A high-profile incident in the 14th Motorized Rifle Brigade due to supply problems: objective and subjective obstacles, failure of control, and delayed command response
The situation surrounding the 14th separate mechanized brigade became painful both because of the supply problems on the front line and because of the question it posed to the entire military command system. At the front, there are always objective circumstances that can break even the prepared plan: constant shelling, dangerous routes and lack of access to positions. However, along with this, there are subjective reasons – the irresponsibility of commanders, their false reports, the lack of control on the part of the military command and its ability to see the problem only after it acquires a wide resonance.
The case with the servicemen of the 14th separate mechanized brigade: personnel reset after the inspection
The second mechanized battalion of the 14th separate mechanized brigade, which performs combat missions as part of the 30th separate mechanized brigade named after Kostyantyn Ostrozky, found itself in the center of a high-profile situation due to critical problems with the provision of positions near Kupyansk. Information about a significant shortage of food and drinking water spread on social networks, as a result of which the soldiers lose consciousness from hunger and are forced to drink rainwater. This state of affairs always goes beyond the boundaries of everyday issues, because on the front line, food, water, the possibility of evacuation and replacement of personnel are related to how long the unit can perform combat missions in these conditions.
The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine confirmed that the higher command had paid attention to the published facts, and the commander of the 14th Motorized Rifle Brigade took the situation under personal control. At the same time, the main reason for the delays in supplies is the extremely tense situation on this section of the front, which prevents stable access to the defenders’ positions. The Ministry of Defense also noted that such situations should not exist, but in some areas the combat situation can sharply complicate access to positions; the brigade and corps command, according to the department, maintains contact with the relatives of the servicemen.
At the same time, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that in order to correct the situation, the commander of the 14th Motorized Rifle Brigade was removed from his post, and the commander of the 10th Army Corps was dismissed and appointed to a lower position. The leadership of the 14th Brigade was transferred to Colonel Taras Maksimov, while the 10th Army Corps was headed by Brigadier General Artem Bogomolov.
The General Staff also explained that after the newly appointed brigade and corps commanders took office and violations were identified, an inspection by a comprehensive commission of the Ground Forces began by the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A separate internal investigation into officials of the 14th Motorized Rifle Brigade is being completed. Based on its results, management decisions should be made, and the materials should be transferred to law enforcement agencies for legal assessment.
The new command of the brigade and corps, according to the General Staff, is working to stabilize the situation and restore the provision of military personnel who are in combat positions. In addition, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine instructed the Commander of the Joint Forces Group, Major General Mykhailo Drapatom, under whose command the 10th Army Corps is subordinate, to check the comprehensive support of units performing tasks on the front line.
At the same time, the General Staff emphasized that logistics in the Kupyansk area had become significantly complicated due to systematic air and missile strikes by Russian troops on crossings across the Oskil River. The support of Ukrainian units in this area is carried out using watercraft and heavy drones. The command is also taking measures to strengthen air defense, anti-drone defense, and build up the electronic warfare system in this direction.
Despite the difficult conditions, the General Staff assured of increased attention to the support of servicemen holding the front line. Officials believe that the previous command of the 14th separate mechanized brigade concealed the real state of affairs, allowed the loss of some positions and a number of miscalculations in providing personnel. Among the identified problems, the supply of food to one of the brigade’s positions was separately mentioned. The 14th separate motorized brigade has already delivered another load of food to this position. The evacuation of servicemen is planned to be carried out immediately, as soon as favorable conditions arise.
The command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine emphasizes that the situation near Kupyansk is developing against the backdrop of intensified Russian assaults. According to the spokesman for the Joint Forces Group, Viktor Tregubov, Russian troops have intensified attacks near Kupyansk and Vovchansk, trying to put pressure on the positions of the Defense Forces and expand their presence on the left bank of the Oskol. This frontline background makes the supply problems particularly dangerous: the shortage of basic resources arose in the area where the enemy is trying to increase pressure.
Supply in combat conditions: objective, subjective obstacles and control issues
The situation in the 14th brigade showed not an isolated episode with a delay in supply, but a complex combination of front-line and management problems. In one area, food and drinking water shortages, difficult access to positions, the need for evacuation, Russian assaults near Kupyansk and Vovchansk, internal conflicts in the command vertical, a change in brigade and corps leadership, a check of supply on the front line and the future transfer of materials to law enforcement agencies all converged.
However, the wide resonance surrounding this situation forced the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to respond to the problem ex post facto, after it became public. This is one of the most dangerous features of wartime management: the system often starts to move quickly not when a failure only appears, but when relatives of military personnel, volunteers, journalists and social networks are already talking about it. For the front, such a delay has a much higher price than for the civilian bureaucracy, because between the first report of a shortage and the official decision, days can pass, during which people remain in positions in the same conditions.
After checking the terrible facts, a comprehensive commission of the Ground Forces began an investigation into the actions of the former brigade leadership. Based on its results, they plan to make management decisions and transfer the materials to law enforcement agencies. Such a procedure means that the military leadership must establish not only problems with provisioning, but also the chain of decisions due to which the situation at the positions became critical and became the subject of public discussion. However, questions arise: how did the Ministry of Defense and the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine allow such facts to occur? Why were there no controls and checks on the state of supply of military units carried out earlier?
However, the lack of timely control by the Ministry of Defense and the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine does not mean that no one knew anything at all, because in the military system there are always reports, journals, requests, service channels and intermediate levels of management. The problem is much deeper, because control is often limited to false reports, according to which the unit is formally provided. Such a scheme is dangerous because it creates the illusion of control, but the real situation on the positions does not coincide with what is on the table of the military leadership.
At the same time, the command should see not only reports, but also respond to complaints from military families, appeals from volunteers and atypical requests from the front. If such signals go on for weeks or months, and the decision appears only after publicity, then the problem lies not only in the unit commander, but in the lack of effective control by the Ministry of Defense and the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,
It should be noted that situations with a shortage of food and water in difficult areas of the front are not isolated, although each case has objective and subjective circumstances, its own routes, its own responsible persons and its own level of risk. Some units that are at “zero”, in the gray zone or in positions with almost impossible supply, have been living in reality for a long time, where provision depends not on the availability of products in the warehouse, but on the ability to physically deliver them to a specific landing, dugout or strongpoint.
One of the key factors due to which the commander cannot always properly organize the supply of water and food to the front is the combination of natural conditions, geography and constant fire danger. In some areas, such as Lymanske or Kupyanske, transportation to positions is complicated by off-road conditions: wheeled vehicles get bogged down in mud or cannot pass through broken roads, and the use of tracked vehicles makes them a visible target for the enemy.
The massive use of FPV drones has also made supply to the front line one of the most vulnerable parts of front-line logistics. Enemy drones hunt not only armored vehicles or artillery, but also pickup trucks, motorcycles, buggies, recovery vehicles, boats, ground robotic platforms, and small groups of infantry carrying cargo. Where night transportation used to be risky but possible, now the route can be traced from the air almost continuously, and an attempt to deliver a few crates of water sometimes requires the same planning as the departure of a battle group.
Krynki on the left bank of the Dnieper River was one of the harshest examples of how geography, enemy fire control, and the lack of stable means of delivery turned supply into a separate battle. The units that held the bridgehead depended on boats, night crossings, weather conditions, electronic warfare, and attempts to transfer cargo by drones. In such conditions, cases of lack of water or food do not always mean someone’s direct negligence, because sometimes the route really becomes almost impassable, and each attempt at delivery threatens with new losses.
The Bakhmut direction, Avdiivka, the areas near Chasovy Yar, Maryinka, and Novomykhailivka showed different versions of the same problem: the closer the position is to the environment or tight fire control, the faster logistics are squeezed to a minimum. In the final stages of the defense of individual strongholds near Avdiivka, the main problem was not even the availability of supplies in the brigade, but the inability to reliably reach the wounded, deliver the necessary supplies, or evacuate people in time. In such situations, one cannot automatically equate the shortage in a position with the fault of a particular commander, because the real situation sometimes breaks the best-prepared route.
The Avdiivka direction in the final phase of defense showed the limit beyond which support and evacuation begin to depend not on the commander’s desire or reluctance, but on whether at least some equipment can pass under enemy fire. Therefore, any assessment of the command’s actions must begin with checking the real situation: whether the routes were accessible, whether the equipment remained serviceable, whether the means of cover worked, whether there was a possibility of delivering water and food by drones. According to the requirements of the Law of Ukraine “On the Statute of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, the commander bears full responsibility for the condition of the unit, in particular for its material support, however, in conditions of intensive combat operations, his real capabilities are often limited.
The objective reason for supply problems arises where the enemy keeps the road under constant fire control, the only entrance is targeted, drones hover over the route, and an attempt to break through means an almost guaranteed loss of the crew. In such circumstances, the commander must choose not between a good and a bad decision, but between several bad options: wait for fog, night or rain, send a minimal load by drone or risk a foot delivery group.
The commander is also forced to determine priorities between different types of support, and weapons and ammunition, communication means or evacuation equipment are usually delivered first, without which the unit may immediately lose the ability to hold its position. Because of this, water and food sometimes fall into second place due to the objective impossibility of safely and regularly delivering everything necessary in conditions of impassability, shelling and constant observation by the enemy. Such situations do not relieve commanders of responsibility for the need to provide for their subordinates, but they explain why the usual logistics scheme in certain areas falls apart.
At the same time, the subjective guilt of commanders begins where the complexity of the front turns into a convenient cover for inaction, chaos or false reports. If the commander has the resources for alternative delivery, but does not organize it, does not raise the issue of rotation, although the unit is already physically exhausted, if a report is sent to the upper level about the controlled situation, and people in the positions count the remains of water and food, then the issue is raised directly with him. The commander’s guilt in such cases lies in the inability to organize alternative logistics or in disinforming the senior management about the real state of affairs.
Rear negligence can also have a very specific form, because products may be in warehouses, but not reach the battalions due to poor distribution, fear of responsible persons to take risks, poor coordination between services or the habit of waiting for orders where the situation requires an independent decision. In such conditions, fighters experience not “temporary difficulties in provision”, but gradual exhaustion, which changes even an experienced soldier. A person continues to perform combat missions, but his resource is depleted every day.
In the case of the servicemen of the 14th separate mechanized brigade, the main thing should not be a personnel decision, but an analysis of why the problem, which had been brewing for more than one day, was not stopped within the system earlier. The complexity of the front may explain individual failures, but it does not replace control over the real state of the units and does not justify a situation in which the reaction to events occurs only after widespread publicity. If the military command does not have a constant picture of what is actually happening on the ground and does not respond to problems before they become public, such cases will be repeated regardless of the names of the commanders. Therefore, their solution should not be indicative and one-off, but systemic.
