Curtailing Lobbying: How Ukraine Refuses Geopolitical Dialogue at the Time of Critical Decision-Making
In 2024, Ukraine significantly reduced its lobbying activity in the United States of America. At a time when support from Washington needs constant confirmation, and the US foreign policy agenda is increasingly focused on domestic challenges and geopolitical balancing between different priorities, this trend raises questions. It is not only about reducing costs, but about changes in the strategy of Ukraine’s presence in the American political space.
The gradual curtailment of contacts with influential lobbying firms, the reduction of visibility in the expert environment and the media, the limitation of interaction with key players on Capitol Hill — all this creates risks not only for the image of the state, but also for its ability to effectively protect its own interests in institutions that are critically important to it. Amid domestic political shifts and foreign competition for the attention of the White House and Congress, a reduction in lobbying efforts could have far-reaching consequences. Why exactly now, when political risks are intensifying, and the internal crises of the USA push external priorities to the background — Ukraine is curtailing the tools of influence? And what can be the consequences of such savings, when it is not about formal expenses, but about national security and political future in the system of strategic alliances?
Chronicle of Ukrainian lobbying in the USA
The first year of the full-scale war was marked by an unprecedented intensification of Ukraine’s lobbying efforts in the United States. Almost $5 million was spent on promoting Ukrainian interests — an amount that not only significantly exceeded the average annual figures for the previous decade, but also demonstrated that Kyiv understands that Washington’s support does not appear by itself, it must be constantly sought. At the same time, the government of Ukraine (over 3 million dollars) and the Ministry of Finance (almost 2 million) were the largest customers of lobbying services in the USA. All this looked like an attempt to systematically consolidate support in Congress, the State Department, think tanks and major American media.
However, the following year, the dynamics changed dramatically. In 2023, costs were reduced by almost 93% — to $367,000. And although certain forms of presence were maintained, this reduction did not look like a point adjustment or a transition to unofficial channels, but a strategic rejection of a systemic presence in the United States. Funding, which in the conditions of the war is not only justified, but also critically necessary, has been reduced to a level that actually removes Ukraine from the political map of American influence.
It should be noted that the historical context only emphasizes this collapse. Since 2015, Ukraine’s average spending on lobbying in the US has been about $270,000 per year, with the exception of 2020, when there was no spending due to the Covid-19 crisis. That is, even after a record-breaking surge in 2022, Kyiv has returned to the level of conditional “minimum survival” — in fact, to full-scale rhetoric that no longer corresponds to either the scale of the war or the intensity of diplomatic challenges.
The contrast with other players in the region only exacerbates the picture. For example, Poland, despite the reduction, spends on average more than a million dollars a year. Its lobbying peak is $2.5 million in 2018, clearly showing how strategically Warsaw works with American elites. At the same time, Russia, despite sanctions, scandals and public political toxic labeling, spends many times more. Before the full-scale invasion, its annual lobbying budget averaged $38 million. Even with a tenfold reduction after 2022, the Russian Federation maintains the position of a player who does not leave the battlefield.
A significant detail in this matter is Ukraine’s attempt to finally regulate its own perception of lobbying. In March 2024, the Verkhovna Rada adopted draft law No. 10337 — a framework document that should define the legal boundaries of lobbying activities in Ukraine itself. It outlines the concept of “influence on the authorities”, declares the need for transparency, registration, control, but in practice the document remains formal for the time being. There are no implementation mechanisms, responsible bodies, or supervisory tools. It seems that lobbying in Ukraine is being formally regulated, while international work is actually dying out.
The fact that in 2023, against the background of a sharp general drop in lobbying expenses, the Representation of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea appears in the register deserves special attention. It spent a little more than 50 thousand dollars. And although this amount did not affect the overall dynamics, the very fact of its appearance in the register indicates an effort to preserve the voice at least in partial, symbolic dimensions — where there are the greatest risks of political oblivion, such as the topic of Crimea.
How Ukraine lobbied for its interests in 2024
In 2024, Ukraine spent only 62.5 thousand dollars on lobbying its interests in the USA. This is almost six times less than in 2023, and this gap does not look like a technical adjustment or savings, but like a deliberate curtailment of the communication front across the ocean. According to the official data of the American registry FARA (Foreign Agents Registration Act), against the background of a full-scale war, the search for international support and a new political season in the USA with elections, the Ukrainian state has sharply reduced its presence in a strategically important field — in Congress, government structures, among influential expert centers and the media.
Falling lobbying costs at a time when Washington itself is faced with choosing a foreign policy course for years to come calls into question not only the effectiveness of Ukrainian diplomacy, but also Kyiv’s ability to compete for attention and support in the US information and political space.
In total, since 2022, after the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has spent $5.4 million on lobbying campaigns in the United States. This is not so little, but the context changes if you look at the Russian Federation, which spent 11.8 million dollars in the same period – more than twice as much. Moreover, even after a sharp reduction in funding in 2024 (by 18 times), the Russian Federation remains significantly more active in Washington: $461,200 is 7.4 times more than Ukrainian spending.
It should be taken into account that the United States is not only a key ally of Ukraine, but only a player whose support determines the amount of military, financial, and humanitarian aid. At a time when the US political landscape is increasingly polarized and foreign policy becomes hostage to domestic ratings, a presence on Capitol Hill is a critical necessity, but Ukraine is silent at the moment.
It is important to note that despite the global trend towards economy in lobbying, competition in the US political market does not disappear. It only changes forms: fewer open contracts, more point influence, shift of emphasis towards information work, closed consultations, cooperation with the think tank environment. And it is here that the reduction of the Ukrainian presence creates a critical vacuum.
What does the general picture look like against the background of other countries in the region? Poland also reduced its spending — from $1.29 million in 2023 to $245,200 in 2024. But even after such a reduction, its presence in the United States remains four times more active than that of Ukraine. We are talking about a country that has ambitious regional plans, actively competes for military-industrial cooperation, and seeks to strengthen bilateral security agreements with Washington. So, Poland reduces lobbying, but it does not disappear, and Ukraine reduces it to a minimum.
It is symbolic that the most active years for Ukraine — 2022 and 2023 — were associated with contracts with structures that had influence among Republican and Democratic politicians. Yorktown Solutions, an example of an effective lobbying company that successfully worked for Ukrainian interests in the US, disappeared from the FARA registry in 2024. This means that not only the amount of funding has fallen, but also the institutional bridges that gave Ukraine a voice in important environments have disappeared.
In total, there are 6,882 registered lobbying companies in the US, of which only 517 are active. They are the ones who shape the agenda, conduct negotiations, and create conditions for decision-making in Congress, government structures, the media, and the expert environment. To be among them means to influence, and to fall out of the bracket means to give up one’s position.
Silence is expensive
For Ukraine, lobbying in the USA is not an option, but a necessity. Not a tool of image presence, but a way to keep an ally in the political field of real influence. It is through lobbying structures that funding priorities are promoted, the contents of bills in Congress are formed, discussions are held about long-term aid, and changes to defense budgets and international coalitions are adopted. In a time of full-scale war, when the support of Western partners is a crucial condition for the country’s survival, lobbying is not a peripheral task. This is an element of political defense, without which coalitions fall apart, aid programs slow down, and interest in the topic of Ukraine cools.
In 2025, lobbying as a tool of foreign policy for Ukraine will become especially critical. Now the world is hearing more and more phrases that directly relate not so much to support as to the end of the war. Peace initiatives, ceasefire models, the format of negotiations — all this is increasingly being discussed in European capitals and, most importantly, in the United States. And precisely at this moment, Kyiv is gradually curtailing its own channels of influence in the American political space.
This is happening against the background of an active political season in the United States: Donald Trump, who is back in the big game, is setting the tone for a new foreign policy skepticism, and a significant part of the Republican establishment is broadcasting theses in which the Ukrainian issue is no longer a priority. At the moment, preparations are underway for a new stage of the American course — both with regard to NATO and the war in Ukraine. Right now, on the sidelines of Congress, the State Department, the White House administration, among advisers and think tank experts, the framework of what the US will consider an “acceptable peace” is being formed, and active negotiations are underway.
The absence of Ukraine in this process at the level of lobbying means the loss of the opportunity to influence the content of this framework. It is through lobbying companies that an alternative vision is usually presented, non-public contacts are established, wording in analytical reports, amendments to draft laws, and recommendations of expert commissions are influenced. When there is no such influence, a foreign framework is formed, to which Kyiv will be forced to either adapt or find itself isolated. That is, the situation will turn out: “They married me without me.”
This issue is especially acute in the context of negotiation proposals from China, Hungary, Saudi Arabia, and the Vatican. The US, regardless of the composition of the administration, remains the key arbiter whose signals determine the tone of the entire Western coalition. And if Ukraine is not present at the political level in these processes, its interests are simply not formulated from within, but are replaced by general calls to end the war in the absence of effective measures.
Importantly, lobbying has declined not only in absolute numbers of spending, but also in qualitative representation—gone are key players who had historically built connections in American political circles. One gets the impression that Ukraine not only stopped financing active campaigns, but also did not replace them with any other form of communication. Under such conditions, even supporters of Ukraine in Congress and government circles find themselves in a situation of information vacuum, which Russia, despite the formal reduction of its expenses, fills pointwise and systematically.
We can assume several reasons for such convolutional logic. First, administrative fragmentation in Ukraine: lack of professional lobbyists, loss of authority, clear division of responsibility for external communication direction, which is especially complicated by the parallel launch of the law on internal lobbying. Second, there is a likely misunderstanding in government circles that working in Washington is not about “one campaign a year,” but about daily presence in the conversations, briefings, hearings, and documents that shape policy decisions. And, thirdly, a reassessment of the role of diplomatic channels is possible — a bet on traditional embassies and intergovernmental contacts, while the modern lobbying ecosystem works in completely different areas.
Political silence has a very high price for Ukraine. When a country is fighting for its place in the world, it cannot afford to be coy or aloof in Washington. A lack of voice is a loss of subjectivity, and a loss of subjectivity is a loss of support. And very soon it will be possible to measure not in thousands of dollars for lobbying services, but in reduced defense budgets, thwarted decisions and political indifference of allies.
When lobbying disappears, access to pressure mechanisms is lost. At a time when geopolitical agreements are taking on a new format and the balance of interests is changing, Ukraine should not be an object of agreements, but a participant. The absence of professional, active lobbying in the US in 2025 is a voluntary relinquishment of the levers without which diplomacy becomes a closed-room monologue.
