“Smart” drones, artificial intelligence on board, telegram control: Oleksandr Kochetkov debunks myths about missile and drone strikes on Ukraine

In 2025, the nature of the Russian air war against Ukraine has become significantly more complicated. Russia continues to carry out massive attacks with kamikaze drones and missiles on Ukrainian cities, energy and transport infrastructure. Recent weeks, in particular after Donald Trump’s call to Putin, have been marked by a new round of escalation. Drones attack in flocks, bypass anti-aircraft defenses, carry out attacks at heights inaccessible to anti-aircraft artillery. At the same time, Russia is increasing the production of both “Shaheed” and ballistic missiles, setting aside part of the arsenal for possible strikes on Europe. Many myths about allegedly “smart” drones, artificial intelligence on board, telegram control, and absolute invulnerability to EW appear in public space.

Oleksandr Kochetkov, a political analyst and former design engineer of KB “Pivdenne” introduced technical clarity, in detail having explained, what changes have taken place in the missile and drone tactics of the Russian Federation, what is real and what is an exaggeration, and what mistakes Ukraine made that led to the current state of affairs.

Kochetkov immediately outlines the logic of mass attacks: these are not acts of revenge or emotional actions, but part of a military strategy. The strikes are coordinated in preparation for Russia’s summer offensive, and their main task is to weaken the logistical links of the Armed Forces, demoralize the civilian population, and put pressure on the political leadership of Ukraine to accept the enemy’s terms. He notes that the current wave of attacks is not a record: in 2022-2023, similar attacks occurred more often, but society has now lost the sense of that intensity.

The analyst considers popular statements about the alleged presence of artificial intelligence in drones to be false. In his opinion, even conditionally autonomous operation requires a very powerful and at the same time compact computing module — Russia does not manufacture such processors, and it is impossible to purchase them in sufficient quantity due to sanctions. Therefore, we are not talking about full-fledged AI, at most – about simple algorithms with visual recognition, which in theory should focus on infrastructure, but in practice are aimed at civilian objects.

What has really changed is the tactics of use. According to the expert, the enemy began to gather drones in the air in large “flocks” near the target and attack them simultaneously. At the same time, Shaheds began to fly at heights that avoid damage by small arms and even many anti-aircraft guns. These actions significantly reduce the effectiveness of mobile machine gun groups. As Kochetkov notes, to fight such groups, you need either cheap anti-aircraft missiles, or installations like “Cheetahs” or “Skynexes” – and there is a critical shortage of them in Ukraine.

Oleksandr Kochetkov emphasizes that “shahedis” remain vulnerable to electronic warfare systems. But the effectiveness of EW depends on placement and power. If the tool is not located where a swarm of drones will fly, it is useless. This war continues the classic shell vs. armor contest, where each side’s speed of adaptation is critical.

In the analytical review, Kochetkov also mentions the so-called Telegram bots, which Russians began to use as early as 2023. The idea is not that the drone broadcasts video to the operator, as some people think, but that in this way the enemy collects information about the operation of our air defense system. But, according to the expert, there is nothing breakthrough in this system – it is not autonomous navigation, but only a variant of coordination during the approach stage.

Kochetkov draws attention to the alarming dynamics of drone production. According to him, Russia has reached the level of 5-6 thousand Shaheds per month and has ambitions to bring it up to 15 thousand. So far, these plans have not been implemented, but the threat remains. He notes that the Ukrainian army does not have cheap and massive means of interception that could be scaled. He notes ironically that instead of serial batches of sports planes or helicopters for interception, we have single samples.

Regarding missiles, Kochetkov notes that the bulk of cruise missiles of the X-101 and Kalibr types are shot down by Ukrainian air defense forces very effectively – almost one hundred percent, primarily thanks to the aviation component. Therefore, Russia practically does not use them now, instead it accumulates them, probably for future attacks on EU countries.

Regarding the maneuvering of ballistic “Iskanders” at the final stage of the trajectory, the analyst calls it a fiction that cannot withstand criticism from a technical point of view. The maneuver while falling greatly reduces the accuracy of the missile, so technically it does not make sense. But what has become more effective is the guidance system due to satellite communication, as well as the use of radar and inertial traps that the missile fires as it approaches the target. Such technologies existed back in the 20th century, but now they are used for tactical missiles to confuse air defense.

Another problem that Kochetkov talks about is that one such protected ballistic missile requires three of our anti-missile defenses. And again, there is a lack of modern air defense systems, especially long-range ones. Russia produces at least 170 missiles a month, but uses far fewer against Ukraine. He suggests that these stocks will be used either during the summer offensive or in the event of an attempt to force Europe to make concessions by threatening large-scale airstrikes.

In conclusion, Kochetkov believes that the current state of our air defense and anti-missile defense is not only a consequence of military decisions, but the result of miscalculations in 2022-2023. During this period, according to him, the authorities avoided total mobilization of the system, tried to exist in a conditional “semi-peaceful” regime – with all the defects of the Ukrainian bureaucracy: unprofessionalism, intrigues, corruption and inertial thinking. While the enemy was moving to industrial rails, Ukraine was unable to deploy its own military industry in response.

“To sum up, I am forced to state that the difficult situation we have with air defense and anti-missile defense now is the result of mistakes and miscalculations made by our military and political leadership back in 2022-2023. The point is that instead of preparing and launching a total war against a more powerful enemy, we tried to live an almost peaceful life – with unprofessionalism, intrigue, bribery and trivial stupidity officials

This is what prevented our military-industrial complex from developing into a really powerful system during the war years, which mainly provides for the needs of the front and rear. Moreover, anticipating the realities of war, and not hopelessly trying to catch up with them.” – noted the expert.