capacity of candidates, conduct interviews, provide opinions and informally approve or reject candidacies. In some cases, for example in the rule of law system, the decisions of internationalists became decisive.

In East Timor, after the end of the occupation and independence in 2002, the UN mission UNTAET had full executive control over the formation of the state administration. Foreign experts not only made decisions on the appointment of officials, but also headed competition commissions, took exams, conducted interviews, and created personnel databases. This participation was legally formalized in the mandate of the mission and lasted for several years before the transfer of powers to new national authorities.

In South Sudan, after gaining independence in 2011, foreign experts, in particular within the UN and USAID missions, were involved in the formation of state institutions, including judicial and administrative bodies. In the first years, it was the internationals who participated in the commissions for the selection of officials, evaluated candidates, drew up conclusions and coordinated the appointment processes, since the education system, personnel and document circulation in the state were practically non-functioning.

All these examples have a common feature: the participation of foreign experts in personnel procedures was determined not by ordinary intergovernmental cooperation, but by a state of crisis or transition. The role of internationals was to ensure basic trust in the state apparatus at the stage of its formation or purification, and only under such circumstances their presence in tender commissions was considered permissible, justified and effective. In stable democracies or even in most transition countries, this practice does not apply, since personnel policy belongs to the exclusive competence of national sovereignty. Therefore, the described cases remain rare precedents that can only be compared in the context of deep institutional instability or external administration.

External control without internal results: what does the participation of foreigners in the public administration of Ukraine mean

The presence of this construction no longer causes debate, but is perceived as something natural. Moreover, in public rhetoric it is presented as an achievement. This is presented as evidence of openness, as a gesture of trust. However, this does not raise the question: why does Ukraine need the approval of a former official from another country in order to appoint someone as a director of a state structure or state company? Is this an official recognition of the loss of subjectivity, mistrust or lack of own professionals?

The thesis about “lack of personnel” has long been a convenient formula for explaining the participation of internationals, but in reality it is not a shortage of personnel. There are more than enough professional economists, lawyers, and corporate management specialists in Ukraine. The question is not who to appoint, but who controls the appointment process itself. In this system, a candidate who is not approved, supported, or covered by an external mandate cannot pass. Otherwise, the procedure either breaks down, or the legitimacy of the result is questioned even before the final. At the same time, the participation of Ukrainian representatives in commissions performs only a decorative function. They do not have the opportunity to draw their line, because even with complete unanimity, they cannot make a decision without the voice of at least one “international”. This is no longer partnership, but systemic prevention. An institutional formula according to which domestic structures are not allowed to make a mistake, because they are not trusted.

A separate layer is made up of state companies. The presence of foreigners on the supervisory boards of Ukrenergo, Naftogaz, Ukroboronprom, and other enterprises is both a strategic signal to investors and a legal fixation of external trust in specific persons, not in institutions. In this case, our state rents management decisions and under close supervision and control by foreigners, which is removed from the state mechanism. It seems to strengthen trust at the international level, but at the national level it kills the idea of ​​responsibility.

Finally, the main thing. The presence of foreigners in the composition of tender commissions and supervisory boards gives almost no guarantees and results. The fight against corruption has not become more effective, judicial reform has not gone beyond the procedural theater, anti-corruption bodies continue to function in a mode of constant conflict, procrastination, behind-the-scenes struggle, and sometimes — demonstrative imitation, NABU has almost not stopped budget fragmentation, and state-owned companies, despite independent supervisory boards, remain the arena of political decisions, where external control does not mean fair play. Most likely, the Bureau of Economic Security will not protect business from pressure either, but just the opposite.

If the participation of foreign experts remains the only condition for trust in state decisions, this indicates that the state has not managed to independently form its own tools capable of ensuring transparency and accountability of the activities of state structures and enterprises without external supervision. This design turned out to be convenient for everyone. In case of failure, Ukrainian officials can place responsibility on the international composition of commissions and councils. At the same time, partners are able to directly supervise and control processes in which too many opaque areas remain. In this case, what kind of independence can we talk about? When the next competition is again called a turning point, it is worth asking: how many have there already been, and why after them everything remains without positive changes for the people?