Now many analysts are trying to figure out how to end Russia’s war with Ukraine. Many of them in their research turn to the results of the Korean War (1950-1953) as a solution to the problem. At first glance, everything looks like this: North Korea attacked the South – the United States and its allies supported South Korea, and after three years of a difficult war, they went to the world. However, in reality the picture was quite different.
North Korea, in fact, after agreeing with Stalin, attacked South Korea. The balance of power was completely inadequate – until 1950, North Korea trained the future army of invasion at an increased pace for five years with the help and support of the USSR. At the beginning of the war, it had a multiple advantage in both people and technology. In a short time, the North Korean army captured almost the entire territory of South Korea, including the capital Seoul. Stalin, confident of the success of Kim Jong Il, ignored the vote in the UN Security Council, and the US received a mandate for the participation of UN troops in the reflection of North Korean aggression. The UN troops conducted a gigantic amphibious operation – the largest amphibious operation in the history of world wars, landed in the center of the Korean peninsula, surrounded and destroyed almost the entire North Korean army. As an organized force, the North Korean army ceased to exist. The UN troops moved towards the Korean-Chinese border, and within the shortest period of time they actually cleared North Korea of the communist government.
In response, Mao Zedong sent 200 divisions of so-called “volunteers” – more than a million soldiers – to China. They were covered by Soviet aviation and received support from tank units. As a result, the Communists had a more than two-fold advantage in strength. The US government was afraid of the political consequences of this confrontation and did not dare to actually expand the grouping of UN troops (the US and its allies) or to use strategic weapons. The maximum that the White House went to was demonstrative bombing of a part of Chinese territory near the border with Korea. It was all a game of subterfuge: unlike the war with the Third Reich, the US never dared to launch systematic strategic bombing. Against the backdrop of defeats in this war, the Democrats lost power in the country and the Republicans won the 1952 elections. Eisenhower, the hero of the war with the Third Reich, became the president of the USA, who showed himself to be a worthless and cowardly president. The UN troops, retreating from the superior forces of the Communists, retreated back to the 37th parallel. However, the offensive died out in many respects due to the enormous losses of the Sino-Soviet troops. However, the war did not stop, although already in 1952 it was a purely positional war of low intensity.
The conclusion of the armistice in 1953 was not caused by any healthy thoughts, but by the death of Stalin and the far-reaching plans of Beria. Beria, who became the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, who assumed control over foreign policy activities, built plans for “peaceful coexistence” with the West. One of the elements of this plan, along with the plan for the GDR to preserve part of capitalist relations, was an armistice in Korea. However, after the death of Beria in the clan war in the USSR, the situation in Korea did not change: North Korea did not have the strength for a long time to really threaten South Korea, in addition, the USA left a large military group in South Korea. It is characteristic that, in fact, both the leadership of South Korea and even the leadership of North Korea had nothing to do with ending the war and concluding an armistice. This was decided on the one hand by Beria personally, on the other – by the Eisenhower administration.
Unlike the border between North and South Vietnam, the border between North and South Korea was very short, and was quickly transformed with the help of the US into a single line of defense. What was never done in South Vietnam was lack of strength. In addition, it should be borne in mind that relations between the USSR and North Korea began to deteriorate even earlier than with China. Already by the end of the 50s, a cat ran between them, as they say – repression fell on those members of the Communist Party of North Korea who were oriented towards the USSR. As a result, North Korea, unlike North Vietnam, refused a new attempt to seize South Korea. For a long time, the leadership of South Korea itself had an indirect attitude towards the reflection of possible North Korean aggression. It was the area of US responsibility. In South Korea itself, there were political movements aimed at unifying the country, even under the communist banner. South Korea really turned into a democratic state only in the 1970s, but the problem of relations with North Korea has not yet been resolved. The famous problem of democratic countries, to which Vasyl Aksyonov’s brilliant book “The Island of Crimea” is devoted, concerns not only the situation in Taiwan, but also the problems of South and North Korea. Only the behavior of the leadership of North Korea is completely inadequate, which does not allow the political movements of South Korea, which seek the unification of the country, to gain great influence.
However, none of the real aspects of the history of the relationship between North and South Korea can be used in the situation in Ukraine. It is no accident that world analysts are trying to move away from the experience of the Korean War – this is the most tolerant option for the end of the war on the territory of Ukraine. The fact is that the situation with the war between South and North Vietnam is much closer to our realities. The Nixon administration, out of its lofty considerations, through the machinations of Henry Kissinger, betrayed its ally and abandoned him to arbitrariness. Many of the actions of the Biden administration over the past two years resemble Nixon’s policy in Vietnam after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement and the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam.
There is another example that Western analysts try not to mention for political reasons: Israel’s war of independence. Meanwhile, the experience of that war would be extremely useful for Ukraine. Israel, at the time of its creation, found itself surrounded by enemies who many times outnumbered it. At the same time, the Israeli armed forces – the IDF – were put in conditions where they did not have more or less operational weapons in the required quantities, and could not acquire them. In the course of the war, Israel was forced to withdraw from very important territories, giving them to Jordan and Egypt, at the same time suffering huge losses as a percentage of the country’s citizens.
Although the Israelis themselves demanded to continue the war until victory, the leadership of Israel, in view of the huge losses and the lack of modern weapons, went for a cease-fire and a truce. It went, even though it was understood that the truce would be “hot”, and the enemy would arrange provocations and try to kill as many Israelis as possible. Meanwhile, Israel had big problems with the world community: many countries, in the name of friendship with the Arab world, were determined to prevent Israel from rearming and standing on its feet. And still, the leadership of Israel agreed to a truce: huge losses in the absence of modern weapons determined this decision. The end of the war marked the beginning of Israel’s rapid rearmament. With no heavy industry of its own, Israel managed to create state-owned enterprises (without corruption) that rebuilt cheap equipment bought on the secondary arms market. As a result, by 1954, that is, five years later, Israel had a modern army capable of quickly and effectively defeating its strongest opponent – Egypt.
The losses of a weakly armed army inevitably weaken the army of the future. In such a situation, it is better to retreat, wait, and fight when you can really get back on your feet. This is what the experience of Israel’s war of independence teaches. After all, Ukraine today is in an immeasurably better position than Israel was in 1949. However, the question arises: is Ukraine ready for a truce? Is our country ready to use peace to one hundred percent to strengthen the state’s defense? We can only hope for balanced decisions of our authorities.
Leonid Shtekel
