Bail as a legal way to avoid responsibility: from high-profile arrests to impunity for corrupt officials and criminals
Ukraine is known for its long-standing traditions, one of which is to release defendants on bail for millions of rubles. First, the public is shown high-profile arrests, searches, and statements about a decisive fight against corruption. Then bails appear that are disproportionate to the scale of the thefts, and the suspects are released. Then the cases drag on for years, the bail amounts are gradually reduced with the help of clever lawyers, and the process turns into a long cycle of postponements of court hearings and appeals, after which responsibility becomes increasingly elusive. Current legislation has long allowed such a practice, although government officials eloquently assure the public of their active fight against corruption, official and other crimes. However, despite total corruption and official crimes, the legislation does not change. This indicates that it is beneficial for state authorities to leave the system in this state, so everything goes in a vicious circle.
Bail in criminal proceedings: a legal guarantee with problematic practice
For years, Ukrainians have been told that bail in criminal proceedings is not a ransom for a crime or a fine and does not replace a court verdict. Legally, this logic really looks convincing: a person has not yet been convicted, his guilt has not been proven, so holding him in a pre-trial detention center until a verdict should be a last resort, and not an automatic response by the state to every suspicion. However, a large crack has long been visible between the laws and the public sense of justice in Ukraine, which is especially sharply visible in cases of top corruption, treason, or crimes that took human life.
The law sees bail as a financial safeguard that should keep the suspect in the presence of the investigation and the court. In this case, the amount is deposited into a special account, and the alleged criminal receives not unconditional freedom, but a limited opportunity to wait for the court’s decision outside the pre-trial detention center. He must respond to calls from law enforcement officers, not communicate with witnesses, not influence other defendants, not destroy evidence, surrender his passport, wear an electronic bracelet if necessary, and perform other duties. If the rules are violated, the money may go to the state, and the preventive measure is strengthened. This is how the structure looks in the law.
In practice, we see a completely different picture: a person suspected of a serious crime posts bail, which relatives, friends, business partners, or legal entities help him collect, after which society hears the familiar explanation of a “procedural instrument.” For a lawyer, this phrase may sound correct, but for the family of the person killed by a criminal, witnesses, and citizens who have been observing the selective severity of the state for years, it often sounds like a cold clerical screen.
It should be noted that bail in Ukraine has a long history. The Criminal Procedure Code of the Ukrainian SSR of 1960 did not initially provide for such a preventive measure. It was introduced into the old code in the early 1990s as an alternative to detention, in particular in order to reduce the number of people in pre-trial detention centers. The separate Law of Ukraine “On Bail” of October 2, 1992 mainly concerned civil and economic relations, where property ensured the fulfillment of obligations. Bail acquired full significance in criminal proceedings after the adoption of the new Criminal Procedure Code of 2012, which prescribed in detail its procedure, amounts and obligations of the suspect or accused.
In theory, this model makes humane sense, because the state should not keep a person behind bars just because the investigation has raised suspicions against him. Pre-trial detention centers cost the state budget a lot of money, and for a person its price is even higher: health, work, reputation and connection with family. If the suspect is not a dangerous criminal, terrorist, or a person who cannot be controlled otherwise, the law allows him to be left outside the cell, but put on a strong financial and legal chain. The idea is simple: the risk of losing a large sum should work no worse than the lock on the door of a pre-trial detention center.
The problem begins when the amount of bail becomes a real blow for some, and for others – just an unpleasant expense. A million hryvnias for an average person can mean a lifetime of work, a sold apartment, and family debts, while for an official, businessman, or person with access to shadow resources it looks like the cost of temporary comfort.
At the same time, the law provides for situations when the court may choose detention without the possibility of bail. This approach is allowed when the crime is associated with violence or the threat of violence, caused the death of a person, when the person has already violated the conditions of the previous bail, when the case concerns criminal organizations under Articles 255–255³ of the Criminal Code of Ukraine or especially serious crimes in the field of drug trafficking. Separately, bail is not set for persons declared internationally wanted, those who are in occupied territory or in the Russian Federation. During martial law, this rule also applies to crimes against the foundations of national security, terrorism, high treason and war crimes, in particular under Articles 109–114, 258–261, 402–408, 429, 437–442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. If the issue of detention is considered at the request of the International Criminal Court, bail is also not set.
However, even with such legislative restrictions, judicial practice has repeatedly shown decisions that are perceived as a blow to common sense. This is most clearly seen in cases where there are fatalities. An illustrative case was the case of former judge Oleksiy Tandyr, who was accused of a fatal drunken traffic accident that killed National Guard member Vadym Bondarenko. Tandyr was held in a pre-trial detention center without bail for more than two and a half years. In January 2026, the Sviatoshynskyi District Court of Kyiv set him bail at 119.8 million hryvnias, although the prosecutor insisted on detention without alternative. However, the court explained the record amount by saying that it should ensure the proper behavior of the accused. In February 2026, the Court of Appeal reduced the bail six times to 20 million hryvnias. The basis for the review was the decision of the ECHR, which recognized prolonged detention without alternative as a violation of human rights.
Two logics collided in this case, and neither can be simply crossed out. The ECHR reminds the state that even a high-profile case does not cancel the procedural rights of the accused. Society sees a dead soldier, a drunk driving charge, and a judge who gets a chance to get out of pre-trial detention for money.
No less painful was the case of the murder of five-year-old Kyrylo Tlyavov, who died from a gunshot wound after police officers had fun shooting at cans. Initially, the suspects were held in custody without bail. Later, one of the defendants, former police officer Volodymyr Petrovets, was able to be released on bail at the investigation stage. The main defendant, Ivan Prykhodko, was transferred to 24-hour house arrest at the end of 2022 after more than three years in a pre-trial detention center. In May 2023, he received four years in prison, but due to the credit for time served in the pre-trial detention center under the so-called “Savchenko law,” he only had half a year left to serve.
When a child dies from a gunshot by law enforcement officers, each mitigation of the preventive measure looks like a depreciation of the tragedy. However, the legal procedure lives according to its own rules: investigation, examinations, court hearings, terms of detention, review of risks. Human pain lives differently: it does not understand why the death of a child turns into a procedural marathon for years, in which the accused gradually receive more lenient conditions.
Another example is the case of Stanislav Tolstosheev. In 2016, the driver of a Mercedes crashed onto the sidewalk near the Livoberezhna metro station in Kyiv and hit an elderly woman to death. The court set him bail in the meager amount of 137.8 thousand hryvnias, it was paid, and Tolstosheev was released. Later, the case was closed several times due to the version of the driver having an epileptic seizure.
A separate story is the case of blogger and media worker Hlib Lyashenko. In March 2022, the Halytskyi District Court of Lviv chose a preventive measure in the form of detention with the possibility of posting a bail of 4 million hryvnias for him on suspicion of treason. Against the backdrop of a full-scale war, such decisions are perceived especially sharply, because behind such crimes are the front, occupation, dead, captured and destroyed cities.
It should be noted that bail is not a punishment, therefore, after acquittal, the funds are returned to the person who paid them. If a person is convicted, the money can also be returned, because they do not replace a fine and are not included in the sentence. However, they are not returned when the suspect or accused violates the rules imposed on him, runs away, ignores challenges. Be that as it may, bail looks as if he bought himself an indulgence. In a democratic legal system, bail is necessary, because without an alternative, a pre-trial detention center easily turns into an instrument of pressure, revenge, or public pacification. However, when society does not see the same approaches to all citizens, if some cases move quickly, while others sink in a procedural quagmire for years, then even a legal mechanism turns into injustice.
Bail after a high-profile detention: how high-profile cases lose weight in the courts
Ukrainian society has almost become accustomed to a scenario that repeats itself with strange stubbornness: an official or an influential figure is loudly detained, the case is presented as a blow to corruption, hundreds of millions or billions of hryvnias are reported, and then the court story slowly loses its tension. This happens because of bails, which significantly decrease over time. In this practice, the gap between the scale of the suspects’ embezzlement and the amount that ultimately becomes the price of being out of pre-trial detention is indicative.
The case of the former head of the State Fiscal Service Roman Nasirov can be considered one of the most illustrative examples of such a gradual “blowing up” of bail. In the proceedings on a bribe of UAH 722 million, which is called the largest in the history of Ukraine, after the announcement of suspicion in October 2022, the court determined that he be held in custody with a bail of UAH 523.2 million. At the start, this amount seemed commensurate with the scale of the charges, but during 2023–2024 it began to decrease: first to UAH 261 million, then to UAH 100 million, 70 million and 65 million. In May 2024, the bail was reduced to UAH 55 million, which was paid by Nasirov’s wife and father-in-law, after which he was released from pre-trial detention on personal obligations.
Further developments only reinforced the feeling that a large sum in a high-profile case is not always a stable guarantee. In April 2025, after Nasirov’s attempt to mobilize into the army, which was canceled as illegal, the court again took him into custody and raised his bail from UAH 27 to 40 million. On May 9, 2025, this money was deposited again, and he was released, and on April 27, 2026, despite Nasirov’s stay in pre-trial detention due to the verdict in the “gas case,” the Supreme Court of Criminal Appeals in the bribery case once again reduced the bail — from UAH 55 million to UAH 27.5 million. As a result, the amount, which started at over half a billion, was reduced almost twenty times.
A similar situation arose in the case of the former head of Naftogaz Andriy Kobolev, who is accused of paying himself bonuses of more than UAH 229 million, which, according to the prosecution, significantly exceeded the legal norms. The court set bail at UAH 229 million, i.e. at the level of the bonus amount, but the defense stated that the suspect did not have such money. Later, the bail was not paid in full, and the Supreme Court of Criminal Appeals refused to send Kobolev to pretrial detention, leaving him under personal obligation with the obligation to wear an electronic bracelet. For supporters of the presumption of innocence, this may look like caution on the part of the court, but for society, such caution looks different: when hundreds of millions are at stake, a mild preventive measure is perceived as a signal of the state’s weakness.
The story of oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky has become an even larger example of legal maneuvering around bail. Although he is not an official, his cases are related to state banks and huge sums, so the public resonance here is no less. In September 2023, Kolomoisky was detained by the SBU in a case of fraud and legalization of 570 million UAH of PrivatBank. The first bail was 509 million UAH, but the businessman refused to pay it, called the amount unfounded and remained in pre-trial detention.
After that, Kolomoisky was suspected by the NABU in the case of embezzlement of 9.2 billion UAH of PrivatBank, and the amount increased sharply: the Shevchenko Court increased the bail to 3.89 billion UAH. At that time, it was the largest bail in the history of Ukraine, but then a long process of its reduction began. In February 2024, the amount was reduced to UAH 2.4 billion, in May to UAH 1.9 billion, in August to UAH 1.87 billion, and at the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025 it fell below the psychological threshold of one billion and reached UAH 650 million. The defense explained this by Kolomoisky’s health and the inability to pay billions due to the seizure of assets, but to an outside observer, such a chronology looks like bargaining around a figure that was supposed to be a guarantee, but became the subject of protracted procedural football.
Also telling is the case of former Defense Ministry official Oleksandr Liev, who was accused of embezzling UAH 1.5 billion for the purchase of shells for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Supreme Anti-Corruption Court initially released him without a preventive measure. Subsequently, the appeal ordered detention with a bail of 50 million UAH, but in March 2024 the court released Liev on a personal bond even without bail, citing reduced risks. Against the backdrop of a war, when it comes to shells for the army, such leniency looks especially painful: society sees not a legal change in risks, but a failure of the moral proportion between suspicion and the state’s reaction.
The case of former Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleh Gladkovsky is also indicative. In 2019, the Supreme Court of Justice assigned him a 10.6 million UAH bail in a case of abuse in the field of defense procurement, although the losses were estimated at tens of millions. In March 2022, the bail was replaced with a personal bond on condition that it be transferred to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, after which Gladkovsky went abroad. Officially, such a replacement has a procedural explanation, but public memory records something else: the defendant in the defense case received a more lenient regime and left the country.
The question of whether the practice of bail is justified does not have a clear answer, because the idea itself is not wrong. Bail relieves the pre-trial detention center, where keeping a person costs the state money for security, food, medicine, and administrative support. It also corresponds to the presumption of innocence: a person is not considered guilty until the verdict, so not every suspicion should automatically mean a cell. In addition, a large sum can be a real anchor, because the risk of losing one’s own money or the money of relatives often disciplines better than a formal promise to appear in court.
However, Ukrainian practice shows the weakness of this logic, because money should be a deterrent only when its loss is truly painful for a particular person. For the average citizen, even a small bail can mean financial disaster, and for a defendant in a case worth hundreds of millions, tens of millions look like an expense for the right not to sit in a detention center. In such a system, property inequality ceases to be an abstract problem and turns into the difference between a cell and freedom.
What is especially dangerous is that being at large gives defendants more opportunities to influence witnesses, coordinate positions, put pressure on participants in the process, or destroy evidence. The court can impose obligations, prohibit contact, take away a passport, install a bracelet, but these tools work only when control is real, and the consequences of violations are quick and inevitable. When society sees that bails are reduced, obligations are softened, and cases drag on for years, trust in such control melts faster than the numbers in court decisions.
The practice of bail in Ukraine could be a reasonable balance between human rights and the interests of justice, but in high-profile corruption cases it increasingly looks like a mechanism for gradually easing pressure on influential figures. The problem is not that suspects are released on bail, but that the amounts often lose touch with the scale of the suspected crimes, and society does not receive a convincing explanation for why the risks have suddenly decreased. Where the state cannot explain its decisions in the language of justice, even legal procedure begins to work against trust in the court.
After bail: how high-profile cases slowly lose their chance for a verdict
After bail is posted, a high-profile case often does not move to a quick finale, but enters a long corridor of legal procedures, where the noise of the first detention is almost irrelevant. At the start, the state’s determination is shown to society: searches, suspicions, amounts of damage, statements about the fight against corruption. Потім камери зникають, увага слабшає, а справа залишається в судах, де кожне перенесене засідання, кожна зміна адвоката і кожне нове клопотання працюють не на очищення системи, а на її виснаження.
Після внесення застави резонансна справа часто переходить у найнебезпечнішу для суспільства фазу — повільне процесуальне виснаження, де перше затримання вже не має тієї ваги, яку йому надавали в новинах. Гучні підозри, великі суми збитків і публічні заяви поступово відходять на другий план, а в центрі залишаються перенесені засідання, нові клопотання, апеляції, зміни адвокатів і формальні підстави для затягування. У цій частині справи вирішується те, чи здатна вона довести провадження до вироку без уникнення відповідальності.
Найзручнішим фіналом для підозрюваного або обвинуваченого стає сплив строків давності, бо він дозволяє вийти з процесу без вироку й без судимості. Захист у таких випадках не обов’язково доводить невинуватість по суті, значно вигідніше буває розтягнути час настільки, щоб сплив термін давності. Роки минають у засіданнях, які не відбулися, у лікарняних, відводах, зміні адвокатів, численних клопотаннях і повторних процесуальних колах, після чого суд фіксує завершення строку. Застава в такому випадку повертається заставодавцю повністю, а справа, яка починалася як демонстрація боротьби з резонансним злочином, завершується юридичною тишею.
Втеча фігурантів за кордон після пом’якшення запобіжного заходу показує ще одну слабкість системи, де офіційні обмеження часто виглядають міцнішими, ніж є насправді. Людина може мати заборону на виїзд, зобов’язання здати паспорт, електронний браслет і перелік процесуальних правил, однак для впливових фігурантів нерідко знаходяться маршрути через лікування, спеціальні дозволи, а також службові механізми або нелегальний перетин кордону. Коли така особа зникає, держава може стягнути заставу в держбюджет, але гроші не замінюють присутності обвинуваченого в суді. При цьому провадження зависає, потерпілі й суспільство роками чекають повернення фігуранта, а первинна гучність справи перетворюється на архівний спогад.
Мобілізація під час війни додала до цих сценаріїв ще один складний і чутливий шлях для процесуальної паузи. Підозрювані або обвинувачені можуть просити суд змінити запобіжний захід на особисте зобов’язання у зв’язку з призовом на військову службу. За такої моделі застава повертається або за згодою перераховується на ЗСУ, а розгляд справи може бути зупинений на період служби. У воєнній країні служба в армії не може автоматично сприйматися як маневр, але в резонансних справах з великими сумами й сильними адвокатами така можливість потребує особливо жорсткої перевірки, бо інакше вона легко стає способом відкласти судовий фінал на невизначений строк.
Отже, чинне законодавство залишає занадто багато простору для затягування справ фігурантів через конструкцію кримінального процесу. За таких умов в Україні неможливо подолати корупцію, посадові та інші тяжкі злочини лише гучними затриманнями й заявами про боротьбу з ними. Коли законодавство роками не змінюють, хоча його наслідки добре видно на резонансних провадженнях, це означає наявність інтересу з боку державних органів зберегти існуючий механізм, який дозволяє справам поступово втрачати силу.
