In June 2025, the SOCIS Center – one of the leading sociological institutions of Ukraine – published the results of its next sociological survey, which became a reason for thinking about the deeper processes taking place in Ukrainian society. The data are not sensational, but there are many markers in them that testify to accumulated fatigue, growing disillusionment and gradual psychological distancing from the war, which has been going on for more than three years. Sociologists say that there are quite clear signals of the transformation of public consciousness, which seeks stability, predictability and responsibility on the part of those in power. Ignoring these processes means turning a blind eye to the changing political reality, in which the authorities can no longer count on the same level of trust that was at the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
There is a prevailing feeling that the country is moving in the wrong direction
56% of respondents believe that events in Ukraine are developing in the wrong or rather wrong direction. Only 35% rate the vector as correct. And here it is indicated not only the assessment of the government, it is rather an indicator of the general state of expectations. Moreover, the dynamics indicate a gradual increase in disappointment: 60% of respondents noted that the situation has worsened over the past year. Only 6% believe that it has improved, another third that it has not changed.
Infographic: IA “FACT”
Expectations for the future are also not encouraging: 33% predict further deterioration and only 24% believe in improvement. At the same time, 14% refused to answer at all, even despite the anonymity of the surveys. This level of silent anxiety is also symptomatic.
Infographic: IA “FACT”
What really worries Ukrainians?
Despite the ongoing war, the survey shows that most Ukrainians are not worried about hostilities as such, but systemic, chronic problems of an internal nature. Corruption consistently remains in the first place – it is the main claim against the authorities and one of the key threats to the future of the state in the eyes of the citizens themselves. The second is missile and drone attacks, which increasingly affect civilian infrastructure and the psyche of people. The third most urgent problem Ukrainians call the decrease in the standard of living, which is directly related to the negative trends in the economic sector since the beginning of the full-scale war.
Infographic: IA “FACT”
Other worrisome challenges include the loss of territories, Russification, and general exhaustion. But what is truly revealing is that losses among the Ukrainian military as a separate problem were not included in the list of main ones. Does this mean indifference? Rather, we are talking about a psychological transformation, when the front and the war are perceived more and more as something distant, “alien”, which does not directly relate to the daily life of the majority.
According to the data, only approximately 1% of the population of Ukraine is directly on the front line. This means that the fate of 99% of Ukrainians, despite the general mobilization, is not determined by the front in the direct sense. Instead, their lives depend much more heavily on economic difficulties, instability in the rear, shelling, pressure from the military commissars, and the destruction of the usual security models.
In this context, it is quite clear why the front is gradually disappearing from the top positions on the public agenda. People begin to focus not so much on national goals and values, but on their own survival – material, psychological, everyday. And it is these daily threats – even if they are less heroic – that form a picture of anxiety, which increasingly affects attitudes towards war, the state and the future.
Confidence in the government: Zelenskyi holds his own, but does not dominate
According to the survey, 50.7% of respondents still “trust” or “prefer to trust” President Volodymyr Zelensky. 43.8% do not trust. This is not a disaster, but it is not a mandate of absolute trust either. Especially since other institutions and figures are perceived more warmly by Ukrainians.
The SBU has the highest level of trust – more than 63%. Armed Forces and military command – 55.3%. But the Office of the President (ie, relatively speaking, Yermak) is distrusted by 60.6% of citizens.
An important signal follows from this: the presidential vertical is no longer perceived as the only legitimate point of attraction. Instead, trust in the power structures, which are perceived as relatively autonomous, is growing.
Elections and presidential ratings: paradoxes of trust
The majority of citizens – 57.6% – believe that after the ceasefire it is necessary to hold both presidential and parliamentary elections. Against – 37.4%. This again indicates a request for an update, but not a revolutionary one.
Infographic: IA “FACT”
Under conditional elections: 22% are ready to support Zelenskyi, 19% Valery Zaluzhnyi. Other candidates are within statistical error. In other words, a runoff between Zelensky and Zaluzhny looks likely, but not mandatory, if the latter does not run. In this case, despite everything, Zelensky gets a chance for a second term.
However, the trust index paints a slightly different picture: Ukrainians trust Zaluzhny, Kyryl Budanov (HUR), and also, interestingly, Andrii Bilecki (political and military leader, veteran of the ATO).
Thus, we see a paradox typical of applied sociology: Zelenskyy leads in the voting rating, but is not the leader of trust. This may indicate “inertia voting”, when the choice is made not out of enthusiasm, but out of lack of an alternative. Or about a certain fear of instability – the familiar is better than the unknown.
The paradox of compromise: Ukrainians want peace, but are not ready to make concessions
One of the most sensitive parts of the June SOCIS survey concerns Ukrainians’ perceptions of a possible ceasefire. The results revealed a complex and at the same time contradictory landscape of public opinion, in which the desire to stop the war as soon as possible coexists with a deep unwillingness to make any concessions.
Thus, 72.3% of respondents said that they would support a compromise termination of the war on the front line as of now. The formulation sounds quite pragmatic, but it is worth looking at the answer to another question: what could be the elements of this compromise?
- Only 16.5% are ready to agree to territorial concessions,
- 15% – to give the Russian language official status at least in certain regions,
- 36% allow refusal of the course in NATO,
- 21% – from European integration.
At the same time, 30% of respondents firmly stated that Ukraine should not make any concessions at all.
At first glance, it seems that a certain part of the population is ready for a compromise. But if you look more closely, it becomes obvious: the so-called concessions concern mainly those areas where Ukraine currently has no real leverage.
For example, NATO is not officially ready to accept Ukraine, and therefore the refusal of this course is more declarative than a real sacrifice. In the same way, accession to the EU is not blocked by any side of the conflict, and therefore the “concession” in this area does not have a meaningful burden. At the same time, questions about territorial compromises, the language or the status of the occupied territories, which are indeed the subject of potential negotiations, do not have support in society.
In other words, the majority of citizens want an end to the war, but without real compromises, a situation that resembles a political and emotional impasse. In such a context, any negotiations with the enemy look like betrayal at best, and defeat at worst.
This creates a serious dilemma for the country’s leadership. If the demand for “compromise without compromise” is followed, any real progress will become politically toxic. On the contrary, if the authorities really try to promote at least some formulas for a peaceful settlement, they will inevitably face accusations of capitulation.
All this testifies to the deep rupture of the Ukrainian mass consciousness between the rational understanding of war fatigue and the national myth of invincibility. And perhaps this is not only a consequence of natural emotional protection in the conditions of a long-term existential threat, but also the result of information policy, which for years avoided the language of losses, compromises and strategic uncertainty. The public has lived for a long time in a world where complex issues were replaced by simple images: victory is inevitable, concessions are unacceptable, allies are always nearby.
Today, when reality is increasingly contradicting these ideas, a cognitive dissonance arises, for which neither an honest conversation nor a political format has yet been proposed. But without this, no compromise, even with the support of society, will be neither possible nor sustainable.
