When the political elite and Ukrainian society face failure, crisis, war or disappointment, the past is the first to come under suspicion. Not in the sense of in-depth analysis of mistakes or understanding of heritage, but the usual ritual of criticizing or punishing those who can no longer answer. They were believed in, idealized, elevated to the rank of symbols of national salvation. But they should have stepped down from the political pedestal, suffered defeat or died, as the same people, even close associates, made them guilty of everything. In statelessness, “wrong turn”, in the fact that they “didn’t resist”, “didn’t prove”, “couldn’t”. Such a sequence in Ukraine has been repeated for centuries, and it is not only a historical paradox, but also a deep political and psychological construction, in which no current government wants to admit its participation in the failure, shifting the blame to its predecessors. This is how one of the deepest social mechanisms of Ukrainian history is formed, which is not limited to the political elite, it is rooted in society, and that is why it has such stability in different eras.
The past as a defendant: how Ukrainians create idols for themselves, and then blame them
In the Ukrainian political culture, one stable model of behavior was historically formed, which gradually turned into a national habit. This is a reflexive transfer of responsibility for modern difficulties and miscalculations to “those who came before us” – previous governments, ancient historical decisions, conditional ancestors who, they say, did everything wrong, made a mistake or betrayed. As soon as criticism is heard, the answer is already ready: “That was before us!” More than one generation of officials and citizens has grown up on this convenient explanation, who can always find an external or past factor that is more to blame than themselves.
In public discourse, this is presented as a sober explanation of the circumstances, as well as an analytical view of the context. At the same time, the government not only feeds on this narrative, but also becomes its direct creator, but in fact, behind it is the reluctance to admit one’s own mistakes and, even more, to correct them. Every new government begins with the obligatory demonstration of “inherited chaos” to absolve itself of even a shred of responsibility. And there is nothing unique about this: political inheritance is always accompanied by conflict.
Ukrainian history interweaves a series of political defeats, a succession of idealizations, disappointments and devaluations. At different times, society converged around strong figures who offered at least some hope – military, political or spiritual. They were believed in, idealized, elevated to the rank of symbols of national salvation. But as soon as they left the political Olympus, were defeated or died, they became guilty of all the troubles, as historical facts eloquently testify.
In 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was hailed as the Messiah. Folk songs glorified him as “the sun from behind the clouds”, the Orthodox Church sang prayers, and in Kyiv he entered Sophia Square as a winner. He was called “the savior of Russia”, enlightened by God’s grace. But several decades later, especially after the decline of Cossack statehood in the second half of the 17th century, historical memory turned against him.
In the annals of the end of the century, there are claims that it was Khmelnitsky who “gave Ukraine to Moscow”, “got confused in the choice of an ally”, “signed a fatal agreement”. Its alliance with Moscow was no longer considered a forced step under the pressure of war, but was perceived as a strategic mistake. In the 18th century, it turned into a symbol of disaster, distance from Europe, loss of subjectivity. Khmelnitsky has not changed, but society has changed — he needed someone who could be considered guilty. And the most convenient is a dead hero.
During the 1680s and 1700s, Ivan Mazepa was the most stable hetman in history. Kyiv experienced a cultural boom, new churches were opened, the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy lived on his patronage, he personally defended the interests of the foreman before the royal court. Evidence of deep respect for him on the part of the Cossack leadership was preserved in the letters, but when he switched to the side of the Swedes in 1708, all of this came to nothing.
Zaporizhzhya Sich declared Mazepa a traitor, although part of her senior staff had sworn loyalty to him a year ago. After the Poltava defeat in 1709, Mazepa is widely perceived as a destroyer of stability, not as a political rebel. It is he, and not the Moscow army, who becomes a symbol of defeat. His body, buried in exile, does not return to his native land. All previous merits are erased, because the defeated have no right to excuse. And again, all the blame is on the one who left the circle of obedience. Even those who were close to him were the first to refuse.
Petro Doroshenko became the hetman at the most difficult moment — split, internal war, pressure from three sides. He entered into an alliance with the Ottoman Empire, trying to save at least a fragment of integrity. And although at first his support was obvious – among colonels, foremen, townspeople – within a few years these same allies began to turn their weapons against him. He was not overthrown by foreigners, but betrayed by his closest associate – Ivan Samoilovych. It was by order of the Moscow command, but with the participation of the left-bank sergeant, that Doroshenko was isolated, stripped of his mace, and imprisoned in eternal political isolation. He who fought for unity became guilty of division. The one who negotiated to save autonomy became a “traitor to the faith.”
In April 1918, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi was accepted as a figure of salvation. After the anarchy, Bolshevik terror and political chaos of the Central Rada, the majority of military units, officials, representatives of the urban intelligentsia, entrepreneurs and part of the foreman welcomed his coup as a chance to return to order. His election as hetman was publicly approved by a gathering of farmers in Kyiv, where slogans about the restoration of statehood were heard. His hetman letter was supported by university professors, scientists, artists, as well as Kyiv merchants. Ukrainian newspapers wrote about the “return of legitimacy.” Skoropadskyi’s government began the restoration of the state administration, founded the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, developed a network of secondary and higher schools with the Ukrainian language of instruction, and resumed the work of diplomatic missions.
In the first months of his administration, he received wide support, especially among right-wing circles, moderate Democrats and owners. However, already in the summer of 1918, socialists accused him of “restoration of the old order”, “oppression of the peasants” and “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”, and left intellectuals – of “treason of the revolution”. Although Skoropadsky did not cancel the land reform completely, but only stopped the spontaneous distribution of land, he was presented as a protégé of the landlords. At the same time, the alliance with Germany, necessary for the stabilization of the state front, was interpreted as “selling Ukraine.”
In December 1918, the hetman left Kyiv under pressure from the rebels, who had previously approved of his rule. In the following decades, his name was erased from historical discourse. Even in emigre circles of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, he was remembered as a “singer of order”, but guilty of “extinguishing the national fire”. He was blamed for the defeat of statehood, although it was his government that provided the foundation for the first institutions. The political environment that swore loyalty to him publicly disowned Skoropadskyi, his name was not spoken in a positive context until the 1990s.
Simon Petliura became a hero immediately after the fall of the hetman. In January 1919, he headed the Directory, which entered Kyiv as a victorious force. He was met by crowds, newspapers called him “leader of the people” and “defender of Ukrainian independence.” His photos were printed on the covers, and his appeals were distributed as manifestos of a new stage. Meanwhile, he led the army in extremely difficult conditions without a supply system, with a growing anarchist movement, without the support of the West. At the same time, his staff included the same socialists who rose up against Skoropadsky just yesterday.
Already in the summer of 1919, after a series of military defeats, Petliura began to be criticized, accused of weakness, inability to unite the front and inefficiency. Jewish communities accused his army of pogroms that he was unable or unwilling to stop. Western diplomacy also lost confidence in him. Participation in the alliance with Poland in 1920 caused an even greater flurry of accusations: Petliura was called a “traitor of Galicia”, “Pilsudski’s man”, as well as “a failure of strategic thinking”. After the final defeat of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in November 1920, Petlyura found himself in exile. After his assassination in Paris in 1926, part of the emigration even avoided mentioning his name in public publications.
Mykhailo Hrushevskyi in 1906–1914 was an undisputed authority, historian No. 1. His “History of Ukraine-Rus” was in every conscious Ukrainian home. In 1917, he was elected the head of the Central Rada and in the first months he was admired and met as the personification of Ukrainian identity. His portraits hung on the walls, and his addresses were programs of action. But already in the autumn of 1917, he was accused of “passivity”, “socialist romanticism” and “inability to act”.
In 1918, after his removal from power, Hrushevsky gradually lost his authority among active political circles. In 1924, he returned to Ukraine, hoping to work as a scientist, but even in the USSR he was criticized for “bourgeois nationalism”, “historical naivety” and “inability to build a state”. His socialist beliefs did not save him, until the end of his life he was under political surveillance. After his death, his name was not even mentioned, Hrushevsky became a symbol of a lost idea, but not because of his mistakes, but because he was turned into a convenient target.
How Ukrainian presidents turned from leaders to culprits
The historical scenario, in which the leader is first praised and later blamed for all failures, is repeated in modern Ukraine. The names change, but the mechanism remains the same: first trust and hopes, then disappointment, public devaluation and transfer of responsibility to only one figure. Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych, Petro Poroshenko, Volodymyr Zelensky — at the time of their arrival, each of them had either a significant level of support, or at least political legitimacy, which was formed as a result of disappointment in their predecessor. Everyone was praised both publicly and behind the scenes. Everyone gave new faces a platform for career growth. And almost all of them over time received public depreciation, accusations and dismantling of their political reputation from the same faces.
In 1991, Leonid Kravchuk was hailed as the man who peacefully led Ukraine out of the USSR. He was called a wise negotiator, a flexible and cunning strategist, a “real parliamentarian.” It was he who led the referendum on independence, signed the Bialowieza Agreements, and for the first time put Ukrainian foreign policy on an equal footing with Russia and the West. But already in 1993-94, a reverse wave begins: he was accused of “privatization to please the nomenclature”, launching hyperinflation, weakness in the face of Russian pressure in the matter of the fleet, Crimea, and gas.
In addition, the political forces that grew up next to him accused him of “economic collapse”, “betrayed hopes of independence”, “preserving the Soviet vertical”. After the defeat in the 1994 elections, Kravchuk was publicly called “accidental”, “unsystematic”, “the person who started corruption”. Even in the 2000s, he became the target of political ridicule from politicians who started their careers under his tenure. It was those who grew up in his environment who later accused him of “understated thinking.” It is indicative: when in power he is a statesman, and after that he is a “combinator”.
In 1994, Leonid Kuchma came under the slogan of “reforms and technocracy”. He was supported by industrialists, part of the democratic intelligentsia, as well as those who wanted to “finally start modernization.” Yushchenko (Chairman of the NBU, Prime Minister), Tymoshenko (Vice Prime Minister), Medvedchuk (Head of AP), Yanukovych (Prime Minister), Poroshenko (Chairman of the Rada Committee), Lytvyn, Turchynov, Hrytsenko, Boyko appeared during his tenure. All of them received their first positions precisely during the reign of Kuchma. However, in the public space, over time, he became a symbol of oligarchization, authoritarianism, corruption, censorship, the murder of Gongadze, the tape scandal, and his shadowy second center of power — the SDPU(o).
After 2001, there was a sharp decline in trust in him. People who owed him a political start led Maidan-2004 against “his heir” — Yanukovych. At the same time, Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Turchynov – all distanced themselves. During the election of the next president, the slogans: “Ukraine without Kuchma”, although many still believe that the times of his rule were better for the country. At that time, he responded to slogans: “You will see Ukraine without Kuchma!”, and over time everyone saw it. Kuchma himself remained a toxic brand, although later attempts were made to revive his experience in the Minsk process. But even there – not as an authority, but as a “forced representative”. The blame, concentrated on him, allowed subsequent politicians to wash themselves through the contrast.
2004 — Victor Yushchenko wins with an unprecedented level of enthusiasm and confidence. His face became a symbol of the Maidan. “Yushchenko! Yushchenko!” the whole country shouted. He received full moral legitimacy and unprecedented support of the people. But already in 2005-2006 there was mass disappointment. Quarrels with Tymoshenko, resignations of governments, demoralization of the environment. Under him, corruption did not go anywhere, and the lustration he promised failed.
In 2010, Yushchenko went to the elections with 5% support. Tymoshenko, whom he raised himself, openly accused him of betraying the Maidan. The president’s associates scattered, and his image fell to “an esthete who talks about pottery, Tripoli culture and apiaries.” In public space, the image of a “soft romantic, unable to manage” appeared. Everyone who built a political career on the Maidan turned away from him.
In 2002–2003, Viktor Yanukovych looked like a compromising figure for big business, part of the East, centrists. He went through the path of governor, prime minister, candidate, and was supported by Kuchma. In 2010, he was perceived as a “stabilizer after Yushchenko’s chaos.” Odes were sung to him, especially by business elites: “professional”, “master”, “not a romantic”.
But his environment became the most closed in history. “Family”, corruption verticals, criminalization of state structures – all this caused rage in the society. In 2013, after the failure of European integration, a new round of confrontation began. Yanukovych’s former allies publicly renounced him, and even Akhmetov, who for many years was a shadow beneficiary of his regime, distanced himself. In 2014, he fled, and the politicians who worked in his Cabinet became the “opposition to Yanukovych” within a year. As a result, it is in his person that the government and society concentrate all the anger of the previous era.
2014 — Petro Poroshenko was elected with new hopes of the people and slogans: “Live in a new way”, “Army. Language. Faith”. After the war, the loss of Crimea, the shock from Yanukovych, society was waiting for a responsible, strong, pro-European leader. Poroshenko quickly concentrated power, did what Yushchenko could not: created an independent church, reformed the army, concluded an agreement with the EU. But at the same time, conflicts with anti-corruption bodies, scandals surrounding business, and corruption in Ukroboronprom began. In 2018-2019, the “post-Mayday environment” that grew up under him turned against him: activists, veterans, even “Euro-optimists”. He was accused of “privatizing the ideals of the Maidan”, “trading in war”, and “reproducing vertical influence”.
In 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyi became president with record support – 73% of the vote. Volodymyr Zelenskyi won not only thanks to his beautifully designed program, but mainly as a result of society’s reaction to Petro Poroshenko. The people placed great hopes on him for a completely different, new life. He was perceived not as a politician, but as a symbol of “changing the rules.” At the same time, the Voice Party, a part of the Servant of the People, even the anti-corruption community — all from the milieu that Poroshenko legitimized — became his critics. However, the most ardent critic of Poroshenko was and remains Zelensky, who still blames him for all his failures.
Zelenskyi’s first steps were the adoption of a number of popular laws, the launch of new projects, and a personnel revolution. But already in 2020, scandals begin: the appointment of odious figures, the weakness of the fight against oligarchs, the collapse of trust in judicial reform. In 2021, cases against activists, unprecedented pressure on the media and closure of objectionable media, accusations of “creeping revenge”. At the same time, almost none of the pre-election promises of the president were fulfilled. In 2022, the war changed everything: a new wave of support, recognition in the West. But since 2023, criticism has increased again — already from those who supported the current president in 2019.
Colleagues remain silent or distance themselves, there are loud exits from “Servant of the People”, and even the media environment, which once applauded the reforms, today asks: “where are the promised appointments?”, “where is the result of de-oligarchization?”, “where is the independence of the courts?”. Therefore, Zelenskyi did not become an exception, he is only a new face of the same historically composed scenario: first – a project of hope, then – the focus of loud disappointment. At the same time, it has one thing in common: “predecessors are to blame for everything.”
Joint responsibility of government and society
It should be noted that this mechanism is constantly repeated in all authorities. In the Ukrainian political environment, every ex is necessarily guilty. And not only presidents, but also government officials, ministers, heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, SBU, customs, tax NBU, etc. — all those who leave their positions, leaving behind a mandatory campaign of accusations by the new leaders. In the Cabinet, every successive minister says that he “inherited the collapse.” At the National Bank – that the previous one allowed “looting of reserves”. In anti-corruption bodies, the new head of SAP or NABU says that “nothing worked before him.” The first thing heard in every committee of the Verkhovna Rada is: “the reforms of the predecessors were profanation.” However, no one pleads guilty, everyone is an anti-crisis savior after someone else’s failures. Those who leave are always toxic. Those who come are right in everything. Each new command exists as a commentary on the previous one, and rarely as an independent entity. And so it has been for 34 years.
A part of Ukrainian society is also used to blaming all the troubles, including the war, on the actions of all the predecessors of our political system. Almost every previous government has already been named responsible for “abandonment of nuclear weapons”, “flirting with Russia”, “sluggish European integration”, “corruption in the army”, etc. Depending on political preferences, all presidents are called the culprits, but all of them without exception were elected by the people themselves. They were applauded, hoped for, forgiven, lived with for years.
Therefore, the truth lies not only in the responsibility of politicians and officials. She must be aware that the state is not formed by an abstract “power”, but by the choice of millions of concrete people, not always consciously and critically. What happened to Ukraine is not only the result of leaders’ miscalculations, it is a reflection of the public habit of avoiding difficult decisions, putting up with compromises, putting off the inconvenient “for later”, not going to the elections, not demanding a fair election process, not accepting the situation of “elections without a choice”. So, we are all responsible for what is happening in the country now, for how we live.
However, finding fault today is not the way forward. There is no need to choose a convenient figure again to dump the entire burden of guilt on her. The current government should analyze the mistakes not only of its predecessors, but also its own, not to make excuses, but to correct them. At the same time, every citizen should not allow himself to be passive about voting, reduce his choice to the televised image of the candidate, replace opinion with emotion. If we really want a different future, it will not be created for us, it can only be chosen and jointly responsible for it.
The habit of shifting the blame to others — be it predecessors, politicians, or abstract “society” — sooner or later returns as a responsibility from which there is no escape. And then we will no longer judge the past, but the future will judge us. And perhaps for the first time it will become clear what it is like when you, faced with a choice at the worst moment, are criticized by someone who cannot even imagine what circumstances you were in.
