Simplified Ukrainian citizenship for 33 countries: between the logic of the new policy and risks to national security
The expansion of the list of countries whose citizens can obtain a Ukrainian passport under a simplified procedure immediately moves the issue of citizenship from a bureaucratic plane to a security one. The list has grown from 5 to 33 states, and this means that Ukraine is significantly opening up access to its passport in a period of war, hybrid threats, and high vulnerability of state institutions. The government explains this by supporting people who link their future with Ukraine, but this formulation raises an extremely important question: is the state not opening the doors to the citizenship system too wide at a time when any mistake could have political, criminal, or potential risks to the country’s security?
Two passports – one state: how citizenship policy is changing in Ukraine
Cabinet Resolution No. 589 of May 8, 2026 significantly expanded the list of countries whose citizens have the right to a simplified procedure for obtaining a Ukrainian passport: instead of 5 countries, the list now includes 33. The state actually legalizes instruments of multiple citizenship for certain categories, namely children who acquired it by birth or through adoption, as well as citizens who changed their status as a result of marriage.
This step was the logical conclusion of Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s strategic initiative, which passed through the parliamentary halls in June 2025 and opened a new page in the state’s relations with global Ukrainians. The geography of the updated list of countries with which Ukraine is actually building a common legal space in the context of passport rights covers most of the developed democratic world. This list includes powerful North American partners – the USA and Canada, as well as European neutral countries. A significant part of the list is made up of the states of the European Union and Northern Europe: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg. Together with them, legal synergy is supported by Malta, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Finland, France, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Sweden, creating an extensive network for interaction between citizens of the United Kingdom and the above-mentioned states.
The mechanisms for applying the new norms focus on ensuring the rights of the most vulnerable categories and maintaining the natural ties of Ukrainians with their homeland. The law outlines the circle of persons for whom dual status becomes a legitimate right, in particular, this applies to children who, upon birth, inherit Ukrainian citizenship along with a passport of another country. Similar protection of rights is provided for minors who acquire foreign citizenship through the adoption procedure, as well as for citizens of Ukraine whose status automatically changes as a result of marriage to a foreigner. This differentiation avoids legal conflicts that previously forced people to choose between identity and family circumstances.
The fundamental principle of reciprocity became the basis for expanding the list at the expense of foreigners whose states offer Ukrainians a simplified procedure for obtaining citizenship. Within the framework of this legal structure, foreign nationals originating from certain countries can obtain a Ukrainian passport without having to sever legal ties with their first homeland.
The expansion of simplified access to Ukrainian citizenship for citizens of 33 countries has its own logic, because the state is trying to respond to a problem that will become one of the most painful after the war: how not to lose people, connections, money and specialists in a situation where millions of Ukrainians are already integrating into other countries, and Ukraine itself will need enormous resources for reconstruction.
The strongest argument is to maintain contact with Ukrainians abroad. The war has pushed millions of people to Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Canada, the United States, and other countries. Some of them will eventually receive local citizenship — not because they are abandoning Ukraine, but because they work there, pay taxes, raise children, and must have full legal protection. If Ukraine demands from such people an actual choice between the new security and the old homeland, it risks pushing them to a final break. Multiple citizenship in this sense is an attempt not to lose these people forever.
The second motive is pragmatic. Ukraine needs not only patriotic statements from the diaspora, but its real participation in reconstruction: investments, business, expertise, professional contacts. A person of Ukrainian origin in Canada or the United States may want to work in Ukraine, invest money, open a business, buy property, but the status of a foreigner often turns this into a complicated bureaucratic story. Simplified citizenship reduces the distance between emotional connection with Ukraine and practical action.
In addition, a separate block is made up of foreign volunteers. For those who fight for Ukraine, citizenship is a recognition of their real contribution, as well as an opportunity to provide them and their families with clear social and legal protection. The state that accepts assistance from people at the front must have a mechanism not to leave them in a suspended status after injury, service, or the end of the war.
There is also a demographic calculation in this decision. Ukraine already has a deep population crisis, and after the war it will become even more acute. Birth rate, emigration, losses at the front, destroyed cities, and economic uncertainty create a situation in which the country will have to think not only about the return of its own, but also about attracting new people. Simplifying citizenship for citizens of strategically close states can be an attempt at a managed migration policy, rather than a chaotic opening of borders.
Finally, it fits into the logic of European integration. For many European countries, multiple citizenship is not an exception or a threat in itself. Ukraine, which aspires to be part of this space, is gradually moving away from the old model, where citizenship was perceived as a rigid and exclusive attachment to one state. In the modern world, people often live between countries, work in several jurisdictions, and maintain several identities.
Before the adoption of Resolution No. 589, Ukrainian state policy in the field of citizenship was based on the doctrine of rigid monism. For decades, Ukraine built legal barriers, trying to keep the construction of “single citizenship” in its most conservative interpretation. The previous regime functioned within a critically narrow list, which included only Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
This geography clearly illustrated the outdated vector of state thought, when legal synergy was limited exclusively to the post-Soviet space, which was a legacy of bilateral agreements of the late 90s. While the real centers of concentration of the Ukrainian diaspora — the USA, Canada, Poland or Germany — remained in a legal vacuum, the state focused on countries whose migratory attractiveness for Ukrainians was minimal. Ukraine ignored the reality in which the birth of a child in a Ukrainian family abroad or marriage to a foreigner created an insoluble dilemma. Instead of protecting the interests of citizens, the system demanded loyalty to a single passport, or complete assimilation into a foreign environment with the loss of legal ties to the Motherland.
The procedure for obtaining a Ukrainian passport required the mandatory termination of foreign citizenship. This became an insurmountable bureaucratic and psychological barrier that repelled the intellectual and investment capital of ethnic Ukrainians from developed countries from Ukraine.
As we can see, the previous model was based on the illusion of control through prohibitions. It did not stop the process of obtaining a second passport, but pushed it into a “gray zone”, forcing people to hide their status. The transition from the “post-Soviet five” to a broad coalition of 33 democratic states symbolizes the final rejection of the policy of self-isolation in favor of a modern model that recognizes a Ukrainian as a citizen regardless of his geographical or family circumstances.
A passport without borders: how the world is divided into supporters and opponents of dual citizenship
The practice of multiple (dual) citizenship and simplified procedures is widespread in the world. As of 2026, dual citizenship is officially permitted in almost 130 countries around the world, including most EU and North American countries. This rapid expansion of the “dual passport club” is driven by a desire to attract talent and capital, forcing governments to compete in the speed and ease of naturalization. At the same time, the situation with citizenship on the global stage today demonstrates a clear division between states that choose the path of cross-border mobility and those that steadfastly hold on to a monolithic national identity.
The dynamics of the modern world have forced some capitals to radically reconsider the waiting periods for the cherished document, turning years into months. Argentina is now one of the leaders in this race, offering citizenship status after only two years of legal residence, and the law does not require the applicant to burn bridges with his homeland.
Portugal has chosen a slightly different strategy, setting a five-year threshold, but making the requirements for physical presence on its territory almost symbolic – only 7 days a year open the way to a European passport. Italy holds a special place, which, through the principle of jure sanguinis (“right of blood”, the principle of acquiring citizenship at birth based on the citizenship of parents – ed.), allows ethnic Italians to regain their ancestral citizenship without any time limits on residence, effectively ignoring borders for “those by blood”.
World practice often relies on a system of privileged ties, where historical proximity is translated into legal privileges. Spain vividly illustrates this approach, where ordinary migrants wait for decades for a passport, while those from Latin America, the Philippines or Portugal go through this process in just two years. A real tectonic shift was the German reform of 2024, which legalized dual citizenship and also reduced the waiting period to 5 years, and for people with outstanding integration achievements – to 3 years. A similar evolution was experienced by the Scandinavian countries, where Norway and Denmark finally abandoned the archaic requirement to renounce previous citizenship, recognizing that a modern person is capable of being loyal to several states at the same time.
In addition to general rules, the institution of granting citizenship for special merits is gaining strength in the world, which is actually an investment by the state in its prestige and security. Malta and Austria have been using mechanisms for accelerated admission to citizenship for prominent scientists, artists, or economic strategists for decades, bypassing standard bureaucratic procedures. This logic is related to Ukrainian initiatives to simplify the process of obtaining passports for foreign volunteers, because in both cases the state puts the interests of national development and defense above formal terms of residence.
Despite the global trend towards openness, there is a powerful bloc of states that see multiple citizenship as a direct threat to sovereignty or social stability. Asian giants, including China, Japan and South Korea, along with Singapore and India, remain steadfast in their insistence on having only one nationality. For them, a passport is a symbol of absolute loyalty, where a second passport is perceived as a loophole for foreign influence, espionage or tax manipulation. In Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, as well as in the Caucasus, particularly in Azerbaijan, this issue also lies in the plane of national security and the prevention of internal divisions.
The argument of opponents of dual status is based on several fundamental pillars, not the least of which is social justice. In Austria or wealthy Gulf monarchies such as the UAE and Kuwait, citizenship is considered an exclusive privilege that gives access to enormous state resources, so its “handing out” is perceived as creating a privileged class with excessive rights.
Moreover, many governments see a second passport as a tool for avoiding military service or paying taxes, which is especially critical for countries with high mobilization needs. For Japan, however, cultural identity remains a key factor, where the concept of the nation is so integral that the presence of another citizenship is considered incompatible with the authentic identity of a citizen.
Even within Europe, there are “islands” of strict conservatism, where the rules of naturalization resemble a fortress. Austria requires the formal renunciation of the old passport under threat of losing the new one, and Andorra has established one of the highest residency requirements in the world, lasting 20 years, with mandatory withdrawal from all other citizenships. The situation in Estonia and Lithuania demonstrates the internal conflict between birthright and naturalization, as Estonian law protects those who became citizens by birth, but punishes those who acquire the status voluntarily.
At the same time, Lithuania, despite repeated attempts at referendums, has never been able to overcome the constitutional barrier to expanding the rights to multiple citizenship. These examples prove that the path to a world passport still lies through a difficult compromise between global freedom and national hermeticity.
Dual citizenship in Ukraine: where the right ends and the threat begins
Expanding the list of countries whose citizens can obtain a Ukrainian passport under a simplified procedure opens up not only new opportunities for Ukraine, but also a zone of risks. When Ukraine opens the possibility of multiple citizenship even for citizens of states that are considered friendly, the main danger does not disappear along with the cutting off of Russia and its allies. The government’s decision poses a threat to national security, because for the intelligence services of enemy states, such a scheme is much more valuable than brute force penetration, because it does not break down the door, but uses an open gate.
The most serious risk is associated with agent penetration, when a Ukrainian passport becomes not a sign of a real connection with the state, but a tool for legalizing the necessary person within the country. An agent of influence can act as a citizen of an EU country or another partner of Ukraine who has come to work, invest, consult, engage in public projects, or apply for a position. Formally, such a person looks acceptable, but it is this acceptability that creates a dangerous cover: fewer questions are asked of him, his documents are more trusted, and his contacts are less wary.
Through multiple citizenship, such a person can gradually enter Ukrainian institutions, professional circles, expert circles, defense projects, the energy sector, logistics, digital infrastructure or structures related to reconstruction. Not only direct access to state secrets is dangerous for national security, but also access to people, routes, procedures, vulnerabilities and the internal logic of decision-making. The war has shown that information about supplies, movements, purchases, personnel conflicts or technical vulnerabilities can sometimes be no less valuable than a classified document.
A separate problem is that a passport of a friendly state does not guarantee the political purity of the person using it. Hostile intelligence services can recruit, blackmail or use citizens of third countries, as well as people with dual ties, business dependencies, family in dangerous jurisdictions or hidden financial interests. In such a situation, a Ukrainian passport can become a second layer of protection for a person who, outwardly, has no direct relationship with the aggressor state, but may work in its interests.
No less dangerous is the conflict of loyalty, especially when it comes to civil servants, military personnel, advisors, employees of strategic enterprises or people close to decision-making. Two passports can mean two legal fields, two systems of obligations and two centers of political pressure. In peacetime, this could be presented as a personal legal circumstance, but during wartime, such duality becomes a matter of trust: the state must understand whose interests a person serves in a moment of crisis, when decisions need to be made quickly and without internal bargaining.
Even between partners, disputes can arise over weapons, money, trade, borders, sanctions, refugees or post-war reconstruction. If a person with two passports holds a sensitive position, he may find himself in a situation where his personal status, property, family, or political future depend not only on Ukraine. For the state, this is a risk not because every holder of a second passport is automatically disloyal, but because the security system should not be built on the assumption of good intentions.
Military service only exacerbates this problem, because during martial law, citizenship is associated not only with rights, but also with the defense of the country. A person with two passports may try to use a foreign document as a way to avoid mobilization restrictions, presenting himself to the state not as a citizen of Ukraine, but as a foreigner. In this case, the second passport becomes not a biographical detail, but a practical tool for escaping the obligations that other citizens bear.
An even more complicated situation arises when Ukraine considers a person its citizen and extends military service to him, and another state begins to protect him as its own citizen. The internal issue of defense can turn into a diplomatic conflict, where each individual case will create a dangerous precedent. For a country at war, such uncertainty affects the manageability of the system: the rules should be clear before the crisis, and not be clarified under the pressure of a scandal.
The political dimension also directly affects national security, because citizenship gives the right to influence the government. If a large number of new citizens permanently live abroad, do not pay taxes in Ukraine, do not go through mobilization restrictions, do not depend on Ukrainian hospitals, schools, tariffs and security solutions, but participate in elections, the balance of responsibility will be upset. The voice of a person who does not live with the consequences of his own political choice can become a convenient resource for populists or forces associated with foreign interests.
Such political tourism is dangerous not because of the number of passports in itself, but because of the possibility of organized influence on elections through groups of voters who are outside the Ukrainian reality. In the post-war period, when society is exhausted, the economy will require unpopular decisions, and reconstruction will open up huge financial flows, external political influence can be disguised as normal citizen participation in the democratic process. This is where the passport becomes not just a document, but also a tool for accessing Ukrainian politics.
Social tension will inevitably grow if citizens inside the country see the difference between those who bear responsibilities and those who receive rights without the same burden. People who live under shelling, pay taxes, lose their jobs, undergo mobilization, or wait for relatives from the front will react sharply to the appearance of “new Ukrainians” with strong foreign passports, access to rights, and the ability to return to a safer jurisdiction at any time. This is not a petty emotion, but a question of the internal stability of the state.
Budgetary risk also has a security dimension, because the social system during war and reconstruction is working on the edge. New citizens may be entitled to benefits, pensions, medical services, and other state guarantees, even though they did not participate in financing this system through taxes in Ukraine. If the mechanism is opened without clear conditions, the state risks creating an additional burden on the budget, which is already supporting the army, displaced persons, the wounded, infrastructure, and post-war reconstruction.
A Ukrainian passport can also become a transit tool for people who do not need Ukraine as a political community. For some applicants, it can be a way to get more convenient travel, simplify business schemes, take advantage of international opportunities, or secure a fallback legal status. Such a person does not necessarily seek to integrate, work on reconstruction, or link the future with Ukrainian society, but he receives a document that has political weight and opens access to rights.
The problem of multiple citizenship for Ukraine lies primarily in security, not in beautiful slogans about openness to the world. During war, a passport opens up access for foreigners to the state from within, and therefore the lack of strict filters, unclear legislative norms, an ill-conceived mechanism, and every loophole can become potential risks to the security of our state.
