Will the Russian Federation respond with a nuclear strike on the “Web”: assessment of military analyst Alexei Yezhak
In recent months, the topic of nuclear weapons has again been actively discussed both in the Ukrainian information space and at the international level. Against the background of Russia’s protracted war against Ukraine, statements are increasingly being made that consider not only the risks of direct escalation, but also the broader question: can the Russian Federation use nuclear weapons against Ukraine? Public statements by military experts, analysts, and government representatives indicate a growing willingness to rethink the role of nuclear weapons as the “last argument,” which has long remained beyond criticism and active reaction. This became especially noticeable after the Ukrainian strikes on Russian military facilities, which are formally part of the so-called nuclear triad of the Russian Federation, although they are used in conventional weapons. In this context, military analyst, expert of the National Institute of Strategic Studies and co-founder of the Defense Information Concern Oleksiy Yizhak laid out situation in several logical dimensions: political, strategic and technological.
Russian nuclear rhetoric: the political logic of pressure
After the Ukrainian operation “Web”, as a result of which strategic airfields on the territory of Russia were hit, the Kremlin once again voiced theses about the threat to the nuclear security of the country. According to Oleksii Yizhak, this discourse is not new, it is part of the usual rhetoric of the Russian Federation, which constantly uses the topic of nuclear weapons as a tool of psychological and political pressure. Russia is trying to create the impression that any intervention in its war against Ukraine — whether on the battlefield or in a political sense — could potentially trigger a nuclear response.
The official Russian nuclear doctrine, approved by Presidential Decree No. 355 back in June 2020, and subsequently updated in November 2024, formulates the grounds for the use of nuclear weapons as vaguely as possible. This is its key danger — it does not limit, but on the contrary, opens up space for any interpretation, particularly in the context of the conflict with Ukraine. However, as the expert notes, such maximalism is not confirmed in practice: no other nuclear power, except Russia, supports this approach, and the international community is not ready to recognize it as legitimate.
Actual situation: normal use of nuclear platforms
Oleksiy Yizhak draws attention to the fact that Russia systematically uses dual-purpose weapons, that is, such missiles and aircraft platforms that are components of nuclear forces, but are used with a conventional charge. Such systems include “Iskander-M”, “Iskander-K”, “Kinjal” air missiles, Su-24M, Su-34 and strategic Tu-22M3 aircraft. They are regularly used in attacks on Ukraine. As a result, the expert emphasizes, Russia itself eliminates the “nuclear immunity” of these systems, since their involvement in active hostilities deprives them of their inviolability.
Ukraine has every right and practical necessity to destroy these platforms, regardless of their potential nuclear capability. This corresponds to the logic of self-defense, as well as to international principles regarding the use of force in conflicts. The West, in turn, has no reason to consider these strikes risky from the point of view of nuclear escalation. The expert argues for this position by the fact that Russia was the first to use these systems in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine, thereby excluding them from the list of objects that could have some separate status.
Technical vulnerability and the new reality for the Russian nuclear triad
Along with political and legal arguments, Yizhak also gives strategic ones. According to him, the modern means of defeat that the Ukrainian forces have allow to detect and destroy even those objects that were considered difficult to access. This applies not only to aviation, but also to the Topol-M and Yars mobile missile systems. Their security turned out to be less than previously thought. Thus, the strategic balance that Russia has relied on for decades is losing its ambiguity.
The expert mentions the Kremlin’s long-standing argument that the approach of NATO’s non-nuclear strike systems to the borders of the Russian Federation poses a threat to nuclear deterrence. But today’s attacks on Russian territory are not carried out from the territory of the Alliance countries, but from Ukraine, a state that defends itself from armed aggression. Therefore, the thesis about the balance of power or about the alleged violation of strategic stability is no longer justified: the vulnerability of Russian systems has been proven practically, not only theoretically.
What’s next: prospects without nuclear escalation and the natural end of the Russian arsenal
Despite the tension of the situation, Oleksiy Yizhak does not see any serious grounds for nuclear escalation. In his opinion, if Russia stops aggression, changes its own policy and refrains from nuclear blackmail, the world will not try to destroy its nuclear triad. In this case, like many other Soviet systems, this arsenal will simply fail naturally – due to moral and technical obsolescence. In a few decades, it will become unusable if not maintained and modernized.
The expert summarizes that such a scenario would be the best for humanity. Not due to a catastrophe or a global conflict, but due to the gradual disappearance of the threat, when nuclear weapons lose not only their technical potential, but also their political significance. And most importantly, when it stops being used as a tool of pressure in modern conflicts.
