Many in Europe still hope that Gazprom will one day resume gas exports to the EU. This creates illusions that prevent the search for alternative solutions. However, in reality, Russian gas turns out to be much more expensive, if you take into account not only its price, but also security: countries dependent on Moscow are constantly subjected to pressure, blackmail and attacks on energy infrastructure. For years, Central, Eastern and Southern Europe chose different strategies – political and commercial. However, these decisions often came at a high price for their citizens. However, these challenges can be overcome through closer political cooperation, both at the EU level and at the regional level.
Gas transit: we are opening up new opportunities
The expiration of the gas transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine is a chance for Europeans. Kyiv and the neighboring countries of the EU can use this moment to renew the dialogue regarding access to regional sources of liquefied gas and pipeline fuel. In order to increase energy security and reduce costs for consumers, Ukraine can join forces with gas transmission network operators of its neighbors. It is important to integrate a pipeline system that will connect the Baltic Sea with the Balkans, using Ukrainian storage as a central element of this new energy architecture.
What is liquefied natural gas and why is it important for Ukraine?
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a gas cooled to -160°C to be converted into liquid form. In this form, it is convenient for transportation across the ocean from countries where there is a lot of gas, for example, from the USA, Qatar, Nigeria or Algeria. Ukraine currently does not have its own LNG terminal, so gas is imported through terminals in Poland, Lithuania and Greece. Thanks to this infrastructure, we can supply LNG to Ukraine via Poland (Swinoujscie terminal) and Greece (Revitus terminal), and then through Bulgaria and Romania. However, there are also restrictions, particularly in the Baltic countries, and some countries, like Romania, have restrictions for Ukrainian traders due to technical standards.
What prevents the widespread use of LNG?
The biggest obstacle is the high tariffs for gas transportation, particularly in Romania. Insufficient infrastructure capacity is also an important limitation. Yes, in Poland there is a so-called “bottleneck” in terminals, which limits flows. The technical standards of gas, in particular the content of methane, also do not allow for unhindered transit through some countries. In addition, monopolies such as Poland’s PKN Orlen, which has exclusive import rights in Świnoujście, complicate the situation. Another significant deterrent is war. Traders are afraid to store gas in Ukrainian storage facilities because of the risks of shelling and destruction of infrastructure.
Integration with European markets: new opportunities
One of the important directions of the development of the energy system of Ukraine is its integration with European markets. This is a real chance to unite the Baltic-Balkan gas corridor and make Ukraine a gas storage center for the entire region. However, an important factor will be international support, which includes gas insurance, investment in infrastructure and ensuring transparency of the system. It is also planned to control the origin of gas in order to avoid Russian gas entering the market under other flags. Ukraine must have a clear strategy that will include plans for import, domestic consumption and storage of gas. This will provide an opportunity to strengthen one’s own position on the European market, improve energy security and reduce dependence on external suppliers.
After three years of war, the EU almost completely got rid of energy dependence on Russia. The ban on the import of coal and most types of oil, the reduction of gas imports by 75%, the reorientation of infrastructure, the revision of contracts and sanctions – all this made the gap real and deep. Even at a high price, Europe gained strategic freedom.
Against this background, the return of Russian energy to the EU seems extremely unlikely, even in the case of a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia, which is being actively promoted by the new Trump administration.
Why is the “reverse course” not possible?
The main obstacles to the so-called “reverse course” are complex and multidimensional. The most obvious of them is the destroyed infrastructure. Nord Stream 1 was disabled by explosions, Yamal-Europe was nationalized by Poland, and the Ukrainian transit route was left without a contract and partially destroyed during the fighting. The Turkish stream (TurkStream) is operating at full capacity, but has no reserve, and Nord Stream 2 is still not launched and is under sanctions.
An additional obstacle was the change of the contract base. Long-term agreements with Gazprom have been canceled or frozen, arbitrations are ongoing, and legal uncertainty is not diminishing. Sanctions imposed on Russian energy companies are difficult to reverse. Partial or complete lifting of restrictions on Gazprom, Rosneft and infrastructure assets would require political changes that are unacceptable in Europe today. At the same time, the European Union has already rebuilt its energy system: the gas system now accepts LNG from countries such as the USA, Qatar and Norway, and some thermal power plants and oil refineries are no longer compatible with Russian resources. Even coal was replaced by American and South African coal.
Despite rumors about the possible participation of American investors in the revival of Nord Stream 2, the new German government categorically rejects such ideas. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine fully synchronized their energy systems with the EU, finally disconnecting from Russia.
Thus, even if peace comes tomorrow, Europe is unlikely to return to Moscow’s energy embrace. Too much infrastructure and solutions were built without Russia’s involvement.
Infographic: IA “FACT”
Data from leading Spanish think tank Real Instituto Elcano shows a significant reduction in the share of Russian gas, oil and coal in European imports from 2021 to 2024, reflecting the energy changes in the EU caused by the war in Ukraine and sanctions.
Gas. In 2021, Russia supplied about 35% of gas to the EU, but by the end of 2024, this share dropped to 21.8%, which is a significant reduction. This is the result of the search for alternative suppliers and the growth of LNG imports.
Oil. The share of Russian oil has decreased from over 25% in 2021 to 2.4% by 2024. The EU is actively switching to importing oil from other sources, such as countries in the Middle East and Africa.
Coal. In 2021, Russia provided almost 45% of coal imports to the EU, but in 2024 this share completely disappeared. Europe has found alternatives for the supply of coal, significantly reducing its dependence on Russia.
All these changes indicate a significant transition to diversification of energy sources in the EU, in particular through supplies from the USA, Qatar, Norway and other countries.
The energy gap: how Europe is cutting gas ties with Russia
The contract system for the supply of Russian gas to Europe has actually been destroyed. Of the more than 120 billion cubic meters contracted in 2019, more than 70 billion have ceased. Some of the agreements were not renewed, others were terminated due to Russia’s demand to pay in rubles, disruptions in supplies from Gazprom, and the destruction of key routes such as Nord Stream and Ukrainian transit. Although formally there are still contracts for 50 billion cubic meters per year, actual supplies do not even reach 15 billion. Only Hungary, Slovakia and Greece receive gas from Russia stably through the TurkStream pipeline, and all this without any legal disputes.
As for the remaining contracts, they are now in a state of arbitration. A vivid example is the case of the German company Uniper, where the arbitration in Stockholm obliged Gazprom to pay 13 billion euros in compensation, and the contract itself was recognized as terminated. This precedent is likely to have an impact on cases with other companies such as Engie, RWE and Eni.
Analysts Stern, Yafimava and Ason emphasize: even “dead” contracts until recently had the theoretical possibility of restoring Russian gas if the war ended or the policy in Russia changed. But today, the legal termination of these agreements puts an end to such hopes.
As for Russian liquefied gas, the Yamal project still has long-term contracts with European companies (TotalEnergies, Naturgy, Shell, Gunvor) until 2041. However, since May 2024, the EU has allowed member states to ban the import of this gas. However, none of the key importing countries (Spain, France, Belgium) has yet applied this right. Even in a frozen conflict, these countries are unlikely to want to risk energy security and financial stability for geopolitical reasons.
As for oil and coal, the situation here is no less complicated. Their import from Russia is either stopped, as in the case of coal, or significantly reduced due to sanctions, as in the case of oil. The return of Russian raw materials to the European market will require new agreements, which simply will not exist without the abolition of current restrictions. The only sector where contracts with Russia remain unchanged is the supply of nuclear fuel from Rosatom. Five EU countries still buy it for their nuclear power plants, because changing the supplier is an extremely complicated and lengthy process.
As a result, every year Europe moves further away from energy dependence on Russia. Returning to the old energy ties is not only difficult, but also extremely risky, especially given the new security realities and changed infrastructure conditions.
