Some countries learn from their mistakes, others from those of others, and some never learn. The American war in Vietnam and the Russian invasion of Ukraine took place in different eras, under different circumstances and with different geopolitical contexts. And although it will not be entirely correct to make an absolute analogy between them, because each of them has its own characteristics, but it is difficult not to notice the parallels. Both conflicts were the result of a global confrontation between great powers, in which the local population became a hostage of geopolitical games. In both cases, the attacking country hoped for a quick victory, but encountered a stubborn struggle of the people who refused to capitulate. History once again shows that even the strongest armies can get bogged down in a war that they themselves started. Let’s consider the key parallels between these two wars and try to understand what lessons Ukraine can and should learn.
Vietnam and Ukraine: historical parallels
Wars never end simply because the negotiators want them to. History proves that conflicts continue until one of the parties achieves its strategic goal or is forced to revise it. The war in Vietnam became an example of how even a military victory can turn into a new, even bloodier stage of struggle, if decisions are made not on the battlefield, but in the negotiation halls, where the interests of the great powers weigh more than the fate of the people.
The war in Vietnam, or more broadly, the Indo-China wars of 1945–1991, are one of the key events of the Cold War, which significantly influenced the global processes of the 20th century and continue to have consequences for the modern world order. It was a period of protracted conflict in which different state systems collided, testing models of war of attrition that would ultimately define military strategy and international relations for decades to come.
It should be noted that today international security is experiencing another deep crisis. Recent decades have been characterized by the degradation of international institutions, which until recently were the basis of stability. Conflicts that seemed to remain in the past or were “frozen” return to the form of active confrontation. At the same time, world relations increasingly resemble the era of the Cold War with all its negative aspects – ignoring diplomacy, arms races, attempts by stronger states to redraw borders for their own interests.
In this context, the experience of Vietnam becomes an extremely valuable example for Ukraine. Although there are many differences between these two countries – historical, geographical, political – the very nature of the long armed conflict offers many lessons. First of all, it refers to the period of the end of the First Indochina War, which lasted from 1945 to 1954. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was a crushing defeat for the French army and a symbol of the collapse of colonial rule in Indochina. The Viet Minh won a victory that seemed indisputable: the French garrisons were defeated, the morale of the army was undermined, and further maintenance of the colony was impossible. But why did this victory not bring Vietnam what it sought? Why did the country that defeated its enemy find itself in a new war, even more brutal and protracted?
The Geneva Conference, held after the end of the First Indochina War, was supposed to consolidate the status quo and determine the future of Vietnam. But instead of peace, the country got division. The decision to temporarily demarcate territories along the 17th parallel was imposed by external players — France, the USA, the USSR, and China. This division of Vietnam was supposed to be temporary, but like all “temporary compromises”, it laid the groundwork for a new round of conflict. The US began to support South Vietnam, seeing it as a barrier against the spread of communism. Meanwhile, North Vietnam understood that any attempt at peaceful reunification would be thwarted. It was at this moment that it became clear: victory in the war does not guarantee political success, if the peace agreement is not signed by those who fought, but by those who play geopolitical parties.
The Viet Minh had every chance to continue the offensive and unify the country under its control, but the allies – the USSR and China – opposed it. Moscow and Beijing feared a direct escalation from the US and were ready to sell Vietnam’s interests for their own stability. Their position nullified the military gains of the communist North: instead of seizing the moment, the Viet Minh accepted a political compromise. The result was a new war, even more large-scale and bloody, in which Vietnam found itself involved in a global confrontation. It was originally a war of independence, but after the Geneva Accords it became part of the Cold War. And it was not Vietnam that was deciding its fate — the USA, the USSR, and China were doing it for it.
This scenario looks painfully familiar. Russia, like the US in Vietnam, is trying to hold onto the occupied territories, even if they have no strategic value. Just like the Americans, it creates puppet administrations that exist only through foreign support. Just like South Vietnam, these entities are weak and unable to function independently.
A critically important lesson for Ukraine is the understanding that allies, even the closest ones, have their own interests, which do not always coincide with the national interests of the belligerent state. Betting too much on diplomacy, especially if the negotiations are conducted in the form of geopolitical bargaining, can become a trap that will only delay the war, not solve it. The Geneva Agreements did not bring stability to Vietnam, just as the Minsk Agreements failed to stop the actions of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
Another mistake of Vietnam was that in international negotiations its situation was only part of a big geopolitical game. The Geneva Conference decided not only the fate of Vietnam, but also conflicts in Korea, Laos, and Cambodia. This allowed the great powers to bargain using the Vietnamese issue as a bargaining chip. In the end, this gave the US the opportunity to impose the preservation of the southern regime, which without external support had no chance of holding on to power.
Further mistakes of Vietnam
In the 1960s, authoritarian regimes controlled both parts of the country. Despite the fact that South Vietnam had the support of the United States, democratic values did not become decisive for it. The North, on the other hand, was guided by communist ideology, which traditionally involved repressive methods of governance. Another problem was that the Vietnamese saw the entire war as a struggle for independence, but the country was unable to unite around this idea and instead split into two camps with diametrically opposed allies and value systems.
National formations that fought against the French colonialists created the Viet Minh organization, which had a communist bent. In the 60s, they formed the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, which meant fighting not only against foreign influence, but also against the South Vietnamese themselves. Because of this, the war quickly turned into a complex geopolitical conflict in which the US and USSR used Vietnam as another Cold War arena. By 1965, the Americans began to introduce their troops, and the war lasted until 1973.
The final end of the Vietnam War was not just a collapse for South Vietnam, but also a colossal failure of American strategy, which from the very beginning was based on false assumptions and miscalculations. When the United States left the conflict in 1973 by signing the Paris Agreement, the political elites in Washington still hoped that they had succeeded in achieving an “honorable peace.” But within two years this agreement fell apart, and North Vietnam, taking advantage of the helplessness of the southern regime, took Saigon by storm. Washington’s political miscalculations and failure to support South Vietnam led to its downfall. At the same time, after the victory, the communist government began mass repressions against former officials and soldiers of the South, which led to a new round of migration and instability.
The mistakes of Vietnam, especially after 1975, have also become part of the history of global conflicts, and today they are of critical importance for Ukraine. After the victory of North Vietnam over the South in 1975, many believed that peace would finally come. But instead of the long-awaited stability, the country was mired again in wars and internal turmoil, and the economic and political situation only worsened.
An important mistake of Vietnam was participation in new wars immediately after the end of the main conflict. Already in 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, overthrowing the Pol Pot regime, which caused a large-scale conflict and international isolation. And in 1979, China invaded the northern provinces of Vietnam, wanting to punish Hanoi for its intervention in Cambodia. Although Vietnam was able to survive, the war cost it dearly, and relations with China remained hostile for decades. In addition, corruption remained one of the main problems of Vietnam both before and after the war. The high level of bribery actually destroyed the effect of any foreign aid.
One of the most infamous initiatives of the war was Robert McNamara’s Project 100,000. Due to the lack of military personnel, the Pentagon began to recruit people who did not meet the standards of service, among them many uneducated and physically unfit people, mostly from the poor. Most of them were used in the infantry, and the death rate among them was much higher. Because of this, they were called “McNamara’s Corps of Morons”.
Operation Thunder, launched in 1965, became one of the most controversial pages of the Vietnam War. It lasted more than three years and was intended to completely destroy the military and economic potential of North Vietnam, but it only increased anti-American sentiment and led to even greater support for Vietnam from the USSR and China. A similar situation is observed in Ukraine. During this operation, American forces inflicted devastating blows on the country’s key infrastructure. As a result, 65% of oil storage facilities, 59% of power plants and 55% of large bridges were destroyed. However, this strategy, as it turned out, did not bring the expected results.
The American military leadership believed that such tactics would force the communist leadership to capitulate. According to their plan, North Vietnam was supposed to return to the “stone age”. However, in practice it worked only partially. The large-scale bombing caused significant civilian casualties, which only increased anti-American sentiment in Vietnam. This enabled Hana to mobilize even more of the population to fight, using hatred of the enemy as the main motivating factor.
But the most interesting thing was something else: the more the US destroyed facilities in North Vietnam, the more military and financial aid the country received from the USSR and China. Moscow supplied Vietnam with anti-aircraft missile systems, modern fighter jets, radar systems and missiles. This created a paradoxical situation: instead of weakening the adversary, the US actually stimulated its armament at the expense of Soviet support.
The failure of this strategy became obvious even to the leadership of the Pentagon. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara admitted as early as 1968 that the bombings were not producing any real results. He declared that victory in the air war was possible only through such destruction and sacrifice that contradicted the basic values of the United States. But even after that, the bombing continued because the political leadership in Washington did not want to admit mistakes. By the end of 1972, the United States launched the so-called “Christmas bombings” – one of the largest attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. The operation was intended to force North Vietnam to make concessions in the peace negotiations, which at that time had already been going on for five years in Paris. This tactic did force the Vietnamese to be more flexible, and shortly after the strikes, Henry Kissinger was able to end the negotiations.
Today, this story is particularly relevant for Ukraine. The USA in the 1960s made the same mistakes that Russia is making now. It is trying to methodically destroy Ukrainian infrastructure, hoping that this will force Kyiv to surrender. However, the consequences of this tactic can be the exact opposite: Western allies, as in the case of Vietnam, will only support Ukraine more actively. So, the lessons of “Rumble of Thunder” show that a strategy of total destruction does not guarantee victory. On the contrary, it can lead to an even greater escalation, the strengthening of international alliances against the aggressor and the mobilization of domestic forces for long-term resistance.
As during the war in Vietnam, the Soviet Union supplied weapons to Khana, so now the West and the USA are arming Kyiv. However, as in the case of Vietnam, military supplies alone do not guarantee victory if a country has internal problems. Corruption and instability can nullify any external aid. In addition, as the national liberation struggle of the Vietminh overshadowed ideological differences, Ukraine must also take care of preserving unity.
Failed post-war planning
The end of the war did not automatically mean the establishment of order. The leaders of North Vietnam faced a number of critical problems: socio-economic chaos, critically high crime rates, deep divisions in society, destroyed infrastructure, food shortages, and catastrophic levels of corruption. In addition, the unification of the country did not bring the promised prosperity, but on the contrary – only exacerbated internal contradictions.
The communist government that came to power began mass repressions against the former military and officials of South Vietnam. Tens of thousands of people were sent to so-called “re-education camps”, and hundreds of thousands fled the country. Political instability undermined any attempts at economic recovery, and the centrally planned economy that had been imposed on the south quickly proved ineffective.
This can become an important lesson for Ukraine. After the end of the war, it is critical to ensure an effective transition period, which will include reforms, effective fight against crime, integration of affected regions, etc. If the state does not think through this stage in advance, it risks being trapped in continuous instability. At the same time, it should be understood that after the end of the war with Russia, the threat of new conflicts will not disappear anywhere. That is why it is now necessary to prepare for future challenges by strengthening the army, diplomacy and economy.
Vietnam spent almost a quarter of the 20th century in a state of war, of which 15 years were particularly difficult. He fought with France, the United States and their allies, as well as with neighboring countries: China, Laos and Cambodia. There was also a split within the country: North and South Vietnam were supported by opposite sides of the Cold War. Almost all of North Vietnam’s major cities were destroyed, and the country’s infrastructure—railroads, roads, businesses, and ports—was severely damaged. Human casualties ranged from 3 to 7 million people, most of whom were civilians.
Recently, Donald Trump’s special envoy Keith Kellogg said on Fox News that the losses of Ukrainian troops in three years exceed the combined losses of the United States in the Vietnam and Korean wars. According to American historians, the United States lost approximately 58,000 soldiers in Vietnam over eight years, and about 35,000 in Korea. Kellogg also highlighted the massive destruction in Mariupol, comparing it to Denver, Colorado, noting that the city had about half a million people before the war. These are colossal losses of people, infrastructure and housing, so this is what the authorities of Ukraine should think about first and end the war as soon as possible!
Ukraine should take into account the experience of Vietnam in order not only to end the war, but also to avoid post-war chaos, political mistakes and international isolation. War is not only about the front, but also about long-term consequences, so it is critical to lay the groundwork now for a stable future without repeating the miscalculations of Vietnam in the 1970s. The history of the Vietnam War proves that without a clear policy of integration, fight against corruption, economic recovery and effective international positioning, the post-war period can turn into years of chaos and new conflicts.
