Thirty years ago, on December 5, 1994, in Budapest, Ukraine took one of the most controversial and fateful steps in its recent history. The agreement, which was called the Budapest Memorandum, marked the renunciation of our country from the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Instead, Ukraine received promises of respect for its sovereignty and security guarantees from such countries as the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. Today, on the anniversary of this event, we return to the question: what did this document mean then and does it have real value for Ukraine in the conditions of modern geopolitical challenges?
Who and why signed the Budapest memorandum
On December 5, 1994, a memorandum was signed in Budapest, which went down in history as one of the most controversial international documents of our time. At first glance, the Budapest Memorandum was supposed to become a symbol of security guarantees for Ukraine, which gave up the third most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world. Ukraine, Russia, the USA and Great Britain became the signatories of the memorandum. In addition to the signatories of the memorandum, other nuclear powers — France and China — also expressed support for Ukraine by providing security declarations. However, their documents did not include an obligation to consult in the event of threats. Ukraine, which inherited approximately 1,900 nuclear warheads after the collapse of the USSR, faced a difficult choice. The West demanded nuclear disarmament, Russia also pressed, and the Ukrainian leadership found itself between a rock and a hard place: the country had just become independent and needed international recognition and economic support.
The memorandum contained three key promises for Ukraine: respect for its independence and sovereignty, refusal of any use of force or economic pressure, and guarantees of territorial integrity. At the same time, according to the terms of the memorandum, in the event of a nuclear threat, Ukraine has the right to address the UN Security Council with a demand to take measures. In addition, in the event of controversial situations affecting the obligations of the memorandum, the signatory countries must hold consultations. For Ukraine, this looked like an acceptable compromise, because at stake were economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation in case of giving up nuclear weapons.
At the same time, it is a little-known fact that Ukraine sought to establish guarantees in the form of a strict international agreement, but instead received only a memorandum. This document was not legally binding – its English text uses the word “assurances” instead of “guarantees”. Moreover, the memorandum did not contain a specific mechanism of action in case of violations of its provisions.
At the same time, Western diplomats at the time insisted that the “guarantees” were sufficient, but in reality they were more like political declarations than legal obligations. That is, one of the reasons for the weakness of the memorandum is the lack of coercion mechanisms, it was not a real instrument of protection. Its signing was a consequence of the inexperience of Ukrainian diplomats and excessive trust in international partners. Already in 2013, the USA officially declared that the memorandum is only a political commitment and has no binding legal force.
Another interesting point, which is not customary to talk about now, is compensation. For giving up nuclear weapons, Ukraine received promises of financial aid, according to which the USA allocated funds for dismantling the nuclear arsenal and ensuring security. However, the amount turned out to be significantly less ($500 million) than the actual value of the warheads, which were estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
It is also interesting that during the negotiations in 1994, Ukrainian diplomats proposed to include in the text of the memorandum provisions on specific protection mechanisms, in particular, the creation of multilateral military formats or economic support in the event of a threat. However, these proposals were rejected by the partners, who insisted on a more “flexible” document that would not oblige them to active actions.
In addition, Ukraine tried to use nuclear weapons as an element of political bargaining. In 1993, part of the country’s political leadership proposed to keep at least part of the arsenal as a “deterrence guarantee”. However, the United States and Russia exerted strong diplomatic pressure, promising economic support and assistance in integration into world institutions in exchange for complete nuclear disarmament. As a result, these promises were never fully realized.
Are the conditions of the Budapest Memorandum fulfilled?
As already noted, the terms of the Budapest Memorandum were based on several key principles: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, refraining from using force or the threat of force against it, and avoiding economic pressure to influence its politics. However, 30 years later, it has become clear that the terms of this document are not just being enforced, they have been completely ignored by one of the signatories, Russia, and have not been effectively protected by the other guarantors.
Russia became its main violator – in 2014, by annexing Crimea and starting an armed conflict in Donbas, it openly violated the principles of territorial integrity of Ukraine, fixed in the document. A little-known fact is that a few days before the annexation of Crimea, Russian diplomats at the UN declared that the memorandum “is not a legally binding treaty”, trying to justify their actions. Moreover, Russia used part of the technical weapons transferred to it by Ukraine after the signing of the agreement for operations in Crimea. However, the reaction of the guarantor countries turned out to be limited, being reduced mainly to diplomatic protests, “concerns” and sanctions.
There is an opinion among politicians and experts that Ukraine could have avoided aggression if it had kept its nuclear status. However, what remains little known is that in the 1990s, nuclear warheads in Ukraine were not usable due to the lack of activation codes controlled by Moscow. However, their utilitarian potential as a means of blackmail was invaluable. Thus, in 1993, during negotiations with the USA and Russia, the Ukrainian delegation considered the scenario of partial preservation of the nuclear arsenal as a means of deterrence. This option was rejected under the pressure of international partners.
Consequently, Ukraine actually found itself trapped in promises without a legal mechanism for their fulfillment. The memorandum did not foresee clear sanctions for its violation, while politicians, commenting on the signing of the document at the time, noted that “the main guarantee is the goodwill of the great powers.” However, there are no cases in history when “good will” protected the weak from aggression. In 2018, the second President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, one of the signatories of the Memorandum, called the abandonment of the nuclear arsenal one of the biggest strategic mistakes of independent Ukraine, along with the loss of opportunities after the Orange Revolution and the coming to power of Viktor Yanukovych.
It should be noted that in 1993, Ukraine had proposals to create a regional security system together with Poland and the Baltic states. Such a scenario could become an alternative to the memorandum, but it was rejected due to the fear of isolation from Western guarantees. In addition, in 2000, Ukraine considered an initiative to revise the terms of the memorandum in favor of more specific commitments from the United States and Great Britain, but these efforts did not receive sufficient support.
Does the Budapest Memorandum have a future?
The Budapest memorandum was supposed to become one of the foundations of a new security system based on respect for international law and cooperation between great powers and young democracies. However, three decades after its signing, this document has lost its meaning as a protection tool. Formally, it remains valid, but its real effectiveness has been leveled due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms.
The fact remains: since Russia violated the terms of the memorandum, none of the guarantor countries has been able to ensure the implementation of its provisions. As a result, the document became an illustration of the limitations of political promises in international relations, if they are not supported by coercive mechanisms. The conditions set out in the memorandum did not provide for the automatic intervention of the guarantors in the event of violations. This created a gap that was later used to the detriment of Ukraine. That is, the Budapest memorandum became a symbol of the limitations of international law. The system of international security, built on the good will of the great powers, turned out to be unable to withstand the challenges of modern times. The absence of sanctioning mechanisms or institutions capable of enforcing the provisions of the document made the memorandum more of a declaration of intent than a real instrument of protection.
To date, the memorandum has proven that security guarantees without concrete mechanisms for their provision are illusory. The memorandum also served as a signal to other countries: giving up nuclear status without adequate protection could leave a country vulnerable. Critics call the memorandum one of Ukraine’s biggest geopolitical mistakes. However, he also became a lesson not only for her, but also for the whole world. The Ukrainian example showed that security guarantees without clear implementation mechanisms are empty words. The memorandum also emphasized the weakness of international institutions, which could not respond to the aggression against Ukraine.
However, the Budapest Memorandum has the potential to become the basis for new formats. It can be seen as a starting point for creating new agreements that will take into account the mistakes of the past. For this, it is necessary to rethink the international security system, add effective sanctions mechanisms and strengthen the collective responsibility of the guarantor states.
So the Budapest Memorandum is not just a story about nuclear disarmament, it shows how promises made for political convenience can leave a country vulnerable to an enemy. And today, on the thirtieth anniversary of this document, it is worth reflecting on the fact that the Budapest Memorandum is a lesson for which Ukraine and the world paid too high a price to learn. The document, which was supposed to ensure stability, became a symbol of the helplessness of international law in the face of aggression. However, the future of the memorandum is possible only in a new, rethought format — as part of a global security system based on strict legal mechanisms and real responsibility of the parties. This may be the only chance for documents of this type to gain real weight in the world.
